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Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder
Allison Mann
Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder diagnoses have been rising steadily since
the early 1990s. Today, about 10 percent of the school-aged population has been diag-
nosed with the disorder, and prevalence is increasing steadily among preschool children
and adults. Most of the individuals diagnosed with the disorder use stimulant medications
to treat the symptoms. Both the rapidly rising number of diagnoses and the substantial
variation in prevalence and treatment utilization – across states, regions, gender, race, eth-
nicity, and socioeconomic status – have attracted attention and raised concerns about un-
der and over recognition and treatment.
The implicit justification for the increasing awareness and recognition of the disorder
is that it is a valid clinical object that matches medically-proven treatments with those
reliably expected to benefit from them. From this perspective, the uptake in prevalence
results from changes in environmental determinants or scientific advances in neurology,
psychiatry, diagnostic protocols, or pharmaceutical research. But a widespread argument
among teachers, parents, policy makers, the general public, and academic researchers – in-
cluding sociologists – is that the development and success of the disorder results from a
medicalization process. Medicalization encompasses a social construction critique that con-
tradicts the environmental/scientific advance claims, but medicalization research also em-
phasizes macro-level actors that forcibly advance the medical label and treatment. Tradi-
tionally, medicalization studies focused on the disproportionate power of the medical pro-
fession vis-a-vis patients, but more recently they have begun to emphasize a broader range
of actors pursuing a medical label – pharmaceutical companies and even consumers influ-
enced by new forms of advertising. Those arguments assume that educational institutions
act in concert with those pushing the medical label.
The goal of this dissertation is to provide an account of diagnostic prevalence and
treatment utilization (and their uneven distribution) that debunks explanations based
solely in science but that also demonstrates the insufficiency of the medicalization account.
Together, the chapters show that there is no correlation in timing between the surge in
diagnoses and the processes implied by either medicalization or scientific progress argu-
ments, there is little support in the micro-level data for a strictly medicalization account,
and there is substantial evidence that macro-level educational institutions and the school
context play a significant role in reshaping the category. The chapters emphasize that the
success of the category lies in the confluence of technoscientific innovation, social control
of troublesome behaviors, the increased activism of parents along with direct-to-consumer
pharmaceutical advertising, encroachments of the law into student discipline and into the
health care industry, the institutional needs of schools, a cultural emphasis on high aca-
demic achievement, and the influence of parallel and predecessor classifications, among
other factors. The category – a result of multiple institutions working to recraft expertise
– is a school-specific medical disorder that includes a heterogeneous symptom complex,
one that is understood differently within school and medical milieu. Although the chapters
do not disprove medicalization, they suggest that the medicalization framework overstates
the importance of medical professionals and medicine broadly defined for the success of the
category.
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In the last two decades, public attention has focused on unprecedented increases in
the numbers of children diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
and using stimulant medications to manage their conditions. On average, nearly one in
ten children in the United States has been diagnosed with the disorder, making ADHD
the most commonly diagnosed pediatric1 mental disorder (Subcommittee on Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Management, 2011). More than half of those diagnosed
use a stimulant medication as a form of treatment (Mayes et al., 2008; Rasmussen, 2009),
with sales of methylphenidate and amphetamine stimulants (sold under brand names such
as Ritalin, Vyvanse, Adderall, and Concerta) representing roughly 2.3% of the entire phar-
maceutical market (IMS Health, 2010).2
The existing sociological literature, for the most part, assumes that ADHD is the clas-
sic case of medical encroachment into ordinary human conditions. The ADHD classifica-
tion labels deviant behavior in medical terms and organizes a response in terms of med-
ical intervention, which has the effect of “medicalizing” a heterogeneous mix of (usually
male)3 troublesome behaviors (Castel et al., 1982; Conrad, 1975, 1992, 2007; Conrad and
Slodden, 2013; Freeman, 1976; Malacrida, 2004; Rafalovich, 2007; Searight and McLaren,
1998; Smith and Kronick, 1979; Timimi and Leo, 2009). Because the disorder is defined
symptomatically, by relative deficits in the areas of attentiveness, activity level, or impulse
control, medical experts are said to legitimate problems in the form of a disorder to man-
age social institutions like families and schools (Rosenberg, 2006). Although medicalization
theory has evolved to meet changing realities – most notably, the technological revolution
and the increased ability of patients to become active consumers of medical treatments
(Clarke et al., 2003, 2010; Conrad, 2005; Rose, 2007) – the continued perception of ADHD
1Although classified as a childhood disorder, accumulating research now suggests that ADHD is a life-
long disorder that persists into adulthood (Kessler et al., 2006).
2Some children also take atomoxetine (Strattera), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, or antipsy-
chotic medications to treat ADHD or comorbid conditions; often these medications are taken with stimu-
lant medications (Chai et al., 2012). Chapter 2 discusses the socio-economic determinants of drug type.
3The disorder is characterized by a significant gender skew favoring boys (Rucklidge, 2008).
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as a defining example of medicalization (Conrad, 2013; Conrad and Bergey, 2014; Frances,
2013; Rafalovich, 2013) raises important questions about the influence of medical institu-
tions on the incidence and prevalence of the disorder.
Early studies of medicalization focused on the power of the medical profession to ex-
pand into new areas for the purpose of securing adherence to social norms (Conrad, 1975;
Conrad and Schneider, 1980a; Freidson, 2006; Szasz, 1974). Studies of medicalization in
recent years, however, have broadened to account for the expansion of biomedicine into
an even wider range of areas (and for a wider range of purposes) through advances in bio-
engineering, genomics, and pharmaceuticals and other technoscientific innovations (Clarke
et al., 2003, 2010); studies also have started to recognize new “engines” of medicalization
such as patients, pharmaceutical companies, and managed care (Conrad and Leiter, 2004;
Conrad, 2005). By doing so, medicalization research has begun to de-emphasize causal
claims but continues to point to a re-characterization of the modality with which a sub-
ject is approached – one that moves from moral to technical or from social to individual.
The mechanical application of the medicalization framework to an ever-wider range of phe-
nomena has led some sociologists to question its usefulness; the emphasis on the medical
“frame” is said to detract attention from sites of resistance (Bury, 2006), counter trends
towards demedicalization (Halfmann, 2012), and the “interplay of medicine and other dom-
inant institutions” (Medina and McCranie, 2011, p. 139).
Arguing that the medicalization account overstates the importance of medicine (in its
broadest form) for the success of the ADHD category, this dissertation takes the perspec-
tive that the application of a medical frame to a social problem “should not be the con-
clusion of [the] analysis” (Rose, 2007, pp. 701-702). The emergence and establishment of
ADHD as a medical category is better understood as just “one interesting institutional
layer of an increasingly formalized process of social control over problems in modern life”
(Medina and McCranie, 2011, p. 139). Another way to say this is that ADHD a node in a
broader network through which the interests of several different actors – parents, children,
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schools, medical professionals, pharmaceutical companies, and experts in therapeutic dis-
ciplines – are translated. The problems of inattention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity, the
diagnostic category, the patient identity and behaviors in response to the category, and the
various forms of expert knowledge and intervention (medical, educational, legal, or thera-
peutic) all are part of the network that constructs and maintains the ADHD classification
(Eyal, 2013; Martin, 2007); from this perspective, expertise is not simply the possession
of the powerful but is distributed across actors and ultimately is the product of negotia-
tion among them. Accordingly, I argue that medicalization (by itself) cannot explain why
ADHD prevalence has increased.
The clinical nomenclature that describes or includes the constellation of symptoms of
inattention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity has changed over time; medicalization studies
would say that the changing nomenclature reflects a process through which the diagnos-
tic category expanded because of the dominance of medical approaches to the remediation
of social problems. The changes, however, reflect not only increased knowledge about the
nature and causes of the symptoms, but also the institutional needs of schools (including
the institutional channels through which students are identified), treatment protocols, and
changing socio-demographics. Furthermore, the changes in diagnostic criteria have pro-
duced changes in the types of children who are included within the diagnostic category.
Those consequences, in turn, affect the range of treatment options and alter the stigma at-
taching to the category and to the underlying symptoms. As I will show, the success of the
category (reflected in its extension – first to middle- and upper-class children and then to
adults) has caused it to shift as the coalition has changed.4
All of this is to say that ADHD is an example of what Ian Hacking (1999) refers to
as an “interactive” kind – a classificatory type that changes by means of interacting with
4Conrad and Slodden (2013) argue that the expansion of the category to include adults reflects a med-
icalization process. But, as I will demonstrate, the expansion – particularly insofar as it has resulted in a
reversal of the gender gap in treatment – is in tension with a social deviance interpretation of boy behav-
ior. And medical expansion, in this case, occurred only after adult diagnosis had become routine.
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what is classified. The argument I develop is stated succinctly by Hacking (1999, pp. 102-
03):
[T]here has been a historical succession of ideas: fidgety, hyperactive, attention
deficit, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Perhaps the children to
which these terms have been applied over the course of this century are them-
selves different. Perhaps children diagnosed with ADHD are different from the
children once called fidgety – in part because of the theories held about them,
and the remedies that have been put in place around their bad habits. Con-
versely, it may be that the resulting changes in the children have contributed
to the evolution of ideas about problem children.
An ADHD diagnosis interacts with individuals and families through a process that Hack-
ing describes as a “looping effect” (Hacking, 1998). The expert-created category affects
individuals and families (and groups of individuals and families), who internalize the cat-
egory and alter their self conceptions and behaviors in response to it. Others – parents,
teachers, and caretakers – treat the categorized individuals in accordance with the label.
The altered behavior of the categorized persons also influences the experts who must mod-
ify the category to account for the new behaviors enabled by it (Hacking, 1999, p. 104).
This means that the act of diagnosis is not simply the exertion of medical power; rather,
the diagnosis is established and maintained within a network that reflects a prior history
of looping effects (Eyal et al., 2010).
In the following chapters, I argue that ADHD is a school-specific medical disorder
that includes a heterogeneous symptom complex. It is also an amalgam of medical, edu-
cational and legal perspectives. In my examination of the embedding of ADHD in schools,
I do not assume that schools act as agents of a medicalization process. Instead, I examine
the conditions under which schools defer to (or challenge) medical expertise. Ultimately,
I show that schools are an institutional funnel that leads to a two-tier system, with differ-
ent benefits associated with the diagnosis for different actors, depending on the nature of
the symptoms (impulsivity and hyperactivity on the one hand, or inattention, on the other
hand) and on the characteristics of the child being diagnosed (especially race, class, and
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gender).
I begin in Chapter 1 with a socio-historical analysis of the emergence of the category
of ADHD. The problematization of poor school performance of middle class children cre-
ated a new type – children whose attention problems kept them from reaching their full
academic potential. From inception, disorders of attention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity
have been intimately connected with other learning and behavioral disorders. The differ-
entiation of these symptoms led to the creation of a diagnostic category comprising a loose
hybrid of inattention on the one hand and behavior problems on the other. By grafting
inattention onto the category of hyperactivity, psychiatrists joined behavioral and cog-
nitive deficits in a way that distinguished ADHD from learning disabilities, intellectual
disabilities, and other behavioral disorders. The category stabilized when adults began to
recognize symptoms in themselves – and to ascribe the characteristics to explain their own
past failings. Although the process that established the disorder can be attributed, in part,
to the role of pharmaceuticals in treating the symptoms, it is far from accurate to say that
medical experts exerted a prevailing influence over the creation of the category. Nor is it
purely a story of pharmaceutical or technological determinism – one in which advances in
drug treatment or brain imaging ineluctably led to the stabilization of the category (com-
pare Barker, 2011, and her discussion of the use of Lyrica to validate the condition of Fi-
bromyalgia syndrome). Chapters 2-4 pick up this point by presenting sustained empirical
attention to the core questions underlying the medicalization thesis as well as the issue of
collaboration (and conflict) between medical and educational experts.
Chapter 2 uses quantitative data to address the claim that ADHD results from a med-
icalization process in which medical professionals and pharmaceutical companies collab-
orate with schools and parents to produce a medical category that facilitates the control
of deviant behaviors. Although scholars have recast the medicalization argument to move
beyond the causal level, it is important to examine whether the density of medical pro-
fessionals and the availability of medical treatments affect diagnosis, the use and types of
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drug treatments for children with a diagnosis, and the enrollment of children with a diag-
nosis in special education programs. Overall, my findings suggest that medical dominance
is not a sufficient explanation for the wide variations in prevalence or treatment utiliza-
tion. At best, it partially explains the success of predecessor classifications such as hyper-
activity and minimal brain dysfunction, classifications that were created and controlled by
psychiatrists. Although parents, schools, and other experts use medical knowledge, they
also draw on other knowledge practices to seek different ends. To better understand the
resulting object, I examine the extent to which racial, ethnic, socioeconomic background,
and state-level resources contribute to diagnosis and treatment outcomes. In doing so, I
observe class and welfare state effects. I show that there is a two-tier system in which rich
parents opt for medications while poor children are funneled into special education. Then,
I present evidence of a clear difference in the types of medications used for children that
come from different socio-economic and racial or ethnic backgrounds. The wealthier, white
children are more likely to receive stimulants, essentially performance enhancers, while
poor, black children are more likely to be controlled by anti-psychotic medications or to be
placed into special education programs. These findings suggest that any pre-existing coali-
tion is coming apart at lines drawn by class. If medicalization is about social control, then
it is missing the role of the stimulants. If it is about medical dominance, it is missing the
influence of middle and upper class white parents. Even if ADHD began as a product of
a medicalization process, I show that it is no longer quite that. It is a focal point around
which there is negotiation among many different interests. The category that results is so
heterogeneous that it makes little sense to refer to it as a “medical” object.
Chapter 3 uses a longitudinal dataset that tracks a sample of kindergarteners over
time within the context of their schools to examine pathways to diagnosis and variations
across schools. In addition, because this dataset includes parent- and teacher-reported
socio-behavioral skills, I develop measures of symptoms that I use to examine the extent
to which the effects of the socio-demographic predictors discussed in Chapter 2 are medi-
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ated by symptom differences across these groups. Although medicalization theory would
predict that the disorder is a reaction to a behavioral problem, I show that the disorder
has a very strong cognitive aspect for students in high SES groups and schools, and that
this emerges not just in young adulthood, but also in the early grades. I also show that
teacher- and parent-reported symptoms have independent effects on diagnosis for white,
high SES children, but parent-reported symptoms have virtually no effects on diagnosis for
poor, low SES children. This finding demonstrates the role that the parental clout of high
SES children has on diagnosis. The impact of class on diagnostic expansion is not atypical.
Ong-Dean (2006) discusses the learning disabilities category in the 1970s when there was a
“high road” to diagnosis for privileged students with mild difficulties; yet once the category
fully was institutionalized, the category became more heavily populated by lower class stu-
dents that also had more severe difficulties (a “low road”). That pattern was influenced by
the concurrent legal pressure to minimize the number of minority students being labeled
with mental retardation. Of course, the association of learning disabilities with students of
lower potential had the effect of repelling privileged students. I compare the trajectories of
ADHD and learning disabilities in the first three chapters.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the U.S. special education domain, as an active bat-
tlefield where educators contest the ADHD diagnosis and its counterpart in special edu-
cation law – the Other Health Impaired (OHI) classification. I focus specifically on what
happens when collaboration among professionals fails. Delving into special education due
process hearings, I consider how the medical category interacts with educators and parent
advocates in the context of legal disputes about accommodations and services for children
with ADHD. I use the disputes to assess the nature of contestation between the interested
parties and the types of claims that are validated when disputes do emerge. With this ap-
proach, I evaluate the capacity of the classification to extend into other contexts, as med-
icalization theory would predict. If the diagnostic category can be successfully imported
into other institutional settings, it would open the door for treatment, reimbursement, and
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public insurance, which it assuredly does, as well as disability status and special education,
where its significance is less clear.
Even though the medical diagnostic process explicitly accounts for impairment within
the school setting, schools do not defer to medical insights into biological determinants
of learning challenges and behaviors. I show how medical expertise is implicated in four
distinct areas – diagnostic credibility and initial eligibility determinations as well as the
assignment to eligibility categories, how schools determine appropriate placement for eli-
gible students, how schools address drug therapies or the failure of children to utilize drug
therapies, and the consequences of diagnosis for school disciplinary proceedings. Although
medicine supplies an individualized, biological response to learning and behavioral fail-
ure, schools are loathe to provide educational programs and services to children based on
a medical label if those programs and services would equally benefit students facing other
(non-neurological) academic challenges. This skepticism is aggravated by public opinion
about the true nature of the disorder. This analysis shows how the individualizing aspect
of medicine is in tension with the law’s desire to ensure a level playing field, even in the
context of a statute whose cornerstone is individualization.
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Chapter 1
The Origins of the Medical Model for
Understanding Childhood Abnormalities
of Attention, Hyperactivity, and
Impulsivity
10
The ADHD epidemic1 has been explained in strikingly different ways. Increased symp-
tom levels have been attributed to environmental causes, including toxins like fluorescent
lighting or lead poisoning, maternal risk factors like smoking and alcohol use, and the mis-
use of modern technology like excessive television watching and video game playing (Chris-
takis et al., 2004; David et al., 1972; David, 1974; Froehlich et al., 2009; Ott, 1976; Nigg,
2009; Pasamanick et al., 1956; Smith et al., 2007; Swing et al., 2010). Some point to a
gene-environment interaction that would explain both the effects of environmental influ-
ences on increased risk and evidence that ADHD is heritable (Banerjee et al., 2007; Mill
and Petronis, 2008). But it is unlikely that an environmental cause would be responsi-
ble for increased prevalence of a whole aggregate of symptoms and symptom groupings
(see Eyal, 2013). Another significant literature posits the unchanging nature of the symp-
toms and accounts for increased prevalence by pointing to progress in the fields of neu-
rology and psychiatry that facilitated the recognition of symptoms (Faraone et al., 2003;
Polanczyk et al., 2007, 2014; Smith et al., 2007). This explanation also is insufficient, as I
discuss, both because medical advances have not always led to increased diagnostic rates
and because efforts to define and re-define the category often have occurred in the face of
acknowledged gaps in medical research. Moreover, the problems of distraction, impulsivity,
and hyperactivity are not strictly “natural.” Hyperactivity and impulsivity obviously are
context-dependent, but even distraction became a problem in a specific place and time; art
historian Jonathan Crary, for example, explains that the problem of distraction emerged
when distractibility was “articulated in terms of socially determined norms” as “part of the
formation of a modern technological milieu” (Crary, 2001, p. 29).2
Social construction arguments assume that increased prevalence is not an inevitable
1Popular press writers and academics have referred to the increasing prevalence of ADHD diagnoses as
an “epidemic” (Clarke, 2011; Diller, 2011a; Koerth-Baker, 2013; Editorial, 2013).
2This premise is stylized in Nobel-prize winning work in economics. Herbert Simon – a political sci-
entist – articulates the concept of attention economics to refer to the management of information that
treats human attention as a scarce commodity (Simon, 1971), while Daniel Kahneman – a psychologist –
expands on the capacity idea by proposing that performance on a secondary task depends on the difficulty
of a primary task (Kahneman, 1973).
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response to scientific progress or a result of higher symptom levels. Instead, ADHD preva-
lence is said to result from the greater availability of services and treatments and the greater
understanding by parents, teachers, and children of the benefits that a diagnosis can pro-
vide (Mayes et al., 2009; Garfield et al., 2012; Olfson et al., 2003). By looking beyond nat-
ural causes and medical progress, social construction arguments make an important contri-
bution to our understanding of the epidemic. However, because they emphasize individual-
level motivations for increased prevalence, social construction arguments can only go so
far; in particular, they do not specify macro preconditions – the conditions that allowed
these motivations to appear for the first time in the late 20th century.
The macro precondition that has been discussed in the literature is medicalization –
the power of the medical profession to define a broader range of behaviors as problems re-
quiring a medical solution (Conrad, 1975, 1976; Singh, 2006). Evidence for medicalization
is found in the predominant use of stimulant drugs to treat the core symptoms and the
successive re-iteration of diagnostic criteria to cover a more heterogeneous range of symp-
toms. The medicalization argument, however, cannot account for increased prevalence
without specifying individual-level or interactional mechanisms. Early medicalization anal-
yses pointed to the jurisdiction-grabbing efforts of experts (Conrad, 1975, 1976), but that
explanation cannot be reconciled with the fact that the weakening of the medical profes-
sion acted in concert with the construction of ADHD. The introduction of managed care,
the increased advocacy of consumers, and the power of pharmaceutical companies (among
other factors) have limited the ability of the medical profession to claim and treat behav-
iors as medical. Accordingly, more recent medicalization arguments temper the power of
the medical profession with that of many other actors – biotechnology, pharmaceutical
companies, managed care, and consumer activism (Conrad, 2005; Clarke et al., 2003). Yet
those approaches retain a definitional emphasis on medical categories and treatments at
the expense of considering whether the qualifier “medical” says much about ADHD.3
3I argue below and in Chapter 2 that attempts to bring in new actors under loose frameworks such as
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In this chapter, I examine the socio-historical context in which ADHD emerged and
became a widely-used, yet heterogeneous, diagnostic category, the predominant treatment
for which is stimulant drugs. In doing so, I advance an alternative explanation for the so-
called ADHD epidemic. In short, I show that while the category began as a problematiza-
tion of the poor self-control of poor, minority, immigrant kids, this is not how it ended up.
It morphed into a problematization of achievement gaps – of the poor school performance
of middle class children who were supposed to do better. This was the key condition that
explains why what failed in the past, has succeeded in the present. With this shift, there
finally was a strong enough coalition behind the diagnosis; in other words, the diagnosis
was able to translate the interests of clients and thereby secure their cooperation. The di-
agnosis became a way in which middle-class parents could conceive of themselves, and also
of their kids, and hence a process of looping began – which ultimately led to diagnostic
changes to account for differences in ADHD patients (Hacking, 1998).
After a brief presentation of the current diagnostic criteria and the conventional his-
tory of the disorder, my account emphasizes several processes that shaped its construction
and success. To begin with, I demonstrate how ADHD came to be delineated as a disor-
der distinct from learning disabilities, conduct and emotional problems, and intellectual
disabilities, despite overlapping symptoms and uncertain etiology. The original inclusion
of a large range of symptoms under the minimal brain dysfunction (MBD) label – an etio-
logical label that grew out of research on brain injury – was useful when subjects were in
institutional settings; however, it proved insufficient once experts began to respond to the
“engines of medicalization” (Conrad, 2005) or the more heterogeneous “scientific establishment” (Clarke
et al., 2003) attempt to keep the “critical” mantle of the medicalization argument – that medicine dom-
inates and silences patients by turning human problems into technical ones and de-politicizing social
relations. More fundamentally, those frameworks do not consider education or law and how those domains
interact with medicine along fuzzy interfaces. As a result, they pay insufficient attention to the way that
ADHD is co-produced between parents, school districts, doctors, and insurance companies such that the
qualifier “medical” says little about it. To be sure, the medication itself plays a significant role – even more
so than the professionals themselves; it does so because it translates the interests of all parties in most
situations. Put differently, without medication, the disorder arguably would not exist, but medication’s
effects are situated in a historical place and time. The effects of the substance alone were insufficient to
produce a successful diagnostic category.
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cognitive and behavioral problems of children in schools. The political dynamic influenc-
ing learning disabilities and the resumption of research into the effects of stimulant drugs
on children’s socio-behavioral skills both contributed to the differentiation of hyperactivity
and learning disabilities – even though this demarcation was never complete.
Next, I examine the progression of ideas regarding the core symptoms of what be-
came the “medical” category of ADHD, showing that each of the major symptoms was
regarded as a central symptom at different times. This process is reflected in the succes-
sive re-iteration of diagnostic criteria from DSM-II to DSM-V, which at least superficially
suggests a medicalization process (Conrad and Potter, 2000). However, I argue below that
the successive iterations of the category owe as much to a looping process demarcating it
from other pediatric mental disorders (and thereby enhancing its clinical validity) as to
expansion of the range of covered symptoms or populations.4 I show that there is no corre-
lation in timing between the surge in diagnoses and various processes that are implied by
the medicalization thesis. And diagnostic criteria did not really change in any significant
way from 1980 to 2013, so the post-1980 increase is unrelated to diagnostic expansion.
No less importantly, I show that essential aspects of the object, especially the discov-
ery of the paradoxical effects of stimulants, were already in place in the 1940s-1950s, and
yet did not give rise to a surge in diagnoses or medication use. This point is particularly
important because the medical profession was at the height of its power. The advent of
patients’ rights groups, the anti-psychiatry movement, and managed care are associated
with the rise in diagnoses, so medical dominance is inversely correlated with the epidemic.
Furthermore, much of the crucial research is done not by medical researchers or biologists
but by psychologists, who latch onto areas where the medical profession is weak, namely
the buffer area between the mental (still controlled by psychiatry, psychoanalysis, etc.)
and the physical (controlled by medicine proper). Anyway, all of this indicates that the
4To be sure, the diagnostic criteria broadened (particularly when attention was added), but the suc-
cessive iterations reflect an effort to increase reliability in the clinical diagnostic process when clinicians
increasingly were asked to treat new types of patients.
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epidemic is not the result of the power of the medical profession, but its weakness.
To conclude I examine the development of consensus in the medical community re-
garding the treatment of ADHD with stimulant drugs and the extension of the category to
reach adults. The current “epidemic” – which started in the 1990s – has been connected
with aggressive pharmaceutical marketing by medicalization theorists. Although phar-
maceutical marketing has had an effect on prescription practices (King and Essick, 2013;
Schwarz, 2013b), I argue that the widespread acceptance of the category cannot be ex-
plained solely by reference to trumped-up demand generated through advertising. The
current “epidemic” is not the first one; there was a first wave and a moral panic about
it in the 1960s, which inhibited for a while the widespread use of medications with chil-
dren. It eventually gave way to a second epidemic, not because of marketing, but because
of new understandings about the core symptoms of the disorder. Moreover, medical doc-
tors were not active proponents of the category; rather, they gradually acquiesced to the
combined pressure of parents, pharmaceutical companies, and schools. Parents and ado-
lescents, with the professional advice of educators and medical experts and the mass of
information available to the public, took an active role in balancing the risks of drug side
effects (some quite serious such as heart problems and stunted growth) against the risks
of academic failure and school disciplinary problems, all in the context of moral, politi-
cal, and social issues raised by prescribing drugs to children. Increased parent activism
opened the door for the extension of the category to include adults. It had been known for
some time that some of the symptoms persisted into adulthood, but as the understanding
of what was core shifted, parents began to identify with the category. Eventually, the di-
agnostic criteria were revised to facilitate adult diagnoses.5 I show how the disorder has
become a way in which adults (including parents) can conceive of themselves and also of
their kids. I attribute the widespread success of the disorder to a looping process, since
5To be sure, genetic research and the discovery that brain scans of adults showed similar abnormalities
to those of children with the disorder greatly contributed to the extension of the category to adults, but
those conditions were insufficient.
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this pressure was not coming out of nowhere, and was not unrelated to medical theories
and classifications, but, at the same time, the success of the category cannot be attributed
exclusively to medical imperialism or technological expansion.
1.1 How the Disorder Is Articulated in Medicine
It is not easy to make sense of the historical precursors to ADHD without setting out
some details about where things stand now. The first question is precisely how medical
experts define the disorder today. The second is how often it is diagnosed and treated.
1.1.1 Current Diagnostic Criteria
The current criteria for a clinical diagnosis of ADHD appear in the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published in May
2013 (fifth edition). The previous edition (DSM-IV) was published in 1994, with a revision
of the text sections giving extra information on each diagnosis in 2000 (DSM-IV-TR). Be-
fore May 2013, the criteria had not changed in nearly twenty years. Appendix Table A.1
displays the main features of the diagnostic criteria from DSM-III in 1980 to DSM-5 in
2013 (for comparative purposes); the appendix also includes a brief description of the pre-
decessor disorders in DSM-I and DSM-II. The diagnostic category emerged with the publi-
cation of DSM-III. DSM-III was the first to refer to “attention,” the first to indicate that
the information used to support a diagnosis should come from the adults in the child’s
environment, and the first to introduce subtyping. DSM-III cleared the way for the use
of rating scales based on behavioral inputs. Rating scales are provided to teachers, par-
ents, and older adolescents or adults and are used to achieve reliability across clinicians,
and their use greatly expanded the application of the diagnostic category. I discuss recom-
mended diagnostic practices in greater detail in Chapter 4.
In DSM-5, the disorder is characterized by a triad of clinical features – hyperactiv-
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ity, inattention, and impulsivity – that form the basis for three “presentations” – a pre-
dominantly inattentive presentation, a predominantly hyperactivity-impulsivity presen-
tation, and a combined presentation. The diagnostic criteria list nine symptoms in each
of the first two presentations. For children under the age of 17, six of nine symptoms are
required for a diagnosis under either presentation, and six symptoms in both dimensions
are required for the combined presentation; for older adolescents and adults, only 5 symp-
toms are required. DSM-5 replaced the subtype configuration used in DSM-IV with the
presentation concept. The subtype configuration was criticized because the presentation
of symptoms tends to change during development; in particular, hyperactivity symptoms
tend to decline with age (Tannock, 2013). The presentation concept emphasizes the de-
velopmental variability in when symptoms “present,” while blurring the boundaries in the
subtype structure. The changes in the symptom grouping grow out of the ongoing con-
tention about the core symptoms of ADHD, as I discuss below. The symptoms must oc-
cur for at least six months and “to a degree that is inconsistent with developmental level.”
Each symptom also must be present “often” as opposed to occasionally or infrequently.
Besides having the requisite number and type of symptoms, DSM-5 imposes four re-
quirements. First, there must be some symptoms that cause impairment before the age
of 12 (the age of onset requirement); DSM-5 increased the age of onset to 12 in response
to the lack of research support for the prior requirement (age 7) and the difficulties that
adults faced in retrospectively recalling symptoms that occurred before the earlier age
(Tannock, 2013). The symptoms must be present in at least two settings (the multiple
setting requirement). There must be “clear evidence that the symptoms interfere with, or
reduce the quality of, social, academic, or occupational functioning” (the impairment re-
quirement). Last, the symptoms must “not occur exclusively during the course of schizophre-
nia or another psychotic disorder” and should not “be better explained by another mental
disorder” (the differential diagnosis requirement). DSM-5 removed the hierarchical rela-
tionship between Pervasive Development Disorders and Attention Deficit Disorders (ap-
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pearing in DSM-III and DSM-IV), in which the presence of Pervasive Development Disor-
ders would preclude diagnosis for attention deficit disorders. That change makes it more
likely that co-morbid conditions will occur.
The dual presentation (formerly subtype) structure, clusters of clinical symptoms, and
frequent co-existence of other psychiatric developmental disorders (Barnard-Brak et al.,
2011) suggest variability in levels of severity and symptoms between individuals.6 Even at
the symptom level, where experts differentiate, for example, between incapacity for sus-
tained attention and selective inattention (Barkley, 1997a), there is remarkable dissimilar-
ity. There also is significant variability in symptom expression according to developmental
stage and environmental factors (school curriculum and the like). The heterogeneity im-
plies that ADHD is not in fact a singular disorder with a well-founded etiological basis,
and the increased heterogeneity over time suggests expansion to reach more behaviors, ar-
guably consistent with a medicalization process (Conrad and Potter, 2000).
Undergirding the diagnostic framework is a struggle to find a consensus as to whether
behavioral manifestations of ADHD constitute a unitary or multidimensional construct.
Poor behavioral inhibition is understood by some ADHD experts as the central neurolog-
ical deficiency – one that provides an underlying functional basis for the complete symp-
tom cluster (Smith et al., 2007; Nigg, 2009; Williams et al., 2010; Sagvolden et al., 2005;
Barkley, 1997b). That understanding is a cognitive theory that is founded in part on neu-
rological research and correlation studies utilizing brain imaging (Barkley and Lombroso,
2000; Castellanos and Tannock, 2002; Sagvolden et al., 2005). As a result, for some sub-
stantial group of experts, the scientific basis of the disorder is beyond question; a group of
about 85 scientists led by Russell Barkley issued an International Consensus Statement on
ADHD in 2002 (Barkley, 2002), which professed complete faith in the scientific validity of
the disorder and flatly rejected the social construction critique:
6A number of genetic disorders also present with overlapping symptoms, including Tuberous Sclerosis
complex, Fragile X, Celiac’s, TBI, Noonan Syndrome, congenital hypothyroidism, and velo-cardial-facial
syndrome (Nass and Frank, 2010).
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We cannot over emphasize the point that, as a matter of science, the notion
that ADHD does not exist is simply wrong.... To publish stories that ADHD is
a fictitious disorder or merely a conflict between today’s Huckleberry Finns and
their caregivers is tantamount to declaring the earth flat, the laws of gravity
debatable, and the periodic table in chemistry a fraud.
Other experts (more realistically) acknowledge that the assumption that all children with
ADHD share the same causal etiology is “the scientific equivalent of a red herring” (Sonuga-
Barke and Castellanos, 2005, p. 244); see also Nigg (2009). For these researchers, ADHD
is simply a “useful clinical heuristic” because “it gets care and treatment to those who need
it,” but the category in fact represents “an umbrella term” for a range of “distinct but re-
lated sub-conditions” (Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2005, p. 244).
Despite the lack of agreement as to a unified etiology, medical organizations and re-
search groups, including the National Institute of Mental Health, the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Academy of Child
Adolescent Psychiatry, agree that the disorder is a valid clinical object, that it can be di-
agnosed reliably, and that the symptoms can be treated successfully with pharmaceuticals
(Castellanos and Tannock, 2002; MTA Cooperative Group, 2004; National Institutes of
Health, 1998; Nigg, 2009; Smith et al., 2007).
1.1.2 Epidemiological Profile
Although what is to be explained is the increase in prevalence and treatment for ADHD
that has been so widely discussed, it is not easy to make sense of prevalence estimates
across periods of diagnostic change. Studies conducted before the 1990s – with estimates
ranging from 1 to 20 percent (Brown et al., 2001; Goldman et al., 1998; Krager and Safer,
1974; Ross and Ross, 1976; Safer and Krager, 1988; Sprague and Gadow, 1976) – rely on
nonstandard criteria and convenience samples (Hoagwood et al., 2000; Rowland et al.,
2002). More recently, studies have used national samples with sophisticated survey tech-
niques, but these studies necessarily rely on parent-reported data, which might not accu-
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rately represent true prevalence (Getahun et al., 2013; Visser et al., 2013); it is well known
that socioeconomic characteristics and parents’ mental health conditions are correlated
with parents’ perceptions of the mental health of their children (Glied et al., 1997).
Recent estimates of national prevalence from the 2011 National Survey of Children’s
Health suggest that 11 percent of school-aged children had a parent-reported diagnosis in
2011 (Schwarz and Cohen, 2013). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2010) de-
scribes results from the 2003 and 2007 National Survey of Children’s Health, which indi-
cate that the percentage of children ages 4-17 years with a parent-reported diagnosis rose
from 7.8 percent in 2003 to 9.5 percent in 2007 (representing a 21.8 percent increase in 4
years). Akinbami et al. (2011) describe data from the National Health Interview Survey,
1998-2009, which indicate that the percentage of children ages 5-17 years with a parent-
reported diagnosis rose from 6.9 percent in 1998 to 9.0 percent in 2009 (representing a 30
percent increase in 11 years). Data on office-based visits reflect a similar pattern (Robison
et al., 1999, 2002; Sclar et al., 2012; Zarin et al., 1998).7
Stimulant drug use also has increased, but it is difficult to pin down the extent to
which this is attributable to increased distribution to children with ADHD. Estimates
based on revenues or DEA quotas fail to separate use by children and adults or use by
children with ADHD as opposed to other children. Further, the heterogeneity in formu-
lations, delivery devices, and dosages makes it difficult to interpret estimates based on
weight. Nevertheless, the data are instructive as to the direction of trends. Chai et al.
(2012) report a 46 percent increase in the number of prescriptions dispensed for ADHD
drugs from 2002-2010 to the pediatric population. Bokhari et al. (2005) report a 5-fold in-
crease in grams per 100,000 population between 1980 and 1996 (with a 3.7-fold increase
7Sclar et al. (2012) report a 4-fold increase from 1991-1992 to 2007-2008 in the number of office-based
visits for children ages 5-18 with a diagnosis of ADHD. Data from the National Medical Expenditure
Survey and Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, reveal that the rate of outpatient treatment for ADHD in-
creased from 0.9 per 100 children (ages 3-18) in 1987 to 3.4 per 100 children in 1997 (Olfson et al., 2003).
Olfson et al. (2014) report psychotropic medication visits doubled for youths from the mid 1990s to the
late 2000s.
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from 1990-1996). The Drug Enforcement Administration (2012) reports another 1.4-fold
increase from 2007 to 2011. Finally, a large prescription drug manager estimates that use
of ADHD medications by privately-insured individuals aged 4 to 64 rose 35.5 percent from
2008 to 2012 (Express Scripts, 2014). Although children are still the primary users of ADHD
medications, the number of adults using these drugs has been increasing at a much faster
pace; among adults, more women than men use ADHD medications (Express Scripts, 2014).
What can be agreed is that nationwide diagnostic prevalence and stimulant drug treat-
ment have increased significantly since 1990 and that there probably were very few nonin-
stitutionalized children treated before the 1970s8; however, it is not clear how much preva-
lence increased during the period of rapid diagnostic change from 1980-1994. It should
also be mentioned that rising diagnostic rates do not necessarily imply that the disorder
is “over” diagnosed. Studies that estimate the prevalence of ADHD-type symptoms suggest
that some children with clinically significant symptoms have no history of prior diagno-
sis (e.g., Wolraich et al., 2014; Cuffe et al., 2005; Froehlich et al., 2007; Merikangas et al.,
2010), implying under-diagnosis for at least some children. In addition, significant varia-
tion in ADHD prevalence rates across the United States and between the United States
and other countries leaves open the possibility of localized differences in over- and under-
diagnosis (Bokhari et al., 2005; Cox et al., 2003; Fulton et al., 2009; Polanczyk et al., 2007).
1.2 Understanding ADHD: Contested Narratives
The following account synthesizes secondary sources from several distinct disciplinary per-
spectives that relate to the development of ADHD and its treatment from the early 20th
century to the present date. The existing literature includes the work of medical experts
that is aimed at both clinicians and interested members of the public. That work gener-
ally presents the perspective of medical progress, but it also reflects the competing defi-
8What is known about the extent of the use of drugs in children with minimal brain dysfunction in the
1960s comes from surveys sent to institutions for the intellectually impaired (Sprague and Gadow, 1976).
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nitions and theories that underlie the diagnosis (Barkley, 2005; Conners, 2000; Ross and
Ross, 1976; Sandberg and Barton, 2002). The literature also includes the work of social
scientists, much of which questions the validity of the category, the influences of profes-
sional and entrepreneurial interests, politics, and technological advances on its develop-
ment (Brancaccio, 2000; Lakoff, 2000; Lange et al., 2010; Mayes and Rafalovich, 2007;
Neufeld and Foy, 2006; Rafalovich, 2001; Smith, 2012; Taylor, 2011), and the power of
the psychiatry profession to impose its labels to describe human variation (Conrad, 1975,
2006; Lloyd et al., 2006; Schrag and Divosky, 1976; Singh, 2002; Timimi and Leo, 2009).
I use both types of sources to sketch out an informed history of the disorder, attempting
to accomplish three things: (1) to set out the conditions for the appearance of the symp-
toms, (2) to track the development in the process of thinking about these symptoms as a
single medical diagnostic category, and (3) to assess what is at stake in the different ways
of thinking about the category.
1.2.1 The Straight Path from Symptom Expression to Symptom
Recognition to Diagnostic Standardization
It is useful first to briefly describe the “expert” story. The conventional medical history
(e.g., Barkley, 1997a; Hallowell, 1994) begins with the early recognition of symptoms in
the 18th and 19th centuries, continues with the 1902 lectures of English pediatrician George
Still that proposed behavioral inhibition as a central deficiency, then moves to 20th cen-
tury research linking brain damage or irregularity to behavioral and learning difficulties,
and finally (in the 1990s) concludes with brain imaging studies, genetic research, and the
“return” to the behavioral inhibition thesis. The emphasis by medical experts on the early
recognition of the behaviors that eventually become symptoms of ADHD should not be
surprising (Barkley, 1997a; Sharkey and Fitzgerald, 2007; Fitzgerald, 2009; Hartmann and
Palladino, 2005; Hartmann et al., 1997; Kelly, 2009). By doing so, experts legitimate the
validity of the medical disorder as scientific discovery. As Brancaccio (2000, pp. 165-166)
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explains, the “alleged unchanging nature over time” indicates that the disorder is “indepen-
dent of the period or ... context” and “instead primarily due to an individual neurophysi-
ological condition.” Although most medical researchers agree that the diagnostic category
emerged with DSM-III in 1980 (attention deficit disorder) and expanded successively with
DSM-III-R in 1987 and DSM-IV in 1994 (attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder), the in-
ternal history does not account for the apparent surge in prevalence, particularly during
the period between 1994 and 2013 (when there were no relevant changes in the criteria).
1.2.1.1 The Context for Early Symptom Recognition: Institutional Care of
the Feebleminded and Emotionally Disturbed
Before the symptoms of hyperactivity, impulsivity, and distractibility could be recognized
and treated, childhood deviance had to emerge as a social problem requiring a specialized
response. The “idiocy” construct emerged in the late 19th century in response to the polit-
ical and economic upheaval associated with immigration and expansion, which led, in turn,
to a differentiation of the moral idiot and the feebleminded (Deutsch, 1949; Grossberg,
2011; Jackson, 2000; Lazerson, 1983; Trent, 1994). Population growth in the 19th century
led to the first wave of institutional “care,” but child “deviants” were first treated as a spe-
cial group during the Progressive Era. Believing that it was important to instill traditional
values in children in response to the social unrest caused by industrialization, immigration,
the growth of cities, and the rapid increase in income and wealth, Progressive social re-
formers turned their attention to poor children as objects for scientific study and as recipi-
ents of needed reform (Smuts and Smuts, 2006; Brancaccio, 2000; Foucault, 2008; Jackson,
2000; Neufeld and Foy, 2006; Rose, 1985; Strohl, 2011; Taylor, 2011), making childhood
“the critical period for learning restraint and developing a proper social identity” (Strohl,
2011, p. 28).
Among the most expansive reforms were laws that required all children to attend school.
The reforms were so fundamental that Hinshaw and Scheffler (2014b) argue that they were
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the condition precedent for an ADHD “explosion.” Compulsory education surely marks
a turning point on the path to the recognition of many pediatric mental disorders, but
this explanation is too general to explain the particular form that ADHD comes to take
years later. With compulsory education came the embedding of health and social services
– medical and dental inspections, free school lunches, physical education and instruction in
hygiene, and the employment of social workers and mental health workers – in schools to
meet the needs of the new students (Cohen, 1983; Petrina, 2006; Tyack, 1992).9 The grade
retention of significant numbers of these children provided the impetus for the first locally-
funded special education programs; because of the association of learning problems with
immigrants and the mentally deficient, these programs were inadequate (Lazerson, 1983).
Around the same time, children’s social or behavioral problems started to be seen as
a psychiatric domain. This understanding was influenced by psychotherapists such as Sig-
mund Freud and Adolf Meyer (Horn, 1989), and child behavioral problems were attributed
to parental or environmental causes that could be improved by psychosocial treatments.
The first psychological clinic that studied children with learning or behavior problems
opened (McReynolds, 1987); it was used as a model by William Healy when he established
the first psychiatric clinic for children in association with the Chicago Juvenile Court in
1909 (the juvenile justice system was being formed). In response to the problematization
of the troublesome child (Strohl, 2011), child guidance clinics provided outpatient mental
health care to children who were at risk for delinquency, many of whom were considered
feebleminded (Nehring, 2004). It is fair to say that the reforms collectively represent an
example of social control of poor, immigrant children.10
The so-called conventional historical account begins within the milieu of the Progres-
9Medical professionals and women reformers, and not educators, were the main proponents of these
services; as these programs became institutionalized, health and social services in schools increasingly were
directed to middle-class children rather than urban immigrants (Tyack, 1992).
10The initial focus on saving immigrant and lower-class children at risk for delinquency eventually
shifted to an emphasis on the emotional and behavioral problems of the mostly middle-class child (Eyal
et al., 2010; Eyal, 2013; Horn, 1989; Jones, 2002).
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sive Era. Much of the research that I describe below occurred in institutional settings
(reformatories, asylums, and child guidance clinics) where many children were consid-
ered feebleminded, and those who were not had severe behavioral problems that necessi-
tated custodial care (typically diagnosed as neurotic, psychotic, or personality disordered).
Nonetheless, medical experts point to this period as the time of discovery of the symptoms
and underlying theories linking the symptoms to brain pathology, symptoms which today
have morphed into a medical category predominantly associated with the middle and up-
per classes.
1.2.1.2 Early Brain Research, Methods, and Findings
The expert medical account typically attributes the first description of the symptoms to
British pediatrician George Frederick Still (Barkley, 2005; Brancaccio, 2000; Conners,
2000; Lange et al., 2010; Neufeld and Foy, 2006; Palmer and Finger, 2001; Rafalovich,
2001; Taylor, 2011),11 who delivered a series of lectures to the Royal College of Physicians
of London in March 1902, describing 43 children (Still, 1902a, p. 1008), many of whom
were intellectually impaired or in institutions. Still observed that some of the children
were unable to sit still and seemed unable to focus for long on any one thing. Still adopted
“the view that ‘effort of attention is the essential phenomenon of the will” ’ (Still, 1902b, p.
1166, citing William James),12 and suggested to fellow physicians that abnormal manifes-
tations of “moral defect” (or an impaired ability to act with “the idea of the good of all”) in
11Earlier medical references have been identified (Barkley and Peters, 2012; Lange et al., 2010; Palmer
and Finger, 2001), but Still is the most prominent in this line of work. Among the first references to a
hyperactive child are the poems of the German physician Heinrich Hoffman in 1865. Adopting a purely
moral construction, Hoffman wrote about Fidgety Philip and many of the other childhood maladies he
saw in his medical practice; an English translation of the poems along with illustrations can be found at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12116/12116-h/12116-h.htm#The_Story_Flying_Robert.
12James’s work was inspired by French psychologist Theodule Ribot who distinguished between spon-
taneous attention and voluntary attention (Lakoff, 2000). James, in turn, distinguished between sensorial
and intellectual attention, immediate and derived attention, and passive and active attention. Although
James inspired interest in attention as a topic of study in the incipient field of psychology, research on
attention slowed during the behaviorist period. The study of attention returned to the forefront with
Broadbent’s information processing model in the 1950s (Cornish and Wilding, 2010).
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children of normal intellect should be considered a medical condition “apart from any such
general disorder of intellect as is ordinarily recognized as imbecility, ‘feeble-mindedness,’
or insanity” (Still, 1902a, p. 1008). Thus, for Still, attention is bound up with “the will,”
a hybrid concept, with moral and physiological dimensions. The idea is that attentive-
ness requires an exertion of “the will” to inhibit reactions to other stimuli; the problem
that immediately emerges – and remains a fundamental concern today – is the location
of the boundary between pathology and ordinary distractibility or excitability. By linking
qualities such as “an abnormal incapacity for sustained attention,” “memory [that] seemed
abnormally defective,” and “an abnormal lack of judgment” with “a defect of inhibitory
volition” (Still, 1902b, p. 1166), Still anticipated the behavioral inhibition theory, which
is proposed in the 1990s as a central deficiency that joins the symptoms that comprise
ADHD (Barkley, 1997b).13 Although the initial medical account is largely a mix between
“badness” and “illness,” Still did speculate that defects in inhibition might be caused by a
hereditary condition or pre- or post-natal brain injuries (Still, 1902b).
In an authoritative medical text published six years later, British physician and eu-
genicist Alfred Tredgold developed the idea that undetected brain damage could account
for behavioral and learning problems, including the inability to pay attention (Tredgold,
1916). His work received validation in the aftermath of the encephalitis lethargica epi-
demic. As the epidemic spread around the world, researchers observed that children who
had recovered from encephalitis often showed unusual behavioral changes even in the ab-
sence of evidence of cognitive impairment (Ebaugh, 1923). Brain damage became the pre-
dominant understanding of childhood behavioral and learning problems after World War
I, and, ultimately, the linkage of brain damage and behavioral and learning abnormalities
resulted in the amalgamation of a vast number of symptoms under a single classification
(Ross and Ross, 1976) – a symptom grouping that remained in place until the 1960s.
13Rafalovich (2001) contends that George Still’s importance lies in associating feeblemindedness with
children. Although that may have been Still’s main contribution at the time, he is important to medical
advocates of the category because his work anticipated the behavioral inhibition thesis.
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An influential study that extended this work and specifically identified hyperactive be-
havior was Eugen Kahn and Louis H. Cohen’s 1934 piece in the New England Journal of
Medicine describing “organic drivenness.” Referring to research showing that encephalitis-
induced changes in the brain-stem produced changes in personality and behavior, but also
describing intelligent children and adults who were hyperactive but who had no history of
neurological dysfunction, Kahn and Cohen (1934, p. 752) proposed that “there are indi-
viduals who are possessed of organic drivenness from birth, either as the consequence of a
prenatal encephalopathy or injury or of birth injury, or as a constitutional variant.” They
said that “the impression that one gets when observing these patients, that there is an
‘organic’ condition, is overwhelming,” where the “patient becomes a puppet at the mercy
of its source, i.e. a defective brain stem” (Kahn and Cohen, 1934, p. 750). The patients
seemed to have a “surplus of inner implosion,” characterized by difficulty in maintaining
quiet attitudes, abruptness and clumsiness of movement, and an explosive motor.
Alfred Strauss and his co-workers later conceptualized and named a specific syndrome
associated with mild or undetected brain damage, although their research involved chil-
dren with mental retardation. Building on the work of Kurt Goldstein, who conducted
longitudinal studies of German soldiers that had returned home from World War I with
brain injuries (Carrier, 1986; Hallahan, 2002), Strauss’ team differentiated children with
mental retardation on the basis of whether they exhibited physical brain damage or not.
The children with brain lesions (referred to as the exogenous type) exhibited the behav-
ioral problems that Goldstein had observed in the brain-injured soldiers (Strauss and Werner,
1942; Strauss and Lehtinen, 1947); the children with no discernible brain damage (the en-
dogenous type) did not appear to exhibit any behavioral problems. The linkage of severe
brain damage with severe behavioral problems was later extended to associate less severe
brain damage with milder behavioral problems (Strauss and Kephart, 1955). Strauss and
Lehtinen (1947, p. 107) explain that “slight noxious accidents at birth” might “be deduced
only by extensive psychological and behavioral observations,” meaning that the behav-
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ioral differences that were said to result from the brain trauma sometimes were used to
define the existence of the exogenous type (Kavale and Forness, 1985a,b). They coined the
phrase “minimal brain damage” to describe children with restless and inattentive behavior
for whom brain damage was unobserved.
Mild brain damage also was used to explain speech and language problems and dis-
tractibility. Franz Joseph Gall, a German anatomist, drew attention to the idea of the
localization of brain functions, and although his ideas were largely discredited due to his
association with the phrenology school, European researchers furthered his work in the
area of speech aphasia (Hallahan, 2002). Other European researchers such as James Hin-
shelwood began to study “word blindness,” both due to acquired brain damage and to con-
genital causes (Hallahan, 2002). In the 1920s and 1930s, an American neurologist, Samuel
Orton, relying on Hinshelwood’s work, associated various language problems in brain-
damaged individuals with particular parts of the brain; Orton hypothesized that the same
problems in otherwise intelligent children indicated a similar brain dysfunction. Strauss
and Werner (1942) conducted a series of experiments in which they compared the per-
formance of children with exogenous and endogenous mental retardation on a variety of
figure-background tasks, where each child was shown slides of familiar objects embedded in
backgrounds at fast exposure times; children in the brain-injured group were more likely to
refer to the background and were less likely to recall the figure correctly, which they saw
as evidence of distractibility. Another colleague, William Cruickshank, demonstrated that
cerebral-palsied children had difficulties with abstraction, thus linking brain injury to cog-
nitive difficulties for children without low intelligence (Carrier, 1986).
In the conventional account, subsequent events followed in a fairly straight path from
what came before, largely by happenstance, with validation from new imaging technolo-
gies and inferences drawn from the effects of the stimulant drugs. So, around the time
of the development of the MBD label, Charles Bradley discovered the calming effects of
stimulant drugs on hyperactive children. The diagnostic label “minimal brain damage” was
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changed in the 1950s and 1960s to “minimal brain dysfunction,” reflecting the presumption
of a neurologically-based deficit in the face of limited evidence of brain damage in most
cases. The increasing recognition of hyperactivity as a symptom of “minimal brain dys-
function” in the 1960s prompted the change of the diagnostic label to “hyperkinetic reac-
tion of childhood.” With the publication of DSM-III, the label “Attention Deficit Disorder”
was adopted and subtyping became possible, which reflected the understanding (largely
attributed to Virginia Douglas) that inattention was in fact the primary symptom. With
the first revision of DSM-III, the subtyping distinction was eliminated and the diagnostic
label changed to the current ADHD, reflecting lack of certainty in the medical community
about the existence of the two subtypes. In 1994, with the publication of DSM-IV, the la-
bel remained the same but subtypes were again included in the diagnostic framework to
reflect the broad variation in children with attentional disorders. Finally, in 2013, because
of genetic research showing that the disorder “runs” in families, brain imaging research,
and longitudinal studies showing that symptoms can persist into adulthood, the criteria
were revised to facilitate the diagnosis of adults with ADHD.
1.2.2 The Winding Path From Institutional Social Control to Per-
formance Enhancement of Middle Class Children
1.2.2.1 Early Use of Stimulant Drugs in Children and Its Discontinuity with
the Current Epidemic
One weakness of the conventional story is its failure to account for the discontinuity be-
tween the early use of stimulant drugs in children and the later surge in prescription rates.
This discontinuity arose out of the circumstances in which the early use occurred.
As part of a trend toward a specialization and hospital-based, technologically-oriented
treatment, as well as a shifting interest towards providing psychiatric treatment for chil-
dren with emotional problems, the first residential treatment centers for children in the
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United States were established in the 1930s to care for and treat children with post-encephalitic
behavior disorders and related conditions. Some were converted orphanages and reforma-
tories; others were residential units operated by child guidance clinics or children’s units
of adult hospitals (American Psychiatric Association, 1957). While child guidance teams –
staffed with social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists – evaluated all of the develop-
mental and contextual factors affecting children (Jones, 2002; Kanner, 1957), the residen-
tial centers treated children with behavioral problems like those found in child guidance
clinics (school difficulties, hyperactivity, and oppositional behavior) alongside children with
neurological diseases. Residential treatment centers for children also incorporated medi-
cal technologies including extensive physical exams, blood tests, pneumoencephalograms,
electroencephalograms, and hormone and shock treatments.
Charles Bradley was a psychiatrist and the medical director of the nation’s first res-
idential psychiatric hospital for children, the Emma Pendleton Bradley Home for Chil-
dren in Rhode Island, which opened in 1931. Admitting children with brain injuries, post-
encephalitic and convulsive disorders, and severe emotional and behavioral disorders (Bradley,
1936, 1944), the Bradley Home was founded at the intersection of “a broad-based social
movement emphasizing the whole person, the social context, and moral development” and
“an invigorated medical profession conceptualizing children’s misbehavior in organic terms”
(Bromley, 2006, p. 383). It is within that setting that Bradley is said to have discovered
the paradoxical effect of stimulant drugs on children with behavioral problems. Bradley’s
research on Benzedrine (a stimulant drug manufactured by Smith Kline and French) was
a byproduct of the pneumoencephalography used to document brain damage, a procedure
that often caused headaches. Bradley believed that a stimulant drug like Benzedrine might
reduce these headaches by stimulating the choroid plexus to produce spinal fluid; however,
he detected a different kind of effect. In the first week of Benzedrine treatment, about half
of 30 children receiving the drug had “remarkably improved school performance,” char-
acterized by greater interest in school material, drive to accomplish the work, speed of
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comprehension, or accuracy (Bradley, 1937, p. 582).14 About half of the children also
responded to the drug by becoming subdued; this was viewed as “an improvement from
the social viewpoint” (Bradley, 1937, p. 579). The academic and behavioral changes ap-
peared promptly when the Benzedrine was given and disappeared when it was discontin-
ued. Bradley referred to the effect as “paradoxical” because a stimulant drug produced
subdued behavior in children that were overactive (Bradley, 1937, p. 582).
Relying on electroencephalographic (EEG) technology, Bradley speculated that Ben-
zedrine aroused the impaired cortical activity and induced increased voluntary control.
As Bradley (1942, p. 773) explains, the EEG provides “clues as to what brain regions are
involved in ... abnormal activity,” which “even in the absence of gross neurological signs
... reveals central nervous system instability or disease not otherwise demonstrable.” Us-
ing EEGs, Bradley and his team observed that children with severe behavioral problems
tended to have abnormalities of brain rhythms (Jasper et al., 1938). They also found that
the group that had a clinical response to Benzedrine tended to have a particular form of
EEG abnormality (Cutts and Jasper, 1939; Bradley, 1942). However, there was no rela-
tionship between the effects of Benzedrine on observed behavior and changes revealed in
the EEG while using the drug (Cutts and Jasper, 1939; Bradley, 1942). When Benzedrine
responses and EEG results appeared to be complementary, Bradley defined misbehaviors
according to their pharmacological response pattern and neuroanatomical features. In
other words, Bradley used the data to justify interventions to parents and to investigate
boundaries around a new diagnostic cluster associated with epilepsy. Fully aware of the
preliminary nature of the findings, Bradley did not use the technology to diagnose or to
determine who to treat (Bradley, 1942; Bromley, 2006). For Bradley, the significance of
this new technology was two-fold. First, he believed that EEG abnormalities could not be
14In a follow-up study, Bradley and Green (1940) found no significant effects of Benzedrine on the intel-
ligence scores of 21 children; they suggest that the improvements in classroom performance documented in
the earlier study likely resulted from the drug’s effects on the emotional attitude of the children towards
the tasks they were asked to perform.
31
produced by psychological factors alone, which meant that “faulty handling on the part of
[the child’s] parents or teachers” and “emotional trauma” could be disentangled from neu-
rological signs (Bradley, 1942, p. 774). Second, Bradley believed that EEG could be used
to legitimate the expert judgment of child psychiatrists as to the need for pharmacologic
treatment (Bradley, 1942).
The first report of Bradley’s observations appeared in the same journal in which an-
other study documented improved achievement and intelligence test scores from Benzedrine
(Molitch and Eccles, 1937). Smith Kline and French (SKF) Laboratories supplied Matthew
Molitch and colleagues with Benzedrine so that they could perform a placebo-controlled
experiment on a group of boys (ages 11 to 17) that were committed to a group home for
juvenile delinquency. SKF took greater interest in the work by Molitch; while Bradley be-
lieved the amphetamine effect depended on a brain defect, Molitch characterized his sub-
jects as biologically normal juvenile delinquents (Rasmussen, 2009). The children tested
after taking Benzedrine showed greater improvement than those taking a placebo.15 Al-
though those studies foreshadowed later research on the effects of stimulants on a broad
range of cognitive and behavioral outcomes, they had little influence on research for more
than a decade (Bradley, 1950). The use of psychotropic drugs with children was suffi-
ciently controversial that pharmaceutical companies at the time were not interested in fi-
nancing research in the area (Mayes and Rafalovich, 2007; Rasmussen, 2009).
What is most salient here is what did not happen. Despite the emerging clinical con-
cepts associating mild brain damage with emotional and behavioral abnormalities, the dis-
covery of the so-called paradoxical effects of stimulant drugs on children with these abnor-
malities, and the technology that allowed psychiatrists to link the responses of the drug
to neuroanatomical features of the brain, hyperactivity did not emerge as a social prob-
lem and would not do so until much later. The conventional account has no explanation
15The experiment by Molitch and Eccles was motivated by a similar study conducted on a group of 48
adult patients in a mental hospital. Both Bradley (1937) and Molitch and Eccles (1937) refer to contem-
poraneous studies that describe the effects of Benzedrine on the behavior of adults.
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for the delay. As explained below, there was insufficient impetus for the development and
expansion of a medical category or treatment at that time because the symptoms were not
of concern to educators (Kiger, 1985; Smith, 2012). Medicalization also cannot explain the
failure of the category to emerge; the children involved in these studies were under institu-
tional control, and there was no strong opponent to medical expansion.
1.2.2.2 From Brain Damage to Disability
The alternative accounts – the expert medical and medical power explanations – are not
able to explain what happens next: the emergence of the disability identity and the prob-
lematization of unexplained underachievement. As a result, neither of those accounts can
explain the construction and success of the ADHD category.
Convergence of Child Guidance and Care for the Feebleminded Child After
World War II, the importance placed on family life, coupled with a growing recognition
that “feeblemindedness” could affect children of all social classes, led to a reconceptualiza-
tion of the care of feebleminded and troublesome children. Initially, the concerns about the
strains that feebleminded children placed on families led to an increase in the institutional
care of mentally deficient and mentally ill children regardless of social background (Eyal
et al., 2010; Horn, 1989; Trent, 1994). But following a brief period of increased institution-
alization of middle class children with intellectual disabilities (from about 1945 to 1955)
was a massive shift towards deinstitutionalization, the effect of which was to “scramble”
the categories that reflected the needs of custodial institutions and replaced them with an
“undifferentiated mass of ‘atypical children’ ” (Eyal et al., 2010, p. 3). As a result, etiology
became secondary to the process of differentiating groups of children that presented unique
challenges outside of custodial environments, including classrooms.
The shift in thinking of feebleminded children as a “threat to the social order” (Trent,
1994, p. 292) to seeing them as children with handicapping conditions cleared the path for
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an expansion of special education (Grossberg, 2011). Special education for intellectually-
impaired children increased by more than a factor of 4 from 1948 to 1966 (Trent, 1994).
Although these programs remained underfunded and were segregated from general educa-
tion environments (see Chapter 4), the institutions put in place ultimately facilitated the
development of special education programs for children that had less severe behavioral or
learning challenges (Lakoff, 2000; Neufeld and Foy, 2006).
Changes in the Labor Market Increase Academic Standards The labor mar-
ket transformation that began in the late 1950s contributed to the formation of identities
around school-specific disabilities (Kiger, 1985; Smith, 2012; Ong-Dean, 2009). A techno-
logical revolution that began in the 1950s with the first advances in digital technology and
(to some extent) the Sputnik launch stressed the necessity of an educated populace and
provided a focal point around which debates about school standards would occur (Sleeter,
2010). During the presidential terms of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the fed-
eral government began spending substantial amounts on public education, and in 1965,
the most extensive federal legislation affecting schools – the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act – was enacted, with an emphasis on equal access to schooling and equal op-
portunities to achieve. Reading and math standards were raised, and standardized tests
were revised to reflect the higher standards; at the same time, ability grouping and track-
ing were implemented to facilitate the ability of students to meet the standards (Sleeter,
2010, 1986). With the increased emphasis on achievement came a restriction on the in-
dependence of children. This transition was particularly difficult because it represented a
radical break with the past; where childhood in the American frontier had represented a
time of youthful independence, children in the post-war technological revolution tend to be
“overcultivat[ed]” (Fass, 2011, p. 18). The growing dependence on education necessitated a
significant change in children’s behavior: children needed to be less “spunky” to succeed in
the competitive schooling environment (Fass, 2011, p. 15).
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Medical and Educational Models of Disability The problematization of achieve-
ment gaps – and particularly unexplained underachievement – provided the impetus for a
new coalition of educators, medical experts, and parents to emerge whose aim was to artic-
ulate an educational response to moderate learning and behavioral problems, in the face of
lingering etiological uncertainty. This was the key macro condition that explains the dis-
continuity between Still - who was trying to create a category for the moral disinhibition
of the poor and minorities (“badness” in the medicalization jargon) – and the new coali-
tion around ADHD, which emerges in an entirely different setting and due to a different
problematization of school performance.
What follows was a series of debates about a valid nomenclature for childhood learn-
ing and behavioral disorders (Carrier, 1986; Smith, 2012). Some researchers had become
troubled by the idea of inferring brain damage without any evidence of trauma or disease
(Laufer et al., 1957), and felt that using an etiological nomenclature overemphasized the
contributions of brain injury to the symptom complex that was emerging. Others were
dissatisfied with the heterogeneity of symptoms found in brain-damaged children and pre-
ferred a functional approach that emphasized symptoms (Stevens, 1957). Three sets of
substantially overlapping categories were proposed (Freeman, 1976), and the next two
decades were characterized by efforts to distinguish medical and educational treatments,
etiological and descriptive diagnostic categories, behavioral and cognitive deficits, and
normal and abnormal symptom levels. In addition, because of a renewed interest in child
pharmacology, stimulant drugs influenced the delineation of categories. I start with a brief
note about the evolution of child pharmacology, and then turn to a discussion of the pro-
ponents and substantive arguments involved with each disability model.
Evolution of Pediatric Pharmacology The use of psychiatric drugs for the treat-
ment of adults with severe mental illness was both a cause and an effect of deinstitutional-
ization. But the increased use of psychiatric drugs in adults led to a resurgence of interest
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in the use of drugs for behaviorally disordered and emotionally disturbed children. The
only substantial source of research funding for pediatric psychopharmacology in the 1960s
was the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (Mayes and Rafalovich, 2007). The
NIMH created the Psychopharmacological Research Branch (the PRB) in 1956 (Mayes
and Rafalovich, 2007). In the same year, the NIMH sponsored a conference on the use
of drugs in children with psychiatric problems, a leading voice at which was Leon Eisen-
berg (Leo Kanner’s colleague at Johns Hopkins),16 who had received the first grant for
research on child psychopharmacology in 1958 for a study involving tranquilizers. Eisen-
berg recruited Keith Conners, and they conducted several studies of the effects of Ritalin
on emotionally disturbed children that were published during the 1950s and 1960s (Con-
ners and Eisenberg, 1963). Ritalin was approved by the Food and Drug Administration for
use in children in 1961,17 and psychiatrists began to prescribe Ritalin alongside therapeu-
tic approaches for the treatment of hyperactivity and MBD (Rasmussen, 2009; Freeman,
1966).
The growth in the use of pharmaceuticals in the 1960s and 1970s can be attributed in
part to breaking down socio-demographic divisions that had plagued the child psychiatry
field since its inception. Many of the early stimulant drug studies still centered on children
in institutional settings. But in 1963, Conners and Eisenberg published a study that con-
sidered the effects of Ritalin on emotionally-disturbed children, which reported significant
effects over a 10-day period, the largest of which related to outwardly-directed behaviors;
measures of learning showed only moderate improvements. By the mid to late 1960s, the
research was extended to school children in the inner city; Conners et al. (1967) studied
16Kanner’s work on autism formed the foundation for the subfield of child psychiatry, which was situ-
ated at the intersection of mental illness and intellectual disability (Eyal et al., 2010). Kanner wrote the
first child psychiatry textbook and headed the first child psychiatry department. Eisenberg later succeeded
Kanner as the chair of that department (at Johns Hopkins).
17The FDA has had an impact on clinical nomenclature. In 1970 the FDA determined that behavioral
symptoms should not be used to indicate drug use for hyperactive children; yet, by 1975, the FDA had
decided that the diagnostic label minimal brain dysfunction was too vague and that symptoms should be
listed to indicate stimulant use (Kiger, 1983). This cleared the way for full-fledged behavioral diagnosis.
36
children having significant difficulties in their school work or their classroom behavior in
two severely disadvantaged Baltimore elementary schools. Then, in 1969, Conners et al.
studied a predominantly white sample of children referred to an outpatient psychiatric
clinic with learning problems or behavioral disturbances; this study found effects over a
4-week period in achievements scores, perceptual abilities, and parent-reported symptoms
of impulsivity and concentration.
Around this time, Dr. Conners became intrigued by explaining the heterogeneity of
symptoms exhibited by children and the need for drug research to account for that het-
erogeneity. To that end, he collected data on children from the general population and
children with an existing symptom list who were referred to clinics. Using the data, he
eventually published the first version of the Conners’ Parent Rating Scale in the 1970s
and started using those scales in drug studies with children (Conners et al., 1969; Con-
ners, 1973). Conners’ scale treated a score over a given threshold as discrete clinical entity,
which made sense for drug studies; the success of the scale, however, facilitated a categori-
cal approach to diagnosis in later years. By the end of the decade, the potential market for
stimulant drugs had widened because of these studies, and drug therapy for children of all
backgrounds gained widespread medical support and public acceptance.
Minimal Brain Dysfunction (MBD) Growing out of the minimal brain damage
label used by Strauss and his colleagues, the term minimal brain dysfunction (MBD) syn-
drome represented the status quo. It was used to describe a broad group of childhood be-
havioral and learning disorders that were presumed to be caused by brain injury (Barkley,
1997a; Conners, 2000; Ross and Ross, 1976; Wender, 1971). The Oxford International
Study Group on Child Neurology recommended the use of the term in 1962. In 1966, three
task forces were convened by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
consider issues related to the educational and medical resources required for children who
“show deviations of intellect and behavior” (Clements, 1966, p. 1). The first task force,
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composed primarily of medical professionals, saw as its charge the development of a nomen-
clature that would “rectify professional disjuncture,” given that the “luxury of waiting until
causes can be unquestionably established” could no longer be afforded (Clements, 1966,
pp. 6-7). Proceeding in a wholly etiological vein, the medical task force accepted the term
“minimal brain dysfunction” and used it to describe children with “various combinations
of impairment in perception, conceptualization, language, memory, and control of atten-
tion, impulse, or motor function” (Clements, 1966, pp. 9-10). The task force report listed
38 terms related to the conditions grouped as minimal brain dysfunction, some of which
referred to organic aspects and the others to characteristics or consequences. Hyperactiv-
ity was considered a characteristic of a more general symptom complex (Clements, 1966,
p. 13). MBD thus represented a strictly neurological approach that subsumed environmen-
tal factors, socio-economic influences, and descriptive labels within a broader neurological
frame (Lange et al., 2010; Shorter, 1996; Smith, 2008).
Although MBD encompassed a broad and heterogeneous set of symptoms, an impor-
tant advocate of the label, Paul Wender, suggested that MBD should be understood as
a syndrome that included two major areas of dysfunction – behavioral and perceptual-
cognitive, either or both of which could be present in a particular child (Wender, 1975).
Behavioral problems included motor difficulties, poor impulse control, difficult interper-
sonal relations, or emotional abnormalities; perceptual-cognitive problems included diffi-
culties in learning reading, spelling, and math. Observing that attentional difficulties could
be considered either behavioral or perceptual-cognitive, Wender (1975, p. 47) said that
the proper categorization should be seen as “moot” because “[a]ttentional difficulties are
present in most, if not all, MBD children.”18
Wender went on to suggest a type of differentiation by treatment when he explained
18One way to think about this duality is that the perceptual-cognitive dysfunctions of MBD became
learning disabilities/disorders, while the behavioral ones were picked up mostly by ADHD. However,
this understanding does not account for the way that attention disorders have been interpreted and re-
interpreted over time to include both cognitive and behavioral dimensions.
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that learning difficulties could be caused by attentional or cognitive deficits (or both), but
“[a]ttentional deficits may often be largely eliminated through the use of medication” while
“perceptual-cognitive deficits demand special educational remediation” (Wender, 1975,
pp. 50-51). Referring to the use of psychotherapy without stimulant drugs as malprac-
tice, Wender (1971, p. 114), in his monograph Minimal Brain Dysfunction in Children,
espoused a view towards stimulant drugs that resonates with the claims in the medicaliza-
tion literature about the asymmetry between experts and lay actors (Conrad, 1975):
In the treatment of the MBD child the unsophisticated and unpsychologically
oriented family may for once be advantaged. Not exposed to psychiatric “over-
sell,” they may retain a child-like belief in the existence of a magic medicine
that can solve problems. Since such “primitive fantasies” are often correct for
the MBD child, their attitude is pro-therapeutic.
MBD thus was strictly within the jurisdiction of medical professionals, largely (but not
entirely) etiological, and mostly antagonistic to the autonomy of parents and children.
Hyperactivity, Hyperkinetic Impulse Disorder, and Hyperkinetic Reaction
to Childhood While proponents of the MBD label such as Clements and Wender advo-
cated for an etiological understanding of childhood learning and behavioral disorders, an-
other group of researchers began to promote a functional label based on behavioral symp-
toms, where certain behaviors were seen as symptoms and as organizing constructs for a
unique syndrome. These researchers placed increasing emphasis on excessive motor ac-
tivity as a central symptom of this new syndrome (Barkley, 2005; Chess, 1960; Safer and
Allen, 1976; Stewart, 1976). Maurice Laufer et al. (1957, pp. 38, 48) proposed the term
“hyperkinetic impulse disorder” to describe a behavioral disorder characterized by “hyper-
activity; short attention span and poor powers of concentration; irritability; impulsiveness;
variability; and poor school work,” based on the view that hyperactivity was “the most
striking” symptom displayed by the population of children that he had studied.
Laufer’s research not only represented a compromise between educators and medical
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experts but also focused attention on the effects of stimulant medications. Laufer’s team
used photo-Metrazol tests to validate the neurological effects of stimulant drugs (Laufer
et al., 1957; Laufer and Denhoff, 1957). In the tests, he administered Metrazol (a convul-
sive drug) intravenously while flashing lights at the patients. The response in the EEG
was recorded, and a low threshold response was considered an indicator of dysfunction of
the diencephalon, a subcortical structure (Laufer et al., 1954). Laufer selected samples of
emotionally-disturbed children and divided them into two groups – an experimental group
of children who presented with hyperactive symptoms and a control group of children who
were not hyperactive. Although the photo-Metrazol levels were collected for both groups,
only the hyperactive group was given amphetamine stimulants; the amphetamines resulted
in a rise of the mean photo-Metrazol threshold to the level previously associated with the
control group. This aspect of the design obscured the possibility that the amphetamines
would affect the control group in a similar way (which turns out to be the case). Never-
theless, Laufer’s team concluded that amphetamines were acting upon the diencephalon,
which implied that diencephalon dysfunction was a cause of hyperactivity.
The primacy of hyperactivity over other symptoms was influenced not just by the
response to the stimulant drugs, but also by the characteristics of the subjects of the re-
search. Maurice Laufer, Eric Denhoff, and Gerald Solomons were researchers at the Bradley
Home where the early Benzedrine studies had been done. They worked with emotionally
disturbed children for whom learning problems likely were secondary to behavioral issues.
Laufer’s team also believed that the disorder would be “overcome by the operation of nor-
mal maturational processes,” so they were looking specifically at symptoms that were char-
acteristic of younger school-age children (Laufer et al., 1957, p. 48).
It also is important to observe, that, unlike Wender, Laufer and many other psychia-
trists believed that stimulant drugs should be used in connection with psychotherapeutic
approaches rather than as a substitute for them, except in cases where the family might
not be able to afford other treatments. His team was aware that parents were seeking or-
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ganic causes and was concerned that parents and pediatricians would misinterpret his find-
ings to suggest that stimulants were a cure-all. Laufer et al. (1957, p. 47) noted that in
most cases “there is a definite need for psychotherapy for the child and work directly with
the parents” and that “it is important not to allow the parents to place sole emphasis upon
an organic factor as a means of dismissing any responsibility for making changes in the sit-
uation.” Writing to pediatricians, Laufer and Denhoff (1957, p. 474) advocated concurrent
use of stimulants and psychotherapy, observing that “[a]mphetamine has a specific role,
but is no substitute for psychotherapy.” Following up on Laufer’s work, Freed and Peifer
(1956, p. 22) justified the use of drugs in addition to psychotherapy only where there is a
“need to improve a situation, such as individual misbehavior in a school room” and chil-
dren come from broken homes, rendering psychotherapy “impossible.”
In sum, the hyperactivity label had the advantage of eschewing etiology, while retain-
ing an organic foundation that allowed it to be linked to stimulant drugs. With this bal-
ance, the category potentially was attractive both to educational interest groups that pre-
ferred application of a medical model to children with behavioral problems in the class-
room (Kiger, 1983) and to those that preferred functional labels. It was not, however, pre-
ferred by any of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare task forces. More-
over, the hyperactivity label did not satisfy researchers who were beginning to suspect that
learning issues were associated with hyperactive behaviors and preferred a wholly func-
tional approach to problems that were emerging in modern classrooms.
Learning Disabilities Educators preferred a third label – learning disabilities – be-
cause it deemphasized brain function and directed attention to the learning and behavioral
issues confronting teachers. Before the 1960s, only minor consideration had been given to
the learning problems of children, but heightened academic standards established in the
1950s and 1960s placed new emphasis on them. As educators tried to explain the failure
of lower class and minority children to meet the new academic standards using concepts
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of cultural deprivation, emotional disturbance, or “slow” learners, the inability of educa-
tors to explain the failures of white middle class children motivated groups of parents to
call attention to the earlier research on brain injury. Parents formed organizations across
the United States in support of the “brain-injured child,” the “perceptually handicapped,”
and the “neurologically impaired.” In 1963, the Fund for the Perceptually Handicapped
in Evanston, Illinois sponsored a conference for parents from various similar organizations
(Sleeter, 2010). Dr. Samuel Kirk, an education professor at the University of Illinois,19
opened the conference with an influential address. Although he advocated against the use
of technical labels and preferred to describe the behaviors of children in a way that was
meaningful to educators (Hallahan and Cruickshank, 1973, p. 6), he adopted the term
“learning disability” to describe those children with “retardation, disorder, or delayed de-
velopment in one or more of the processes of speech, language, reading, writing, arith-
metic, or other school subjects resulting from a psychological handicap caused by a possi-
ble cerebral dysfunction and/or emotional or behavioral disturbances” that was not caused
by “mental retardation, sensory deprivation, or cultural or instructional factors” (Kirk and
Bateman, 1962, p. 73).20 As originally conceived, the label included children whose de-
ficiencies resulted from behavioral or emotional disturbances (largely the middle class,
child guidance group) and excluded those children whose deficiencies resulted from cultural
deprivation or mental retardation (largely the lower class, feebleminded group) (Carrier,
1983; Ong-Dean, 2006; Sleeter, 2010).21
19Samuel Kirk worked at the Wayne County Training Center (WCTC) in the 1930s, while a doctoral
student at the University of Michigan. The WCTC was a school where Strauss and his team researched
the effects of brain injury on behavior and learning difficulties. Recall that Strauss coined the term mini-
mal brain damage to refer to children with learning difficulties that were not caused by intellectual disabil-
ities or emotional problems.
20The quoted text appears in an article in a 1962 issue of Exceptional Children. A similar definition
appeared in the first edition of his textbook Educating Exceptional Children, published the same year. The
term was also used in his 1963 speech to parents, teachers, and other professionals at the meeting orga-
nized by the Fund for the Perceptually Handicapped that would become the Association for Children with
Learning Disabilities and, ultimately, the the Learning Disabilities Association of America.
21During the late 1960s and early 1970s, minority groups pressured schools to discard the notion of cul-
tural deprivation and stop classifying disproportionate numbers of minority children as mentally retarded.
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Although Kirk’s definition made passing reference to a “possible cerebral dysfunction,”
it soon became clear that the purpose of the label was to remove any emphasis on neu-
rological impairment. The presumed organic cause was attractive to parents because it
suggested a cure and removed attention from the cultural integrity of the home; however,
any emphasis on proof of organicity was seen as an obstacle to the success of a functional
label. Because it confronted medical jurisdiction directly, the category was wholly unac-
ceptable to the proponents of medical labels. The absence of medical jurisdiction had con-
sequences: it meant that groups that were excluded from the definition of learning disabil-
ities would be able to challenge the exclusion in the political arena without confronting
the “expert” clout of medicine. The second task force convened by the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (discussed above), which was comprised primarily of educa-
tors, adopted the term “learning disabilities” rather than “minimal brain dysfunction,” ex-
plaining that the latter label “failed to communicate accurately” and ignored “the respon-
sibility of the school toward children with learning problems ... regardless of the etiology”
(Haring, 1970, p. 21). The task force buttressed its conclusion by conducting a survey of
school administrators, which showed that about half of the students currently in “special”
classes had a diagnosed neurological impairment.
The task force was united in its rejection of medical approaches, but beyond that was
not able to agree on a single definition of learning disabilities, which foreshadowed decades
of definitional disputes. Instead the task force referred to two definitions – one based on
differences in perceptual-motor function and another based on discrepancies between aca-
demic potential and actual functioning or achievement. The National Advisory Commit-
tee on Handicapped Children (NACHC) to the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped
within the U.S. Office of Education, headed by Samuel Kirk, issued its first report on Jan-
uary 31, 1968, which included a definition of learning disabilities that was similar to Kirk’s
Many students who previously were or would have been classified as retarded, slow, or culturally deprived
were classified as learning disabled (Sleeter, 1986).
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1962 definition, except that it narrowed the category by dropping emotional disturbance
as a potential cause of a learning disability (meaning that the definition excluded children
whose learning differences were best attributed to emotional disturbances). The learning
disability label was created as a discrete category to describe academic problems, partic-
ularly under-achievement, that resulted from specific deficits (although it was not at all
clear what this meant from a neurological perspective) (Kavale and Forness, 1998, p. 245).
Within the learning disabilities field, inattention was seen as a learning problem, but
it was not clear whether inattention arose from a processing deficit. Learning disabilities
might precede attentional problems (where students develop inattentive behaviors because
of repeated failures), or attention problems might precede learning disabilities (where inat-
tention results in the student failing to process important academic instruction). It was
also possible that attention problems and learning disabilities were separate conditions
that co-occur for some group of children (Pennington et al., 1993). As unlikely as this
might seem from an etiological standpoint, this is now the primary understanding of the
two disorders and helps to explain the high rates of comorbidity.
1.2.2.3 The First Epidemic
Although medicalization points to an epidemic starting with the expansion of medical ju-
risdiction and shifting to increased pharmaceutical industry spending in the late 1990s
(Conrad, 2005), the current “epidemic” in fact was not the first one. There was an earlier
epidemic in the 1960s that grew out of shifts in the field of psychiatry (Freeman, 1976),
which inhibited for a while the widespread use of medications with children. Medicaliza-
tion, itself, cannot explain the discontinuity.
From the end of World War II to the mid 1960s, psychodynamically-oriented psychia-
try was a prestigious field; however, by the mid 1960s, the prestige of the field was dimin-
ished due to competition from practitioners and challenges to the legitimacy of the field.
One group that had tremendous influence in the popular culture came from academia
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(Mayes and Horwitz, 2005); academic critics questioned the validity of the concept of men-
tal illness (Szasz, 1974; Scheff, 1999). Chapter 2 contains an extended discussion of the
medicalization critique that grew out of this broader attack. The passage of Medicare and
Medicaid legislation in 1965, which increased the importance of third-party payments,
placed insurance companies in a position to reject the economic justification for the psy-
chodynamic approach, primarily because it did not utilize a categorical disease model
(Mayes and Horwitz, 2005). Finally, deinstitutionalization exacerbated the situation by
changing psychiatry’s core constituency (from inpatient to outpatient) and placing more
importance on pharmacological solutions (Eyal et al., 2010; Mayes and Horwitz, 2005).
Psychiatric views about ADHD were not immune to these challenges. Among the threats
that psychiatry faced was an anti-Ritalin movement that pointed to the numbers of school
children that were thought to be using stimulant drugs. A 1970 Washington Post story
erroneously claimed that 5 to 10 percent of all school children in Omaha, Nebraska were
receiving stimulants (Maynard, 1970). The story created a controversy around the use of
stimulants, because it implied that parents were being coerced into medicating their chil-
dren (a la Wender); this concern was the subject of congressional hearings, conferences,
and books (Lenz, 2005).22 A number of books popularized arguments that hyperactivity
was not a real diagnosis, that it was created by drug companies to make money, or that it
was caused by food allergies and food additives (Schrag and Divosky, 1976; Feingold, 1976,
1975). A prominent book – Crisis in the Classroom by Charles Silberman – argued that
schools actually cause academic failure by imposing discipline and academic standards
that render children docile.
The growing acceptance of stimulant drug treatments that started in the 1960s receded
in the 1970s, as these negative reports surfaced (Ross and Ross, 1976; Sroufe and Stewart,
1973). Some psychiatrists began to break ranks and urge critical appraisal in light of the
22Federal Involvement in the Use of Behavior Modification Drugs on Grammar School Children of the
Right to Privacy Inquiry: Hearing Before the Spec. Studies Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Opera-
tions, 91st Cong. (1970).
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lack of evidence of long-term benefits from stimulant drug use (Sroufe and Stewart, 1973;
Sprague and Werry, 1971). A noteworthy dialogue in the New York Review of Books re-
vealed disagreement among experts as to the disorder (Douglas, 1970; Carrillo, 1970; Holt,
1970; Yanow, 1970). John Holt – an educator and staunch advocate for the perspective
that schools were causing academic failure – referred to the disorder as “fashionable quack-
ery which blames on the nervous symptoms of children the stupidities and inhumanities of
our schools,” while Canadian psychologist Virginia Douglas took the mainstream position
that “stimulants ... can produce significant improvement on a variety of behavioral and
cognitive measures.” Ultimately, confidence in a pharmaceutical solution waned for four
related reasons: the ill-defined boundaries of the three categories (MBD, LD, and hyper-
activity), concerns about the number of children thought to be using stimulant drugs, the
perspective that schools were promoting drugs to render the students docile, and the lack
of evidence of the long-term effects of the drugs (Freeman, 1976). The question, then, is
what macro conditions changed so that a second “epidemic” could occur. The medicaliza-
tion perspective points to pharmaceutical advertising in the 1990s, but I argue below that
the pharmaceutical “engine” is only a partial story. The pivotal factor was the shift in the
1980s to thinking of attention as the core symptom and the resulting cognitive interpreta-
tion of the disorder.
1.2.2.4 Triumph of Behavioral Diagnosis
Formation of New Communities Part of the explanation lies in the construction of
learning disabilities as an educational disorder with little to no emphasis on neurological
issues, which relegated the symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and poor impulse con-
trol to the periphery of the new educational category without relinquishing jurisdiction
over them entirely. In the 1970s, amidst the negative public response to the use of stimu-
lant drugs in children, advocates of the learning disabilities label mobilized in the political
arena, which led to the legislative recognition of disability rights for children with minor
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learning impairments. With a political goal to limit prevalence, advocates placed a pri-
mary emphasis on demonstrable weaknesses in particular school subjects relative to others.
That limitation had several additional advantages. It was in the purview of educators. It
promised a greater return to targeted intervention than a focus on “slow learners” would
have done. And it allowed enrollment to be targeted to the white middle-class children
whose lack of success in the classroom could not be otherwise explained (Carrier, 1983;
Ong-Dean, 2006; Sleeter, 2010, 1986).
In the wake of the civil rights legislation and the rights-based conception of disability,
Congress enacted Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975.23 The broader context of this legislation is discussed in Chapter 4, but, for current
purposes, this law is significant because – due to significant lobbying by the new learning
disabilities advocacy groups – it gave “specific learning disabilities” (SLD) official status
as a category eligible for funding. It remained unclear how learning disabilities would be
defined (and specifically whether the category would include children with symptoms of
either inattention or hyperactivity). Some, but not all, states had defined learning disabili-
ties to include deficits in attentiveness.24
To put these developments in context, a statutory predecessor, the Education of the
Handicapped Act,25 defined learning disabilities as:
a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in un-
derstanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may man-
ifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or
do mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such conditions as per-
ceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and de-
velopmental aphasis. Such term does not include children who have learning
23As discussed in Chapter 4, Congress previously had addressed the problem of educating the hand-
icapped in 1966 when it amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to establish a
grant program to assist states in the education of handicapped children.
24Mercer et al. (1976, 1985, 1996) track the definitions of learning disabilities used by States over time.
As part of a process of gradually moving towards the discrepancy standard, states began to remove atten-
tion and other process-oriented difficulties from their definitions and criteria. As of 1983, 8 states included
attention in their LD definitions or criteria (Mercer et al., 1985).
25Public Law 91-230, April 13, 1970, 84 Stat. 175 (modifying a grant program established in 1966).
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problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps,
of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of environmental disadvan-
tage (emphasis added).
The new federal statute was not explicit about how states and local school systems were
to identify students as having “specific learning disabilities,” but was accompanied by a
mandate to the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in the federal Department of
Education (the predecessor of the Office of Special Education Programs) to establish clas-
sification criteria for SLD that would provide guidance to states.26 Due to concerns about
potentially uncontrolled SLD prevalence, Congress established a temporary cap at 2% of
the population as part of the 1975 statute, pending the development of regulations that
would establish specific classification criteria for SLD.27
The proposed criteria published in the Federal Register took an almost exclusively
non-organic approach, defining a specific learning disability as a “severe discrepancy” be-
tween academic achievement and intellectual ability, with “severe discrepancy” being fur-
ther defined as “achievement in one or more of the areas fall[ing] at or below 50% of the
child’s expected achievement level, when age and previous educational experiences are
taken into account” (Federal Register, Nov. 29, 1976, 41:52405). Although the federal
statute referred to disorders in “basic psychological processes,” no mention of process-
ing deficiencies appeared in the proposed SLD regulations or in the revisions eventually
adopted. The state of research in the early to mid-1970s was thought to preclude using
processing deficits as the basis for classification criteria (Hammill and Larsen, 1978, 1974).
Existing ways to measure neurological processing were deemed inadequate in terms of
norms, reliability, and validity. Moreover, processing deficits were difficult to change through
remedial activities and, changes in processing competencies did not clearly translate into
26Public Law 94-198, November 29, 1975, 89 Stat. 777, 794; Federal Register, Nov. 29, 1976.
27Recall that earlier state- and local-funded programs faced severe budget constraints (Lazerson, 1983).
As a result, the congressional allocation formula specified that no more than 12 percent of the children
aged 5 through 17 could be considered handicapped and no more than one-sixth of the children eligible to
be considered handicapped could be children with specific learning disabilities. Federal Register, Nov. 29,
1976, 41:52401.
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improved academic performance in relevant domains such as reading, mathematics, and
written expression. In short, whatever their theoretical or medical import, educators did
not want to use processing deficits as a defining principle.
Relatively little discussion of the discrepancy criterion itself occurred at this time.
Most of the letters and presenters at public hearings were concerned with the formula for
establishing a severe discrepancy (Federal Register, Dec. 29, 1977, 42:65083-85). The con-
cerns related both to the use of a quantitative measure and to the psychometric adequacy
of the measure. Based on comments on the proposed regulations, the 50 percent figure for
determining “severe discrepancy” was removed. Although some states had defined SLD
to include attention disorders, the delineation of attention disorders and other learning
disorders never became a hot-button issue for those that lobbied regulators. In fact, SLD
was seen as a final common pathway of many things, including “legitimate” cases of atten-
tion problems. According to the regulatory history, “hyperactivity, distractibility, atten-
tion problems, concept association problem, etc.” were “symptoms;” “[t]he end result of
the effects of these symptoms is a severe discrepancy between achievement and ability.”28
The final SLD classification criteria were published just before the Congressional deadline,
averting the necessity for a 2% cap (34 C.F.R. 300.540-544).
A consensus on the best method to measure the discrepancy and the criteria for what
constituted “severe” has never been achieved. The criticism of the ability-achievement dis-
crepancy was that it did not establish a group of students with unique needs (Fletcher
et al., 2003). Most obviously, poor readers with IQs commensurate with their reading lev-
els and poor readers with higher IQs have similar needs and respond to the same kind of
instruction with comparable results. In other words, there was an enormous emphasis on
“potential” embedded in the definition (the significance of which is discussed in Chapter
28The Interagency Committee that was charged with developing a definition of learning disabilities
recommended a definition that would exclude learning problems that were a “direct result” of socioenvi-
ronmental influences, emotional disturbances, mental retardation, or attention disorders. Because other
aspects of that definition became problematic, the regulatory separation of learning disabilities and atten-
tion disorders never occurred.
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4). Moreover, the focus on discrepancy tended to delay treatment to later grades when the
child was farther behind peers and effective interventions were more difficult to implement.
Accepting those criticisms, when Congress reauthorized IDEA in 2004, it rejected the ap-
proach of the earlier regulations. Section 1414(b) of the statute now says that schools will
“not be required to take into consideration whether a child has a severe discrepancy be-
tween achievement and intellectual ability.” Implementing regulations went into effect
in 2006, which require states to permit local school districts to use any program that is
based on a child’s response to a research-based intervention (RTI) if the child does not
achieve adequately for his or her age or meet grade-level achievement standards (34 C.F.R.
300.307, 300.309). Most states have elected to permit students to establish eligibility using
either the RTI or the severe discrepancy tests (Zirkel, 2010). This means that an RTI that
targeted inattention (or another process-related deficiency) arguably would be sufficient to
establish a learning disability if it successfully improved achievement.
In the end, hyperactivity and MBD were separated from learning disabilities both be-
cause medical experts believed that stimulant drugs acted on behavioral symptoms more
than on cognitive domains (Conners, 2000) and because educators and advocates wanted
to define learning disabilities narrowly so that prevalence would be controlled. As three
educational psychologists explain:
a major step in the development of identification methods for LD was the drop-
ping of the even broader concepts such as minimal brain dysfunction (MBD)
and the recognition that MBD consisted of at least two groups of children:
those with difficulties primarily in the academic domain (LD) and those with
difficulties primarily in the behavioral domain (ADHD).
(Fletcher et al., 2003, p. 35). A further complication was that inattention was seen as a
processing deficit; the rejection of a process-oriented definition of learning disabilities inter-
fered with the incorporation of inattention under the LD umbrella. All in all, the politi-
cization of learning disabilities – or, we could say, the de-medical approach29 – allowed
29One of the major learning disabilities organizations – the Learning Disabilities Association of America
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learning disabilities advocates to progress in the political domain well ahead of the medical
experts who were seeking to establish validity of the clinical constructs MBD and hyperac-
tivity; as explained in the next section, a successful diagnostic category would not emerge
until 1980. From the perspective of educators, inattention had a fairly insignificant posi-
tion within the learning disabilities umbrella.30
Debates about Core Symptoms In the aftermath of the negative public response to
the use of stimulant drugs and the relegation of attention disorders to the fringe of the
learning disabilities movement, how did the category emerge and reach its present level of
success? Medical imperialism alone does not supply an answer because the medical profes-
sion had weakened considerably. One contributing factor was the carveout of perceptual
difficulties from learning disabilities, which left a gaping hole for attention disorders to
emerge. More fundamentally, the resolution of the etiological-functional dispute through
the rise of biological psychiatry provided legitimacy for a new diagnostic category. As a
result, rating scales were refined and sanctioned, which provided optimism that drug treat-
ments would be given to the right children. Most importantly, the scientization of the cat-
egory gave parents a reason to “buy in” because it ushered in new understandings of what
symptoms were “core.”
Following the Ritalin scare in the 1960s and 1970s, the research community was in
conflict – about the boundaries of categories, the measurement of symptoms and the util-
ity of diagnostic tools, and the alleged excesses in the use of stimulant drugs to treat tar-
get symptoms. The psychiatrists that promoted the MBD label remained primarily in-
terested in etiology; Wender (1971) was among the first to advance the hypotheses that
the disorder was genetic in origin and was mediated by decreased activity in dopaminergic
– now considers learning disabilities to be neurologically based processing problems. See their web site,
http://ldaamerica.org/types-of-learning-disabilities/.
30This point becomes clear when ADHD advocates begin to argue for incorporation into the IDEA.
At that time, educators argue that the symptoms are better handled within the confines of the learning
disabilities category (See Chapter 4).
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systems in the brain. Laufer and the other psychiatrists that promoted the hyperactivity
label remained primarily interested in building upon Bradley’s drug research using tech-
nologies that depended on correlations between the users that were effected by the stimu-
lants and abnormal EEG responses. Laufer and Denhoff (1957) believed that hyperactivity
was caused by trauma and not genetics and also felt that the symptoms of hyperactivity
were outgrown. It is a safe assumption that parents did not push for either label at this
juncture because neither category was linked to unexplained academic failure.
The contemporary definition of an attention disorder emerged from the interplay of
different forms of medical knowledge. Starting in the 1970s and continuing to present,
new groups of experts began to revisit (and ultimately engaged in substantial debates)
about the core symptoms of the disorder. Much of this research was performed not by
medical experts, but by psychologists that moved in as medicine proper became less dom-
inant. There was a huge increase in publications concerned with attention beginning in
1970s. Psychologists including Michael Posner, Donald Broadbent, Alan Baddeley, Joseph
Sergeant, and others make headway with cognitive studies of attention and, in particular,
with the study of different aspects of attention, including information processing models of
selective attention, investigations of divided attention, interest in sustained attention, and
observations of impaired cognitive skills in neurological patients (Cornish and Wilding,
2010). Much of this research focused on performance enhancement – of soldiers, air traf-
fic controllers, etc. – rather than study of brain-injured individuals (Cornish and Wilding,
2010). Even the way that the research viewed attentiveness deficits shifted from behavioral
(disorganization, forgetfulness, distractibility, poor concentration) to cognitive (differenti-
ating irrelevant information from relevant, switching focus, etc.)
Also significant were the growing threats that psychiatry faced, leading to the gradual
adoption of a symptom-based, categorical orientation that privileged functional symptoms
over “medical” causes across the board (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005; Smith, 2008). The pub-
lication of DSM-III in 1980 “triggered a paradigm shift in how society came to view men-
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tal health” (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005, at 265). A symptom-based approach was adopted
across-the-board to replace the psychodynamic approach used in DSM-I and DSM-II. With
the DSM-III, psychiatrists gradually began to address the symptoms of mental illness with
drugs rather than psychotherapy.31 There was a perception that diagnostic reliability was
needed before substantial empirical research could proceed (First, 2010; Mayes and Hor-
witz, 2005; McBurnett and Lahey, 1993). Further, insurance companies and the govern-
ment were reluctant to provide reimbursement without a more objective demonstration
of the utility of treatment. DSM-III thus motivated private investment in new drugs by
aligning the incentives of clinicians, insurers, the government, and pharmaceutical compa-
nies (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005), which meant that the NIMH would no longer be the only
substantial investor in pediatric psychopharmacology.
The DSM-III categories remained theory-neutral in regards to etiology, focusing in-
stead on symptom manifestation. Within the new framework, DSM-III separated hyper-
kinetic reaction (the DSM-II label) into three behavioral disorders – attention deficit dis-
order, oppositional defiant disorder, and conduct disorder – appearing under the heading
“disorders usually first evident in infancy, childhood, or adolescence” and the subheading
“behavioral.”32 With the new work on attention coming from different medical disciplines,
the predominant clinical focus on hyperactivity shifted toward an emphasis on attention
problems. In a paper addressed to the Canadian Psychological Association, Virginia Dou-
glas (1972, p. 260) (see also Douglas and Peters, 1979) argued “that the inability of these
children to sustain attention and to keep impulsive responding under control may be even
more important symptoms” than hyperactivity. She suggested that a short attention span
might contribute to the impression of excessive activity and pointed out that recent stud-
31Largely influenced by Freud, American psychiatrists during the first half of the twentieth century used
psychoanalytic approaches that attributed psychiatric problems to familial and environmental effects for
nearly all clinically-referred children in the United States (Leffers, 1997, pp. 90-93). The application of
behavioral and cognitive-behavioral interventions to children identified as hyperactive began in the 1960s
and became more widespread during the 1970s.
32The word “learning” was not used in DSM-III, but disorders of reading, arithmetic, language, and
articulation were categorized in DSM-III as “specific developmental disorders.”
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ies indicated that stimulant treatments seemed to exert their “main effect by helping the
hyperactive child sustain attention and control impulsivity” (Douglas, 1972, p. 271). Dou-
glas’ paper was influential at the time and provoked further research on the issue and ulti-
mately initiated a change in the conceptualization of the disorder (Barkley, 2005), leading
to the construction of a disorder that reflected (and continues to reflect) an uneasy associ-
ation of behavioral and cognitive symptoms. DSM-III took the position that hyperactivity
was no longer an essential diagnostic criterion for the disorder and that the syndrome oc-
curred in two types “with or without hyperactivity” (Conners, 2000). The symptoms thus
were grouped into two subtypes for inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity; the criteria
for each subcategory were listed separately to suggest that these characteristics had equal
import. The primacy of the inattention symptom benefited from the understanding that
“when [hyperactive children] grow older they become less active but attentional problems
and impulsivity problems remain” (Douglas, 1972, p. 275).
To improve the criteria with respect to then-current empirical validation, the revision
of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
III-R) in 1987 removed the concept of two subtypes and renamed the disorder “Attention
Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).” The symptoms of inattention, impulsivity, and
hyperactivity were combined into a single list of symptoms with a single cutoff score set
at 8 symptoms (McBurnett and Lahey, 1993). The symptoms were empirically derived by
rating scales and a field trial (Conners, 2000). The subtype “ADD without hyperactivity”
was removed and assigned to a residual category named “undifferentiated ADD.” DSM-
III-R retained “specific developmental disorders,” but as a subgroup of “developmental dis-
orders,” the other two subgroups being mental retardation and pervasive developmental
disorders. DSM-III-R should have had no significant effect on ADHD prevalence.
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1.2.2.5 Response Inhibition Model and Adult ADHD
Modern Research Trends In the 1990s, three significant but related research devel-
opments appeared to have enormous influence on the expert medical understanding of the
disorder, which allowed a coalition to build in support of the diagnosis. One development
related to advances in neuroimaging techniques, contributing to the re-invigoration of the
idea that frontal lobe impairment is responsible for ADHD symptoms. Although the EEG
allowed researchers to detect electrical activity in the brain, new neuroimaging techniques
allowed a visual study of the developmental course of the normal brain (Casey et al., 2008)
and enabled research into many areas of the brain that are thought to be affected in in-
dividuals with ADHD. Using MRIs, researchers found evidence that the prefrontal and
frontal lobes, basal ganglia, and cerebellum are smaller in individuals with ADHD (Castel-
lanos and Tannock, 2002; Castellanos et al., 2002; Zametkin et al., 1990). In addition,
PET scans provided evidence of reduced blood flow in the frontal lobes and basal ganglia
in persons with ADHD. Dumit (2000) points out that the applicability of this brain scan
research to understanding psychiatric disorders was contested within the larger research
community. However, he argues that this preliminary brain scan research became central
to decision-making about ADHD, supplying “a ‘gold standard’ of demonstrative proof of
neurobiological involvement” (Dumit, 2000, p. 222).
Evidence of genetic heritability of ADHD also made an important contribution to the
process of diagnostic expansion. Adoption, twin, and family studies established a strong
genetic etiology for ADHD (Barkley and Lombroso, 2000; Biederman et al., 1990; Cornish
and Wilding, 2010; Kieling et al., 2008; Sandberg and Barton, 2002; Sharp et al., 2009;
Waldman and Gizer, 2006). In a review of twin studies dating back to the early 1970s,
Faraone et al. (2005) found an average heritability rate of 76 percent. Researchers agreed,
however, that environmental risk factors and potential gene and environment interactions
also increase the risk for the disorder (Banerjee et al., 2007). The accumulating genetic
evidence also revealed that the disorder was more heterogeneous than previously thought
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(Kuntsi et al., 2014; Willcutt et al., 2010), both in terms of clinical presentation but also
in terms of etiologic bases. Although there is no direct mapping of genes on a given chro-
mosome to phenotypes, researchers attempted to establish susceptibility genes that con-
tribute to the ADHD phenotype (Castellanos and Tannock, 2002; Kieling et al., 2008).
Numerous molecular genetic studies of association and linkage between attention issues
and a variety of candidate genes have been conducted during the past 15 years; the major-
ity of the candidate genes studied underlie various facets of the dopamine, norepinephrine,
and serotonin neurotransmitter systems, although the etiological role of candidate genes
outside of neurotransmitter systems have also been examined (Cornish and Wilding, 2010;
Waldman and Gizer, 2006).33 There is no clear consensus across studies of different can-
didate genes and their relationships to ADHD (Stevenson et al., 2005; Cornish and Wild-
ing, 2010). Yet, as in the case of autism spectrum disorders (Liu et al., 2010), overstating
the importance of the heritability estimates has allowed researchers to build the case that
ADHD is a genetically-transmitted disorder (Wender, 1997).
The third research development – and perhaps the most significant – was the marked
increase in neuroscience studies of executive functions (Castellanos, 1997; Jurado and Rosselli,
2007; Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996), which helped to stabilize the behavioral-cognitive
association and to resurrect the possibility of ADHD as a form of learning problem. Build-
ing on cognitive psychology research on attention,34 executive functions describe all of the
tasks – coordinated in the frontal lobe – that relate to the management of cognitive pro-
cesses. These tasks include time management, attention, planning and organizing, remem-
33For the most part, attention issues are treated as symptoms of genetic disorders, such that genetic
mutations are not really seen as candidate loci for ADHD. The relationship between geneticization and
the genetic makeup of populations can be complex, as others have observed. In the case of autism, for
example, “geneticization” played an important role in diagnostic expansion, and expansion, in turn, con-
tributed to the genetic heterogeneity now associated with autism (Navon and Eyal, 2016, 2014). Unlike
the case of Fragile X and autism, I have found little evidence of any constituency attempting to link the
genetic disorders associated with attention problems to ADHD (perhaps because its validity is so heavily
contested).
34The executive function literature builds on Broadbent’s (1958) “selective attention,” Baddeley’s (1992)
“working memory,” and Posner’s (1990) “cognitive control,” among others.
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bering details, curbing inappropriate behaviors, and problem solving (Jurado and Rosselli,
2007; Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996). Executive functions are now associated with expla-
nations for learning disabilities, ADHD, and other developmental disorders. Of importance
here, the executive function literature became a catalyst for another shift in conceptions
about the core symptoms of the disorder. The core symptom debate reached its apex in
the early 1990s when Russell Barkley (1997b; 1994) – a clinical psychologist who became
a key advocate for the validity of the disorder – proposed a “unifying theory” of ADHD in
which response inhibition is the “central impairment” (1994, p. 13).35 Barkley concluded
that persons with ADHD have difficulties with executive functions served by the prefrontal
lobes that flow from the capacity for delayed response (including working memory, inner
speech, and self-regulation of emotions); Barkley compared his theory to the Still postulate
that similar symptoms stemmed from a defect in “moral control” (Barkley, 1994, p. 13):
Within the past decade a number of findings from various laboratories using
diverse methodologies have converged on a common conclusion akin to Still’s.
The central impairment in ADHD relative to other psychopathologies in chil-
dren is one of response inhibition or behavioral impulsivity.
Acknowledging that other researchers had made similar assertions, he claimed to be the
first to “explain just how such a deficit leads to the diverse impairments” associated with
ADHD (Barkley, 1994, p. 19). He proposed to jettison the inattentive type of ADHD, con-
cerned that it and the hyperactivity-impulsivity or combined types actually are separate
disorders (Barkley, 1997b). Other researchers disagreed, retaining the belief that weakness
in attentional control is the core impairment (Cornish and Wilding, 2010). For those re-
searchers, poor inhibition should not be seen as a “definitional” because it occurs in many
other behavioral disorders (Sergeant et al., 2002).
Barkley’s views were influential but not dispositive in the drafting of DSM-IV. Dissat-
isfied with the single list of symptoms in DSM-III-TR, drafters relied on factor analyses
that suggested a two-factor solution, with hyperactivity-impulsivity and inattentiveness as
35Barkley is the researcher who compared ADHD science to the “laws of gravity,” as discussed above.
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separate subgroups. The number of symptoms necessary for a diagnosis under either sub-
group was set arbitrarily, in an (unsuccessful) effort to control prevalence (Lakoff, 2000;
McBurnett and Lahey, 1993). The impairment criterion was added, and the diagnostic
category was placed in the group of Attention Deficit and Disruptive Behavior Disorders,
reflecting Barkley’s behavioral inhibition thesis. DSM-IV also renamed developmental dis-
orders as “disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood, or adolescence”; the word
“specific” vanished from all levels of classification and learning disorders was reinstated as
a main subgroup alongside motor skills disorder and communication disorders. There were
no material changes to the diagnostic category in the DSM-IVR in 2000, so from 1994 to
2013, ADHD was considered a behavioral disorder (consistent with Barkley’s response in-
hibition model), although the inattentiveness subgroup was not dropped entirely.
Although the changes purported to be minor, DSM-5 moved a significant step away
from the response inhibition model of ADHD towards a cognitive understanding of the
disorder. A set of studies published after 1994 renewed support for a two-dimensional syn-
drome (inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity) by examining predicted types of comor-
bidity associated with each dimension; the first dimension is associated with learning prob-
lems, and the second with oppositional and conduct problems (Frick and Nigg, 2012).36
As a result of this work, the drafters of DSM-5 changed the clustering of disorders within
subchapters. According to work group members (Frick and Nigg, 2012, p. 85), “on bal-
ance, ADHD is best thought of as a neurodevelopmental condition rather than primarily
or solely a behavioral condition.” Thus, both ADHD and LD are clustered within “Neu-
rodevelopmental Disorders.” This separates ADHD conceptually from oppositional defiant
disorder and conduct disorder (which are now clustered under the heading “Disruptive, Im-
pulse Control, and Conduct Disorders”) and reunites it with learning disabilities (which
36Earlier work exploring an empirical meta-structure of DSM disorders that juxtaposed externalizing
and internalizing dimensions excluded learning disorders, autism spectrum disorders, motor disorders, and
language disorders. Newer studies that find that ADHD clusters with autistic symptoms, motor coordi-
nation, and reading problems have undermined the association of ADHD with behavioral disorders. (See
generally Frick and Nigg, 2012).
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also have begun to be seen as deficiencies in executive function) (Tannock, 2013; Kupfer
et al., 2013). There remains considerable disagreement about whether ADHD can be bro-
ken into subtypes that share phenotype commonalities. Derefinko et al. (2008) reported
different cognitive and behavioral styles between children with the inattentive subtype
and the combined subtype, the former was characterized by a cognitive sluggish tempo.
Consistent with Barkley’s earlier reasoning, sluggish cognitive tempo is now seen by some
as a new disorder or a new dimension of ADHD (Lee et al., 2014; Moruzzi et al., 2014;
Schwarz, 2014; Watabe et al., 2014). Conceptions of the disorder as behavioral or cognitive
continue to evolve, and I would argue that the cluster research says less about the shifting
nomenclature than the related effort to extend the category to reach adults – which was
thought to be necessary because medical specialists already were making these diagnoses.
An ADHD Community Forms Although the brain imaging research was formative
and contested as applied, the genetic research was inconclusive, and the executive function
literature was theoretical, those three research trends were significant to the formation of a
coalition in support of the ADHD label in the late 1980s. A factor of similar import, how-
ever, was the ramp-up of special education programs for relatively high-functioning chil-
dren with mild learning disabilities.37 The primary parent advocacy group, Children and
Adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD), was formed in 1987, in
southern Florida, when two parents (a homemaker and a speech pathologist) organized
a meeting with clinical psychologist Harvey Parker to provide information to people in
the local community about ADHD (Chandler, 1987; Doto, 1987; Hulse, 1993; Lade, 1987;
Saslow, 1991; Vigoda, 1991; Wood, 1988).38 The organization expanded – first statewide
and then nationally – within just a few years. The staff and board of advisors is composed
of psychiatrists, psychologists, educators, and lawyers, many of whom are parents of chil-
37The largest growth in the number of students served with specific learning disabilities occurred in the
late 1970s and 1980s (U.S. Department of Education, 2013).
38The Journal of Attention Disorders was first published in 1996, trailing the formation of parent advo-
cacy groups by almost 10 years.
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dren with ADHD or identify as having ADHD themselves. Beyond providing information
to parents and thus reducing doubt about the legitimacy of the disorder (Barker, 2011;
Rabeharisoa, 2006), a primary aim of the group is to lobby the federal and state govern-
ments on issues pertaining to ADHD. Near the time of its formation, the group became
heavily involved in lobbying Congress to provide special education services to students
with ADHD – an effort that was partially successful; ADHD was recognized in depart-
mental regulations but not in the federal statute. CHADD has adopted a medical under-
standing or interpretation of the disorder. Its website refers to ADHD as a neurobiological
disorder, and it promotes multimodal treatments – meaning stimulant and non-stimulant
drugs, along with behavioral intervention strategies, and educational programs and accom-
modations.39 CHADD has been criticized heavily for accepting funding from pharmaceuti-
cal companies (about one-third of its overall funding) (Schwarz, 2013b).
The state of research and the new advocacy groups spawned a new market for adult
testimonies and self-help books. The idea that adults can have ADHD had appeared in
clinical papers for some time, but only became popularized in the 1990s (Barkley et al.,
2010). Studies that followed children with the disorder into adolescence and adulthood
found that the impulsivity and inattentive symptoms persisted over time, even if the hy-
peractivity symptoms receded. The new conception of executive dysfunction allowed the
disorder to be conceived as a disorder of the cognitive management system rather than a
behavioral disorder of childhood.
This is an important part of the process of looping, because adults began to work to
persuade others about the reality and seriousness of the disorder and the usefulness of
39Advocacy groups differ not just based on the network of expertise that they can build upon but also
on their contributions to that network. Edwards et al. (2014), for example, compares parent advocacy
groups in Ireland and France. Although groups in both countries (as in the United States) aim to augment
parental understanding of what ADHD is and how it can be managed, the differences between the groups
relate to the acceptance of a multiplicity of epistemic practices. In Ireland, as in the United States, ADHD
is seen as a neurobiological disorder, and treatment options are focused on individual-level responses that
have scientific validity in the research community, while in France, ADHD is not reduced to a neurobiolog-
ical disorder, and treatments options consider the individual child and the environment.
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medication. For example, Time Magazine ran a cover story in July 1994 on adult ADHD.
The cover photo displayed a disheveled adult male wearing a suit and tie and including
the caption “Disorganized? Distracted? Discombobulated? Doctors Say You May Have
ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER. It’s not just kids who suffer from it.” The same is-
sue included a review of Hail to the Hyperactive, a book that argued that characteristics
associated with ADHD like impulsiveness, high energy, and risk taking are highly repre-
sented in the U.S. gene pool. Parents increasingly began to recognize ADHD symptoms in
themselves and separate parent groups grew out of the CHADD meetings. Several promi-
nent psychiatrists used the popular press to promote stimulant treatments for ADHD as
a panacea for distracted, impulsive youth. Edward Hallowell (1994, pp. 24, 48, 82, 295)’s
best-selling book Driven to Distraction used a prosthetic metaphor, comparing medica-
tion to “a pair of eyeglasses, helping the individual to focus.” He offered an account of the
symptoms with which many adults could identify: “So many adults with ADD have piles,
little mess-piles, big mess-piles, piles everywhere. They are like a by-product of the brain’s
work” Hallowell (1994, p. 98). And more: “People with ADD also love cars. ADD loves
movement. Many adults with ADD report that their best thinking is done while driving.
And people with ADD love big cities” (Hallowell, 1994, p. 98). In a 2005 sequel, Deliv-
ered from Distraction, Hallowell and Ratey (2005, xxiii) moved even further towards a
performance-enhancing rhetoric: “If you don’t get help, ADD can curse you and make you
wretched. But if you work it right, ADD can enhance your life and make you sparkle.”40
The diagnosis offered the benefit of allowing adults “to reframe the past in a more positive
and realistic light” (Murphy and Levert, 1995, p. 104). Indeed, based on interviews con-
ducted at several evaluation sites, Leffers (1997) argues that the popularity of the category
and all it entailed was sufficient to motivate many adults actively to seek a medical diag-
nosis. Murphy and Levert (1995) explain the role of ADHD therapy for adults as empow-
40The prosthetic metaphor made less sense once it became clear that stimulant drugs could increase
attention for all who took them (Leffers, 1997).
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ering. Therapy aims to “help patients fully understand the disorder and how it manifests
itself in their lives” so that “adults can chang[e] the behaviors or circumstances [they] dis-
like and enhanc[e] [their] strengths and assets” (Murphy and Levert, 1995, p. 104). Ther-
apy also involves letting others know about the disorder and its effects, which allows af-
fected adults to “repair[] any past damage” and to “pav[e] the way to a more stable, fruitful
future” (Murphy and Levert, 1995, p. 104). Thus, more than the cluster research described
above, popular support for a cognitive interpretation of the disorder, consistent with adult
symptoms – many of whose behavioral symptoms had subsided – led to a reinterpretation
of the disorder from behavioral to neurodevelopmental. As a consequence, the number of
adults (particularly women) using stimulant drugs has risen rapidly, reversing the child-
hood and adolescent gender gap favoring males (Express Scripts, 2014).
Coalescing Around Pharmaceutical Treatment Research into the effects of stim-
ulant drugs for children with ADHD symptoms began in earnest in the 1960s, and by the
1970s, drugs were being prescribed for non-institutionalized children of all social classes.
At that time, most medical professionals considered stimulant drugs to be an effective
treatment for children who manifested hyperactivity as a primary symptom (Kavale, 1982;
Hinshaw et al., 1997; Richters et al., 1995), although drugs often were used alongside be-
havioral or cognitive-behavioral treatments. Consensus emerged, however, that despite
the apparent short-term gains in behavior attributable to stimulant medications, few data
from well-designed studies existed. The existing research did not address the effects of
stimulant drugs compared to therapeutic approaches. It often measured improvement
against subjective markers such as teacher responsiveness to children with drugs (Whalen
et al., 1980). It produced little evidence linking drugs to improvement in learning or other
functional domains (Swanson et al., 1991; Swanson and McBurnett, 1993). Most impor-
tantly, it did not track symptom alleviation over the longer term. The research community
perceived that a longitudinal, multi-site study was needed (Hinshaw et al., 1997; Richters
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et al., 1995).
To address concerns with previous drug research, the National Institute of Mental
Health and the Office of Special Education Programs in the Department of Education
initiated a large-scale longitudinal study in 1992 and enrolled the first subjects in 1994
(Arnold et al., 1997; Hinshaw et al., 1997; Richters et al., 1995). The study considered the
effectiveness of several interventions in treating children (7-9 years of age) with ADHD.
Nearly 600 children with ADHD (only the combined subtype) were randomly assigned to
four groups: a “community care” group (the control group, where children continued to re-
ceive whatever care they otherwise were receiving), a medication management group where
stimulant medication was provided under close supervision (which consisted of initial titra-
tion followed by monthly visits), a psychosocial treatment group with school and home
components,41 and a combined medication management and psychosocial treatment group.
The treatment was provided during a 14-month period, and the children were observed
at periodic intervals for 15 years after study treatments ceased. According to interviews
by New York Times staff with several of the researchers that worked on the study, “[t]he
study was structured to emphasize the reduction of impulsivity and inattention symptoms,
for which medication is designed to deliver quick results” (Schwarz, 2013a). For example,
researchers initially used 14 outcome measures that relied heavily on parent and teacher
ratings of symptoms, and even though the medication treatment was adjusted to the sub-
ject’s response, the behavioral intervention was “one size fits all.”
The study’s primary paper, published in 1999, concluded that medication “was supe-
rior to behavioral treatment and to routine community care.” Just as important was the
conclusion that the combined, multimodal treatment “did not yield significantly greater
benefits than medication” for the core symptoms (MTA Cooperative Group, 1999a, p.
1073). For most outcomes, children in the combined treatment and the medication man-
41Psychosocial treatment included three components: direct behavioral treatment of the child, parent
training, and school-based intervention, all of which were integrated and administered by a consulting
behavioral therapist (Arnold et al., 1997).
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agement groups showed significantly greater improvement than those given intensive psy-
chosocial treatment and community care.42 Combined and medication management treat-
ments did not differ significantly on any direct comparisons, but for some outcomes com-
bined treatment proved superior to intensive psychosocial treatment or community care
while medication management did not. The takeaway was that medical management pro-
duced substantial improvement in symptoms (compared to community care and psychoso-
cial treatments), but that the returns to the combined medication and psychosocial treat-
ments were “modest” when compared to medication management alone (MTA Cooperative
Group, 1999a, p. 1073).43 Further analyses showed that psychosocial treatments were not
likely to be cost effective in most cases (Foster et al., 2007; Jensen et al., 2005).44
Follow-up studies that re-analyzed the data came to somewhat different conclusions.
For example, studies that accumulated the different outcomes into a single composite out-
come measure provided greater support for the multimodal treatment. Swanson et al.
(2001) found that the multimodal treatment produced about 12 percent more “successes”
than the medication treatment. They also found that the inability to demonstrate statis-
tically significant effects of psychosocial treatments over community care resulted from off-
42Children who received the combined treatment did better than children in the community care or psy-
chosocial treatment groups on these outcomes: parent- and teacher-reported inattention; parent-reported
hyperactivity-impulsivity, oppositional/aggressive behaviors, and internalizing symptoms; and reading
achievement. There were no significant differences in the effects of treatment assignment on classroom
observation, math achievement, and other parent- and teacher-reported social and emotional behaviors.
Combined management and medication did not differ significantly on direct comparisons, but in several
instances combined management was superior to behavioral management and community care, while medi-
cation management was not (MTA Cooperative Group, 2004).
43The authors noted that the loss of power caused by Bonferonni corrections from the choice to use 19
primary outcome measures resulted in a high chance “of declaring effect sizes lower than 0.4 not statis-
tically significant, even though some clinicians might regard such effects as clinically significant” (MTA
Cooperative Group, 1999a, p. 1083).
44Jensen et al. (2005) quantified this point, finding that over the 14-month duration of the study, the
per-child cost of medication management was least expensive, followed by intensive behavioral treatment,
followed by these two treatments combined. Foster et al. (2007), in contrast, found that the preferred
cost-effective treatment varies as a function of the child’s comorbidity; for “pure” ADHD, medication
management appears likely to be most cost-effective, while for some comorbid conditions, the most cost-
effective choice (considering long-term ramifications) involves behavior therapy. Most recently, Page et al.
(2016) finds that a cost-saving strategy would be to begin treatment for ADHD children with a low dose of
behavior modification before moving to pharmacological solutions.
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setting positive and negative effects, depending on the site at which the intervention oc-
curred (meaning the quality of therapeutic or medical care can be a differentiating factor).
Conners et al. (2001) found that the combined treatment was significantly better than
medication alone (with a small effect size). They concluded that the study’s primary pa-
per “ha[s] been widely misinterpreted as showing that combined treatment is equivalent to
medication alone and offers no advantages over medication alone” (Conners et al., 2001, p.
160). Other follow-up studies have highlighted the variability in effects, depending on the
existence of comorbid conditions, changes in family discipline style during the intervention
period, and the subject’s socio-economic status (Hinshaw et al., 2015).
Moreover, when researchers followed up with the sample after the 14-month treatment
period, they found that the effects of medication treatments had begun to dissipate. The
initial advantage of medication reduced by half by the first follow-up evaluation, which
was 10 months after the termination of treatment (MTA Cooperative Group, 2004). By
the next follow-up, 22 months after the end of the treatment, there were no longer signif-
icant treatment group differences in symptoms (Jensen et al., 2007; Molina et al., 2007;
Swanson et al., 2007). Despite the poor results, NIMH’s press release announcing the re-
sults of the latter paper was titled “Improvement Following ADHD Treatment Sustained in
Most Children,” referring to the obvious conclusion that all children showed an improve-
ment in symptoms regardless of the treatment group to which they had been assigned.45
Later follow-up papers showed that, even controlling for continued medication use during
the follow-up period, the initial treatment assignment did not predict the previously-used
outcome measures 6 or 8 years later; nor did treatment group predict other outcomes in-
cluding grades, arrests, and psychiatric hospitalizations (Molina et al., 2009).46
45The press release is found at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2007/improvement-
following-adhd-treatment-sustained-in-most-children.shtml.
46There were some small but significant effects. Children who received the multimodal treatment had
fewer school services (i.e. special education) at 6 years than children who received the psychosocial treat-
ment alone. Similarly, children who in the psychosocial treatment group had significantly lower rates of
having diagnoses of anxiety or depression than the children in the other groups. A secondary analysis
showed children with behavioral and sociodemographic advantage, with the best response to any treat-
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The evidence in support of pharmaceutical and psychosocial treatments and their com-
bination remains mixed. There is some evidence that stimulant drugs normalize brain
structure, as measured by MRI (Spencer et al., 2013). And hundreds of studies continue
to identify short-term symptom improvements associated with the use of stimulant drugs
(Faraone and Buitelaar, 2009; Greenhill et al., 2002; Paykina et al., 2007). Yet recent stud-
ies using observational data find little evidence of long-term benefits of medication on aca-
demic success (Currie et al., 2014).47 It is not clear why the symptomatic improvements
associated with drugs are associated with such small effects on long-term academic out-
comes (Langberg and Becker, 2012). The inability of drugs that improve attention to pro-
duce long-term academic and social outcomes generally has been attributed to offsetting
effects (Advokat and Scheithauer, 2013), dosage levels that are suboptimal for improving
cognitive domains, or effects that are sufficiently small that they cannot be accurately
measured. It is also possible that the claims about treatment success have kept children
from developing other needed skills.
Behavioral therapy has become the second most commonly used intervention for ADHD,
and many studies have documented its short-term effectiveness (Evans et al., 2014; Pel-
ham et al., 1998; Pelham and Fabiano, 2008; Pelham et al., 2016). Yet Sonuga-Barke et al.
(2013) finds no such support, and other longer-term trials have raised questions about the
effectiveness whether psychosocial treatments in fact provide any significant increment
over medication alone in terms of improving core outcomes (Abikoff et al., 2004). A re-
cent metastudy concluded that stimulant drugs have shown greater effects on symptoms,
but that behavioral therapy has shown greater effects on functional impairment outcomes
(including work accuracy, grades, lecture notes, essay length and accuracy, and assignment
completion) (Sibley et al., 2014).
ment, had the best long-term outcomes.
47There are some that do find evidence. Using data from Iceland, Zoëga et al. (2012a) links medication
use and national exam databases. They associate a later start of stimulant drugs with an academic decline
in math.
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Without regard to the apparently negligible long-term benefits to using stimulant drugs,
it has been widely reported – both in the academic literature and the mainstream press
– that an increasing share of the adolescent and young adult population has used stimu-
lant drugs to improve productivity and focus (Arria and DuPont, 2010; Greely et al., 2008;
Petrow, 2013; Schwarz, 2012a,b; Talbot, 2009; Wilens et al., 2008). The use of stimulant
drugs to enhance performance (without a diagnosis) has become common in schools and
the workplace. In the 1950s, medical experts believed that stimulant drugs worked exclu-
sively to improve the behavior of children with a neurological defect (and in fact used drug
responsiveness as an indicator of a defect). With the discovery that stimulant drugs work
just as well for everyone, there seems to be little to prevent casual drug use. Indeed, the
use of stimulant drugs by college students and other young adults itself tends to support
the idea that the drugs increase short-term focus.
To summarize, despite the lack of evidence linking drugs to long-term benefits, stim-
ulant medications have become the preferred treatment for more than half of those diag-
nosed. A significant but smaller share of those diagnosed are treated with other pharma-
ceutical products, cognitive or behavioral therapy, or special education services, either in
addition to or instead of stimulant drug treatments, as will be discussed in Chapter 2. Al-
though other studies have been conducted, the results of the MTA study (particularly the
findings from the primary paper) were widely publicized. The primary finding – that stim-
ulant drugs were superior to psychosocial treatments – “has become a pillar of pharmaceu-
tical companies’ campaigns to market [ADHD] drugs, and is used by insurance companies
and school systems to argue against therapies that are usually more expensive than pills”
(Schwarz, 2013a, see also Vedantam, 2009 “The drugs’ manufacturers distributed thou-
sands of reprints of the article to physicians at a time when diagnoses of ADHD were spi-
raling upward.”). The question, then, is what role pharmaceutical companies and medical
professionals have had in pushing this second “epidemic” in stimulant drug use.
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1.2.3 Medicalization Explanations for Stimulant Drug Use
Medicalization proponents argue that the dominance of the medical profession and (later)
aggressive promotions of stimulant drugs to doctors and the public resulted in an ADHD
epidemic. I take up this topic in Chapter 2, but there are two brief points to make now
about the relationship between the use of stimulant drugs as the primary treatment for
ADHD and the roles of medical professionals and pharmaceutical companies.
First, there is little evidence that medical professionals led the drive toward the cre-
ation or use of the ADHD label or the stimulant treatment. The leading pediatric medical
organizations were followers in the drive to treat ADHD symptoms with stimulant drugs,
moving from lukewarm to guardedly positive views on the topic. The American Academy
of Pediatrics (AAP) published its first statement on the topic in 1975, in which it found
“a place for stimulant drugs in the treatment of hyperkinetic children” (Kugel et al., 1975,
p. 561), but cautioned about the “confusion in relation to diagnosis and appropriate crite-
ria for the use of medication” (Kugel et al., 1975, p. 560). After the adoption of the term
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, the AAP issued a new statement in 1986 that of-
fered “indications for drug therapy in the treatment of attention deficit disorder,” but cau-
tioned about side effects as well as overzealous educators: “In view of requests from other
professionals and school personnel to prescribe medications for hyperkinetic children, pedi-
atricians should be cautious of becoming surrogate prescribers of medications” (Committee
on Children With Disabilities and Committee on Drugs, 1987, p. 759).
The AAP now advocates for a combined or integrated approach. An updated report,
Medication for Children With Attention Disorders, published in 1996, indicated that drug
therapy “results in significant improvement in 70% to 80% of properly diagnosed children”
but that it should be used as part of an “integrated approach” along with “[p]roper class-
room placement, behavior modification, counseling, and provision of structure” (Commit-
tee on Children and Disabilities and Committee on Drugs, 1996, p. 302). More recently,
the AAP issued two additional reports (Subcommittee on Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Dis-
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order and Management, 2011; Subcommittee on Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,
2001), with different treatment indications (the sequencing of drugs and behavioral ther-
apies) for different age groups (Charach et al., 2011; Jadad et al., 1999; Subcommittee on
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Management, 2011). By contrast, the Amer-
ican Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry – perhaps the organization that has
been the most public in its support of a medication-only strategy – recommends beginning
medication immediately and supplementing with additional medication when necessary
(Pliszka, 2007). Psychosocial treatment is recommended as a secondary treatment only if
there is an insufficient response to medication. The American Psychological Association,
however, recommends beginning with psychosocial treatments and adding medication if
those treatments are insufficient (American Psychological Association, 2006). Others rec-
ommend starting with both treatments simultaneously (http://www.chadd.org).
It appears that the resistance to dual treatment approaches – drugs and therapy –
stems more from the unwillingness of insurers to cover psychotherapy treatments than
from the activism of medical professionals. In a survey of physicians, Hoagwood et al.
(2000) found substantial insurance-related constraints associated with the provision of psy-
chosocial services to children with ADHD diagnoses. If true, the demand for the stimu-
lant drugs comes not from physicians, but from elsewhere. It also is important to recog-
nize that stimulant drugs reduce the autonomy of psychiatrists and doctors (e.g. Whooley,
2010), and therefore they are uneasy with it (as demonstrated by the published recom-
mendations). To that end, Klasen (2000), based on interviews with doctors and families,
finds that parents valued ADHD labeling as an important aspect of validation and legit-
imation, while doctors were reluctant because of concerns about scapegoating and self-
fulfilling prophecies.
Second, the aggressive promotion of stimulant drugs to doctors and the public is an
insufficient explanation for the second ADHD epidemic. One part of this claim is that
the epidemic started in the late 1990s because of legal changes related to advertising to
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physicians and consumers. Proponents of this argument point to U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) guidelines that facilitated direct-to-consumer television advertising
(Conrad and Leiter, 2008; Payton and Thoits, 2011), as well as a law that allowed adver-
tising of off-label uses, subject to a variety of constraints, both in the late 1990s. Although
there has been a dramatic increase in promotions to physicians and direct-to-consumer
advertising since the late 1990s (Donohue et al., 2007), the legal changes cannot explain
the current epidemic. Print drug ads directed to consumers have been prominent since
1985 (Palumbo and Mullins, 2002), and off-label prescriptions and uses were both com-
mon practices well before the passage of the law regarding marketing of those uses (Salbu,
1999). Moreover, as the previous section argues, the popular press was already promoting
the ease of stimulant drug treatments as a panacea for all kinds of organizational problems
well before 1997. Rasmussen (2009), for example, describes the increased parental pressure
to prescribe during the 1980s.
Although there is striking evidence that physician-directed marketing impacts pre-
scription practices (King et al., 2013), it is less clear how to understand parental support
for the decision to medicate. In a content analysis of popular magazines directed towards
mass audiences in English speaking North America from 1988–2008, Clarke (2011) finds
that ADD and ADHD are portrayed in polarizing and contradictory ways. Although mag-
azine stories are ambivalent about whether ADHD exists, the described research on the
causes of ADHD is almost always authoritatively described as either genetic or biological.
Moreover, treatment by medication often is portrayed as profoundly problematic. The re-
ality is that by the late 1990s middle- and upper-class adults and children were aware of
both the potential benefits and the limitations of the drug and sought out stimulant drugs
either because other remedies were not proven or because stimulant drugs were cheaper or
covered by insurance. Pharmaceutical marketing undoubtedly contributed to the epidemic,
but did not drive the process. There is a stronger argument that parental demand insti-
gated a medicalization process, but I will argue in Chapters 3 and 4 that the influence of
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parental demand worked to shift the resulting category to something that is not strictly
medical. Part of the evidence for this comes in the form of other studies that demonstrate
the selective (non-routine) use of medication to treat the symptoms (King et al., 2014).
1.3 Discussion
This chapter argues that the institutional conditions required to make ADHD observable
relate back to the labor market restructuring of the 1950s and the development of the fed-
eral role in education in the 1960s. Those factors fundamentally altered educational insti-
tutions by making them significantly more attentive to the achievement levels of all chil-
dren and less receptive to non-conformity in the classroom. The disorder did not emerge
in the aftermath of World War I, despite research linking brain injury to hyperactivity and
inattentiveness and the “discovery” of the paradoxical effects of psychostimulants, because
that research involved institutionalized patients. Symptom clusters began to be differen-
tiated outside the custodial framework only with deinstitutionalization. Then, the politi-
cal advocates of a response to academic under-achievement were disinterested in waiting
for concrete neurological evidence to explain or support specific processing deficits. As
a result, learning disabilities was carved out of the larger symptom agglomeration. The
early success of stimulant drugs in treating behavioral symptoms later bolstered a sepa-
rate diagnostic category for hyperactivity. The category did not take off in earnest until
after the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which encompassed the first
moral panic concerning the use of stimulant drugs to control children’s behavior. ADD fi-
nally was added to the diagnostic lexicon in 1980 after biological psychiatry prevailed over
the psychoanalytic approach and new research from cognitive psychology and neurology
provided insights on different aspects of attention. Those factors, along with the socio-
demographic shift to higher-income students, led to the relegation of hyperactivity to the
periphery and the elevation of the uneasy alliance of attention issues and impulsivity to
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the forefront.
Although scientific progress is not an adequate explanation for the success of the dis-
order, medicalization cannot explain why ADHD prevalence has increased. The failure of
the MBD label and resulting symptom-based categories demonstrated the insufficiency
of etiological approaches, and the dominance of the medical profession receded around
the time that the category began to emerge. Moreover, pediatricians (at least as an or-
ganized group) had guarded views about using stimulant medications to treat children’s
behavior and learning problems. When drug treatments initially were used to treat non-
institutionalized children, the drugs were seen as a second-best solution that would make
sense for children from broken homes who were not amenable to the preferred psychother-
apeutic approaches; they were not seen as a panacea for a broad range of academic and
behavioral troubles. Furthermore, although MBD proponents like Paul Wender adopted
a medicalization rhetoric when promoting the efficiency of stimulant drug treatments, the
failure of the MBD approach signals the coalition of educators, parents, and other med-
ical experts around a different approach. Ultimately, the success of the category can be
attributed to a process that restructured the group defined by the category – going from
delinquent behaviors of low SES boys to the (relative) cognitive deficiencies of middle-class
children and their mothers. The continuing evolvement in diagnostic criteria has less to
do with expansion of the category as it does with redefining the group of symptoms and
subjects included to match the new coalition. The current clustering of ADHD with learn-
ing disabilities (and apart from behavioral disorders) – a break from past clinical criteria –
points to the increased emphasis on the cognitive dimensions of the disorder, which made
the disorder more palatable to adults (particularly women).
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Test of the Medicalization
Hypothesis as an Explanation for
ADHD Prevalence
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The previous chapter examined the origins of the ADHD label and the factors that led
to its widespread acceptance. I explained that the dominance of the medical profession is
an unlikely explanation for the label’s success because there is no correlation in timing be-
tween the surge in diagnoses and the various processes implied by the medicalization the-
sis. I also showed that most medical organizations, at least publicly, have not advocated
for widespread use of stimulant drugs as a stand-alone solution for addressing the symp-
toms of ADHD. Instead, I argued that the ADHD diagnosis is part of a network through
which the interests of children, parents, doctors, and schools are aligned. However, I did
not use quantitative data to explore the relationships between medical or educational insti-
tutions and the likelihood of diagnosis or treatment choices (if diagnosed).
This chapter uses surveys of nationally representative samples of households with chil-
dren to address the contributions of medical and educational factors to the diagnosis and
treatment of ADHD. I explore how well different measures of medical dominance and so-
cial control explain variation in diagnostic prevalence and treatment for school-age children
across the United States. Then, I start to unpack the extent to which diagnosis and treat-
ment are explained by educational practices. I use several state-level factors associated
with schools, namely, student discipline, achievement pressure, and average incomes. In
particular, because children with ADHD are sometimes school-identified as eligible for spe-
cial education services under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA),1 I
examine the significance of special education for ADHD diagnosis and treatment.
In what follows, I provide an overview of the medicalization literature and its applica-
tion to ADHD. I then describe my hypotheses and empirical approach. Finally, I present
the results and discuss their implications.
1ADHD is not a separate disability category under the IDEA, but more than 25 percent of the stu-
dents enrolled in special education have been diagnosed with the disorder (Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative Services, 2003; Schnoes et al., 2006). Students are typically taught in a general education
classroom, using approaches such as strategic seating, shortened or modified assignments, individualized
instruction, behavior intervention, tutoring, and counseling (Schnoes et al., 2006). As discussed in Chapter
4, these approaches can be used by schools on a voluntary basis (without a special education placement) if
the resources to do so permit.
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2.1 Medicalization Theory
Medicalization theory combines a social constructivist approach to examine how medical
categories are created and a social control approach to ask how behaviors come to be la-
beled as deviant (Conrad, 2007; Conrad and Barker, 2010; Erchak and Rosenfeld, 1989;
Grattet, 2011; Pfohl, 1976). Defined as “a process by which nonmedical problems become
defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or disorders” (Con-
rad, 1992, p. 209), medicalization has two important elements: (1) a process of increasing
medical dominance, leading to (2) the creation of a “medical” object out of behavior that
previously was “nonmedical.”
Medical dominance, evolving over time, was once at the heart of the theory (Clarke
et al., 2010; Conrad, 1992, 2005; Nye, 2003). The idea emerged from several critiques of
medicine generated in the 1960s and 1970s. Among the earliest was a critical assessment of
psychiatry and its extension of the medical model to mental illness (Horwitz, 2003; Scheff,
1999; Szasz, 1974). Another arose from a claim that mainstream medicine was imperial-
istic (Freidson, 1984, 2006; Illich, 1976; Larson, 1978). Those critiques both emphasized
the role of medical professionals in broadening jurisdiction and reacted, in turn, to the still
earlier functionalist approach in medical sociology that emphasized the power of medicine
to define and regulate social behavior (Abbott, 1988; Pfohl, 2009).
Building on the growing literatures debating the extension of the disease model to psy-
chiatry, challenging medical imperialism, and assessing medicine’s role in regulating de-
viance, sociologists in the 1970s begin to broaden the claim that medicine had become the
predominant paradigm for social control on a widespread scale (Zola, 1972, 1983). Describ-
ing “an insidious . . . phenomenon” through which medicine becomes “a major institution
of social control” (Zola, 1972, p. 487), Zola shifts the emphasis to the ubiquity of medi-
cal knowledge, recognizing that earlier critiques of excessively imperialistic medicine over-
stated the extent of the medical profession’s dominance and understated the importance of
medical concepts to everyday society (Strong, 1979; Porter, 1999). This reformulation thus
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makes explicit that social control is achieved not only through the imperialism of the med-
ical profession, but also through society’s increased reliance on experts and expert knowl-
edge (Foucault, 1975, 2008; Nye, 2003; Zola, 1972, 1983). With a broader conception of
knowledge diffusion, it becomes evident that market-oriented forces and consumers can
push medical categories without undermining their definitional centers (Conrad, 2005).
Medicalization theory also emphasizes the contested nature of illness definitions. Thus,
some medicalization scholars argue that ADHD is not a “real” disease in the sense that it
turns behaviors that have no independent clinical or biological existence into a medical
disorder (Conrad, 1975, 2007; Timimi and Leo, 2009). Conrad (2007, p. 147), for example,
explains: “[I]t is certainly possible that a small proportion of children with a diagnosis of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder may have a discernible neurological problem, but
the identification and diagnosis of ADHD goes far beyond those few children and includes
a huge number of children with no identifiable neurological disorder.” The implication that
medicalized objects are less “real” than other health conditions is in tension with a broader
cultural construction approach that considers all medical categories to be contextually sit-
uated (Fleck, 1981).2
The focus on medicalization at a conceptual level presents several challenges. Without
medical boundaries, the meaning of medicalization remains ambiguous insofar as it masks
the line between medicine and other institutional discourses that employ the language of
pathology in non-medical conceptual models or apart from medical interventions. For this
reason, medicalization also eludes any simple measurement approach; the obvious measure-
ment schemes imply the maintenance of jurisdictional boundaries. In what is probably the
most extended discussion of measurement, Conrad (2007) suggests that medicalization can
2This is sometimes demonstrated in policy arguments that rely on medicatization arguments. For
example, addressing the contribution of medicalization to “the societal problem of spiraling health care
costs”, Conrad et al. (2010, p. 1943) find that 12 medicalized conditions (including ADHD, anxiety dis-
orders, infertility, male pattern baldness, etc.) are responsible for nearly 4 percent of the total domestic
expenditures on health care. Linking medicalized conditions to the societal problem of rising health care
costs implies that the spending is excessive because the conditions are not biologically determined.
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be measured by the proliferation of categories, the expansion of existing categories, the
attribution of symptoms to disease, or the availability of a medical treatment. Only the
latter two – measured by the absolute numbers or ratios of those diagnosed or treated –
are useful for measuring the extent to which a particular constellation of behaviors can be
considered medicalized.
2.2 Medicalization Explanations of ADHD
ADHD and its precursors have long been considered important examples of medicalization.
In what purports to be the “first empirical analysis of the process of medicalization,” Con-
rad (2006, pp. 5, 12) associates the “discovery” of hyperactivity with the interplay between
three factors: “(1) the pharmaceutical revolution, (2) trends in the medical profession, and
(3) government action.” Although he says little about specific trends in medical practice
and how they resulted in the construction of hyperactivity, a key aspect of the theory is
asymmetry between experts and lay actors who are “removed from the public realm” (Con-
rad, 1975, p. 18). Conrad’s (1975) early work also emphasizes the importance of moral
entrepreneurs in advancing a deviance classification, pointing to pharmaceutical companies
and learning disabilities advocates as proponents of a medical label. Without examining
contestation among alternative classifications (see Medina and McCranie, 2011),3 Conrad
concludes that learning disabilities advocates had “sensitized teachers and schools to the
conception of hyperkinesis as a medical problem” (Conrad, 1975, p. 16).
Beyond its obvious appeal today, this argument was particularly persuasive at the time
it was made in the 1970s. Hyperkinesis was related to what is presently defined as the hy-
peractivity subtype, enhancing the perspective that “[m]ost of the symptoms for the disor-
3Conrad refers to institutional competition when he explains that medicine has become dominant
over social control schemes associated with church and state. But this approach, rooted in the labeling-
interactionist tradition, concerns itself more with the transference of dominant deviance explanations
from legal or moral ones to medical ones than it does with localized struggles within medicine or between
medicine and other classificatory approaches.
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der are deviant behaviors” (Conrad, 1975, p. 13). Further, around the time those studies
were conducted, the press contained reports of substantial numbers of public school boys
taking medication (Fraser, 1970; Maynard, 1970; Ross and Ross, 1976), and several promi-
nent lawsuits against schools alleged that children were forced to receive medication as a
condition of continued enrollment (Mayes et al., 2008; Nelkin and Tancredi, 1994; Schrag
and Divosky, 1976). The IDEA was amended more than 30 years later to prohibit manda-
tory medication of children, suggesting that forcible medication was a sufficiently impor-
tant problem to require a legal response.
More recent writings de-emphasize medical imperialism and move towards expert knowledge-
driven approaches that account for variation in levels of medicalization and completeness
of medicalization, as well as different normative implications of medicalization and con-
straints and enablements associated with lay participation and intervention (McLeod and
Pescosolido, 2004). Conrad and Schneider (1980b), for example, elaborate three levels at
which medicalization can occur: the conceptual, the institutional, and in the physician-
patient interaction. With those specifications, medicalization theory contemplates a med-
ical claim that might reside at levels of greater or lesser specificity and involvement with
medical professionals. Conrad also distinguishes types of medical control – technological,
collaborative, and ideological (Conrad, 1979, 1992) – with successively lower levels of in-
volvement by medical professionals.
Early scholars conceptualized hyperkinesis as an example of technological control –
emphasizing the use of licensed medical technologies to achieve social control – particularly
as an alternative to traditional forms of student discipline. However, in the absence of le-
gal mechanisms for forcing students to take medication, ADHD is better understood as a
purely ideological form of social control or as a potential example of control by “medical
collaboration” (Malacrida, 2004). Ideological control is not easily observed in survey data.
We could say, on the one hand, that ADHD is self-evidently a medical diagnostic category
because it is included within the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental
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health professionals; on the other hand, we might point to the fact that the medical label
is in tension with the categories used by educators and that it is disparaged in the press
and public opinion (Sroufe, 2012; Diller, 2011a,b). ADHD as a form of ideological control
is hopelessly indeterminate; it is simply too easy to ignore all kinds of knowledge practices
imported within the facade of a medical label. The most useful way of understanding med-
ical control is as an example of collaboration; collaboration refers to the role of medical
professionals as information providers, gatekeepers, institutional agents, or technicians in
the pursuit of the goals of other institutions (Conrad, 1979, 1992). Control by collabora-
tion, in turn, is best observed at the institutional level, where interaction with complemen-
tary or competing goals is likely to occur (Malacrida, 2004).
With this understanding, medicalization theory would imply that the rapid expansion
of ADHD diagnoses and stimulant treatments is explained by collaboration among medi-
cal professionals, schools, and parents (Brancaccio, 2000; McLeod and Pescosolido, 2004).
Schools have an incentive to refer ADHD to the exclusive province of the medical profes-
sions, acting as if stimulant drugs treat ADHD so well that no special accommodation is
necessary in the classroom (Malacrida, 2004; Mayes et al., 2009; Phillips, 2006). Parents
accept the label because it supplies a medical explanation for poor classroom performance
relative to classmates and because they experience the medical labeling as an important
aspect of validation and destigmatization (Conrad and Schneider, 1980a; Klasen, 2000;
Oliverio and Lauderdale, 1996).4 And medical professionals and pharmaceutical compa-
nies benefit from increased demand for medical services and stimulant drugs, respectively
(Conrad, 2005). Overall, this understanding supplies an explanation in which the label of
ADHD and the stimulants satisfy a broad range of interests.
4Bennett (2007) argues that parents seek medical recognition to gain legitimacy in the face of western
ideologies that suggest a “bad” child equals a “bad” mother.
79
2.3 Main Hypotheses
This study examines several specific hypotheses related to the claims of medical domi-
nance and social control of deviance. Although these hypotheses do not necessarily cor-
respond to specific assertions in the literature, they represent important empirical possibil-
ities that are informed by previous research.
Medicalization is a process in which a medical object is created through some form
of medical dominance. Regardless of the level at which medicalization occurs, the theory
implies some involvement (or alliance) with medical professionals, even under a concep-
tion that emphasizes expert knowledge (Conrad, 2005). Conrad (2005) argues, for exam-
ple, “[m]edicalization still doesn’t occur without social actors doing something to make
an entity medical, but the engines that are driving medicalization have changed and we
need to refocus our sociological eye as the medicalization train moves into the twenty-first
century.” Following that logic, pharmaceutical companies increasingly are seen as agents
of medicalization, particularly when they use direct-to-consumer advertising to promote
a medical category and its drug treatment (Clarke et al., 2003; Conrad and Leiter, 2004;
Conrad, 2005; Payton and Thoits, 2011).
The medical dominance hypothesis thus leads to several predictions. First, the medical
dominance hypothesis predicts that the density of medical professionals in a state is pos-
itively related to the likelihood of receiving an ADHD diagnosis; relatedly, the density of
medical professionals in a state is positively related to the likelihood of receiving a phar-
maceutical treatment once diagnosed (Fulton et al., 2009; Hoagwood et al., 2000; King and
Essick, 2013). Second, the stringency of state drug laws regarding direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising and prescription monitoring is inversely related to the likelihood of receiving an
ADHD diagnosis and to the likelihood of receiving a pharmaceutical treatment once diag-
nosed (Metzl and Herzig, 2007; King and Essick, 2013).
The medicalization perspective also suggests that the medical label will be used to
control deviance. If labeling varies with the relational or cultural distance between schools
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or medical professionals, on the one hand, and patients/children, on the other, then social
distance should be predictive of diagnosis and treatment (Horwitz, 2002). Horwitz (2002)
explains that labelling is usually done by higher-status people on lower status people, re-
inforcing existing inequalities,5 and that the tendency to label an individual as mentally
ill varies with the relational or cultural distance between the observer and the actor pa-
tients who are culturally and socially distant.6 The social control hypothesis thus predicts
that the likelihood of diagnosis and pharmaceutical treatment will be positively related
to low socioeconomic status or minority group status (Goffman, 1963). Consideration of
this hypothesis is complicated by several push-pull factors: the worse health outcomes of
the poor, the likelihood of underdiagnosis for those of lower affluence, and the greater ac-
cess to disability status and special education systems for those of higher affluence (Boyle
et al., 2011; Carrier, 1986; Cuffe et al., 2005; Froehlich et al., 2007; Kelman and Lester,
1998; Lerner, 2004; Olfson et al., 2003; Rowland et al., 2002).7
It also is possible to think about social control of deviance by comparing control by
medication to other methods of social control. To that end, several researchers have sug-
gested that the prevalence of the disorder is related to the unavailability of alternative
disciplinary devices – suspensions, expulsions and the like (Kiger, 1983, 1985; Malacrida,
2003). Kiger (1985) explains that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), which mandated due process in juvenile delinquency proceedings, made
the suspension and expulsion of students with ADHD symptoms more difficult. As a re-
sult, drug therapy replaced the concept of punishment. Consistent with that explanation,
5Medicalization can be a mechanism of social inclusion, bringing lower-status people into contact with
medical institutions (Gallagher and Ferrante, 1987).
6Conrad and Schneider (1980a, p. 276) argue that medicalization increases as it becomes a middle-class
problem rather than solely a lower-class problem; that argument implies a trajectory from the socially
distant to the socially near.
7Research on treatment utilization is further complicated by the fact that the racial and ethnic group
status of nonwhite children with mental health problems might be associated with higher likelihood of
stigmatizing attitudes, thus deterring identification and treatment (Bailey et al., 2010; Martin et al.,
2007); yet research suggests that, despite racial and ethnic differences in awareness of the disorder, there
are no significant differences in treatment preferences (McLeod et al., 2007; McLeod and Pescosolido,
2004).
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Ramey (2015) finds that schools and districts with relatively larger minority and poor
populations are more likely to implement disciplinary policies and less likely to place stu-
dents into special education under categories commonly associated with behavior. This is
a school- and district-level analysis, so it does not necessarily imply that disciplinary cul-
ture influences individual decisions to seek a medical diagnosis or treatment. The alterna-
tive discipline hypothesis thus predicts that the likelihood of diagnosis will be negatively
related to the use of traditional forms of school discipline.
Because a medical diagnosis is not simply a private medical determination but is linked
with specific policy outcomes – pharmaceutical treatment, disability accommodations, in-
surance reimbursement, or special education enrollment, for example – diagnosis and treat-
ment should be related to state and local context. In particular, I expect that there will
an inverse relationship between state-level resources and the likelihood of diagnosis and
pharmaceutical treatment; I refer to this relationship as the resource constraint hypothesis.
Nelkin and Tancredi (1994, p. 130) explain that “the focus on biology may direct atten-
tion away from social sources of learning problems.” In a similar vein, physicians quoted
in a New York Times article rationalized the nullification of the diagnostic process on on
the grounds that school environments are not always able to help children academically
(Schwarz, 2012a). If schools are complicit in the adoption of medical categories so that
they efficiently can manage child deviance, then we would expect to find a greater like-
lihood of diagnosis and treatment in states with fewer resources available for education
(Singh, 2006; Schwarz, 2012a). Conversely, a state with greater resources to remediate
the social context in which learning occurs should have lower prevalence.8 At the same
time, those same states might place greater demands on schools in terms of academic pro-
ficiency; accordingly, I expect that states that value achievement more highly, after con-
trolling for resources, will have higher prevalence. The correlation between state-level edu-
8This hypothesis assumes that a state’s education spending leads to lower prevalence; of course, state
spending on education also might follow higher prevalence to the extent that increased prevalence funnels
more students into special education.
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cation spending levels and academic proficiency levels is confirmed in Figure 2.6.2.
Another way to think about the medicalization of ADHD is through its comparison
to similar pediatric mental disorders. ADHD is distinct in that medical encroachment is
seen as a primary explanation, due to the widespread use of drugs to treat the primary
symptoms. For example, if physician density is a better predictor of the likelihood of re-
ceiving an ADHD diagnosis than of the comparable likelihood of receiving an autism di-
agnosis, then this might be evidence that ADHD is medicalized to a greater extent than
autism. Thus, the relative medicalization hypothesis suggests that the likelihood of receiv-
ing an ADHD diagnosis, net of other factors, is more responsive to the density of medical
professionals or the stringency of drug laws than the comparable likelihoods of receiving
diagnoses for other pediatric mental disorders.
2.4 Data and Measurement
2.4.1 Data
Data for this analysis come from two nationally representative surveys, the National Sur-
vey of Children’s Health (NSCH) and the National Survey of Children with Special Health
Care Needs (CSHCN), both of which were conducted by the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC). I use the 2011 NSCH and the 2009-10 CSHCN.9 NSCH is
a random-digit-dial telephone survey conducted by CDC as part of the State and Local
Area Integrated Telephone (SLAIT) Survey, which is sponsored by the Maternal and Child
Health Bureau of the Health Resources and Services Administration. It uses a multistage
sampling method based on identification of households with one or more children aged
0-17 years and random selection of a sample child as the interview subject. The NSCH
allows for state-level estimates of ADHD prevalence. CSHCN is also part of the SLAIT
9For some analyses, I use the Stata Indicator Data Sets prepared by the Data Resource Center for
Child and Adolescent Health, Child and Adolescent Health Measurement Initiative.
83
Survey. Depending on the health care needs of the children in each household, a detailed
interview was conducted for one randomly selected child with special needs, and a brief
health insurance interview was conducted for one randomly selected child without special
needs.
2.4.2 Measurement
2.4.2.1 Diagnosis, Special Education, and Medication
In both surveys, parents are asked whether their children have been diagnosed or treated
for ADHD and about special education enrollment status.10 ADHD diagnosis was obtained
from the question: “Has a doctor or health-care provider ever told you that [child’s name]
has attention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, that is ADD or
ADHD?” In the NSCH, treatment was obtained from a question regarding whether the
child has “taken any medication because of difficulties with [his/her] emotions, concen-
tration, or behavior” within the previous 12 months. The CSHCN question asks: “At any
time during the past week, did [he/she] take medication for ADD or ADHD?” The CSHCN
also includes a question about types of medication used by children with ADHD. In the
CSHCN, parents are asked “What medications did [S.C.] take for ADD or ADHD?” Re-
sponses were recorded to 1 of 17 different drug categories. I consolidated these drug cat-
egories into 3 groups: stimulants, which includes all amphetamines (adderall), dextroam-
phetamines (dexedrine or vyvanse), methylphenidates (concerta, daytrana, metadate, methylin,
ritalin, or methyl), and dexmethylphenidates (focalin or dexmethyl); atomoxetines (strat-
tera); and antipsychotics (abilify or risperdal). Special education enrollment was obtained
from the questions: “Does [S.C.] have a health problem, condition, or disability for which
(he/she) has a written intervention plan called an Individualized Education Program or
IEP?” [NSCH] and “Does [S.C.] receive services from a program called Special Educational
10Using parent-reported diagnoses can be problematic if there is non-random variation in the likelihood
of accurate reporting, perhaps along the lines of class or race.
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Services? Children receiving these services often have an Individualized Education Plan.”
[CSHCN] Behavioral treatment was obtained from the question: “At any time during the
past 12 months, did [S.C.] receive behavioral treatment for ADD or ADHD, such as class-
room management, peer interventions, social skills training, or cognitive-behavioral ther-
apy?” [CSHCN]
2.4.2.2 Individual Background Characteristics
I restrict the analysis to children ages 4-17. Age is categorized corresponding to level in
school: 4-5 (preschool), 6-8 (early elementary), 9-13 (late elementary/middle school), and
14-17 (high school). Gender is a binary measure coded male = 1. Race/ethnicity is coded
as non-Hispanic white, Hispanic, non-Hispanic black, or multi-racial and other race. In-
come level is categorized relative to the poverty level for the household, with cutpoints at
100%, 200%, and 400% of the poverty level. I use an indicator of whether the household
has medical insurance. An indicator for single parent status is used.
2.4.2.3 State-Level Resource Measures and Policies
The number of physicians comes from the Area Resource File (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Administration, 2011-2012); I use the number of physicians per 10,000
residents in each state. I use an indicator for whether the state has enacted a law limit-
ing the marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies as a measure of receptiveness to
pharmaceutical solutions aimed directly at users. The National Conference of State Legis-
latures maintains a list of applicable state laws (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2010). As of December 1, 2009, nine states and the District of Columbia, have laws or res-
olutions restricting pharmaceutical marketing. The specific provisions differ among these
states, but they generally either require disclosures of drug marketing costs or place limits
on various marketing practices. As an alternative measure, I use pharmaceutical market-
ing expenditures in each state from the Dollars for Docs Database (Pro Publica, 2013).
85
Because of settlements and to increase transparency, several pharmaceutical companies
began to disclose payments made to physicians in 2009. As of 2013, 17 companies had dis-
closed more than $4 billion of payments in speaking and consulting fees, travel fees and
meals, and other payments. Companies do not provide information on the specific drug or
class for which payments were made so marketing expenditures are the expenditures for all
drugs. However, three of those companies have a strong market share in the ADHD stim-
ulant market – Eli Lilly, Novartis, and Johnson & Johnson. I use the log of the per capita
expenditures for each state (with alternative specifications based on all manufacturers and
the three ADHD manufacturers).
School discipline data come from the Office of Civil Rights.11 I use the number of stu-
dents subjected to each of the following disciplinary actions: expulsions, suspensions, refer-
rals to law enforcement, and arrests, adjusted for the number of students enrolled within
the state. I then created a single factor from these four items using principal components
analysis.12
State income per capita comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; these data,
which are logged to minimize skewness, are measured as of the appropriate year in cur-
rent dollars. As a measure of school-level resources and equitable distribution of resources
within states, I use two indices from the School Finance section of EdWeek’s Quality Counts
website. The spending index includes, among other things, items such as per-pupil ex-
penditures and the percent of taxable resources spent on education. The equity index in-
cludes, among other things, the relationship between district funding and local property
wealth and the amount of variability in spending across districts.
Finally, based on prior research that attributes prevalence and treatment to the strin-
gency of state achievement standards and accountability laws (Bokhari and Schneider,
2011; Schneider and Eisenberg, 2006; King et al., 2014), I use the state rating from the
11The data are available at http://ocrdata.ed.gov/StateNationalEstimations/.
12The factor loadings are: suspensions (.73), expulsions (.68), referrals (.55), and arrests (.76).
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Standards, Assessments, and Accountability section of EdWeek’s Quality Counts, which
equally weights a variety of state measures pertaining to the use of standards, assessments,
and accountability.13 Following King et al. (2014), I use a binary indicator of whether the
state has a rating of B or higher (the average rating). Because accountability systems have
been somewhat ineffective, as an alternative measure I use a factor created from the per-
cent of 4th and 8th graders in public schools who score at or above the “proficient” level
in mathematics or reading on the State NAEP assessment. This measure represents actual
proficiency levels rather than the accountability measures put in place for the purpose of
producing greater proficiency.
2.5 Analytical Strategy
Using a series of multilevel logistic regression models with children nested within states,
I examine the odds of three different types of outcome variables: diagnosis, treatment if
diagnosed (prescription drugs or special education), and prescription drug type (for 3 dif-
ferent drug categories) if treated with drugs. I examine whether the density of medical
professionals is related to the diagnosis of ADHD and to the medical (drug) treatment of
ADHD, as suggested by the medical dominance hypothesis. I also examine whether diag-
nosis and treatment are related to low socioeconomic status or minority group status, as
suggested by the social control hypothesis, and whether diagnosis and treatment are re-
lated to state prosperity, as suggested by the resource constraint hypothesis. Because an
explanation of the medicalized aspects of ADHD should be able to differentiate ADHD
from other pediatric mental disorders, I examine attributes of ADHD that account for
variation in diagnosis and treatment of other pediatric mental disorders. To this end, I
estimate parallel models for autism spectrum disorders, conduct disorders, learning disabil-
13This consists of items such as the existence of standards that are course- or grade-specific, the use
of assessments that are aligned to state standards, and whether states hold schools accountable for per-
formance by using ratings, rewards, or sanctions. Additional description of the inputs is available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/01/14/17sources.h29.html?intc=ml.
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ities, anxiety disorders, and childhood depression.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 State Level Patterns
Figure 2.6.1 plots the relationships among the state medication rate (y-axis), the state IEP
rate for those diagnosed (x-axis), and the state prevalence rate (represented by the size
of the bubble). As shown, states with higher rates of medication use tend to have lower
rates of special education enrollment. The two dimensions represented by the x- and y-
axes suggest an inverse relationship that seems consistent with a medicalization process
in which educators in budget-constrained states shift “deviant” children towards medica-
tion (because it is cheaper and privately incurred). The states with higher prevalence rates
tend to gather at the high medication/low IEP portion of the graph, although there are
noticeable exceptions. Figure 2.6.1 also implies that there is regional variation, with south-
eastern states grouped at the upper-left portion of the graph and northeastern and western
states at the lower-right portion of the graph. Figure A.1 (in the Appendix), depicts the
geographic distribution of the outcome measures used in this study; the maps reveal strong
regional patterns in state prevalence and treatment rates.
Figure 2.6.2 is a scatterplot matrix that displays the relationships among state preva-
lence rates and the continuous state-level predictors (physician density, average income
levels, levels of school discipline, education spending and equity levels, and academic profi-
ciency levels). The left column shows the regression of each state’s ADHD prevalence rate
on each of the potential state-level predictors, and the top row shows the smoothed regres-
sion of the same relationships. Physician density does not have a significant relationship to
ADHD prevalence, but it is positively correlated with average income. The strongest linear
relationship to ADHD prevalence is the negative correlation with average income, which is
consistent with the resource constraint hypothesis. There also is a strong positive correla-
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Figure 2.6.1: Bubbleplot of Treatments. Source: NSCH 2011-12. Note: The bubbleplot
shows the state medication rate against the state IEP rate for those diagnosed with
ADHD. The bubbles are weighted by the state ADHD prevalence rate. The solid line
represents the prediction of medication rates (conditional on diagnosis) from a linear re-
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tion between ADHD prevalence and the level of student discipline, which contradicts the
alternative discipline hypothesis. However, the negative relationship between average in-
come and the level of discipline suggests that a multivariate analysis is need to disentangle
the effects of average income and disciplinary culture on ADHD prevalence.
2.6.2 State- and Individual-Level Predictors of ADHD Diagnoses
The first set of models predict whether a doctor ever has diagnosed the respondent’s child
with ADHD. Table 2.1 shows odds ratios from logistic regression models that predict the
odds of diagnosis on the basis of an incremental set of independent variables. The models
include state random effects and individual- and state-level variables.
Model 1, which includes only demographic characteristics, tests the social control hy-
pothesis. That model suggests that the odds of reporting an ADHD diagnosis are sig-
nificantly lower for children of all other races than they are for white children. Further-
more, although uninsured children have lower odds of having a diagnosis than insured chil-
dren (suggesting reduced access to medical care), children living in households with in-
comes below the poverty level have higher odds of having a diagnosis than children living
in households with higher incomes (suggesting weaker noncognitive skills for poorer house-
holds). This is consistent with other literature that associates low socioeconomic status
with deficits in “noncognitive” skills and that associates those deficits with lower achieve-
ment outcomes (Claessens et al., 2009; Duncan et al., 2007; Hsin and Xie, 2012; Lareau,
2003). As reported in previous research, boys have substantially higher odds of having an
ADHD diagnosis than girls (Cuffe et al., 2005; Gershon and Gershon, 2002). Race, income,
and gender effects do not change significantly as state-level measures and region indicators
are introduced in Models 2-5.
Model 2 adds an indicator for states that regulate the marketing of pharmaceuticals
and a measure of state-level physicians per capita, both of which are included to test the
medical dominance hypothesis. The data are not supportive of the hypothesis. There is
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Figure 2.6.2: Scatterplot Matrix for State-Level Correlates of ADHD Prevalence. Source
NSCH 2011-12, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Area Resource File, 2012 Exit Polls, IDEA
Data, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Note: The scatterplot matrix shows the state ADHD
prevalence rate against the number of physicians per capita, state per capita income
(logged), the state academic proficiency levels, the school spending index, the school fi-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































no significant difference in the odds of diagnosis based on state physician density or legal
restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing. These results do not change if I substitute psy-
chiatrist density or pediatrician density for physician density in the model. Nor do they
change if I substitute pharmaceutical marketing expenditures (either overall or for ADHD
manufacturers) for marketing regulation.
Model 3 adds the state-level school discipline factor to test the alternative discipline
hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts that a higher likelihood of diagnosis will substitute for
lower levels of discipline. The predicted negative relationship between student discipline
and diagnosis is not seen in the data. Instead, there is a positive relationship between the
level of school discipline in a state and the likelihood of an ADHD diagnosis. It appears
that whatever factors necessitate stronger discipline also are likely result in a higher like-
lihood of diagnosis. Put differently, the problem with this hypothesis is that it does not
account for the possibility that some students are drawn to psychiatric diagnoses in order
to obtain the due process rights that will enable them to avoid school discipline. The un-
availability of student discipline is not driving medicalization of deviance; rather, parents
and lawyers are constructing and using a disability label to protect students from harsher
school discipline policies (a topic to which I return in Chapter 4).14 Although the magni-
tude of the odds ratios decrease as additional state-level measures are added in Models 4
and 5, the odds ratios remain significant and above 1.
Model 4 adds the state-level resource and achievement variables. Consistent with the
negative correlation at the state level (displayed in Table 2.6.2), children in states with
higher average income levels have lower odds of being diagnosed. Presumably, this means
that states with more resources do in fact spend more on education (confirmed by the
scatterplot matrix in Figure 2.6.2), and therefore children are less likely to be diagnosed
14As noted above, black students have a lower probability of diagnosis than white students. A separate
model (not shown here) that interacts race with the state discipline factor suggests that black students
have an even lower probability of diagnosis (compared to white students) when they live in states with
stronger disciplinary environments.
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for the purpose of enhancing their performance by taking stimulant drugs. Other state-
level resource measures are consistent with predictions, even though the effects are neither
substantial nor consistently significant. School spending and equity have a slight positive
effect on the likelihood of diagnosis, as shown in Models 4 and 5, after controlling for state
average income levels. This is contrary to the suggestion that ADHD diagnoses substitute
for generous levels of state funding, but the results are only marginally significant (at the
10 percent level). The spending-prevalence pattern might be explained by a positive re-
lationship between education funding and the proportion of students enrolled in special
education programs (which itself might reflect higher diagnostic rates). Finally, consistent
with Bokhari and Schneider (2011) and Schneider and Eisenberg (2006), living in a state
with stronger accountability requirements is associated with higher odds of diagnosis once
other controls are added, as is the level of academic proficiency in a state, but those re-
sults are not consistently significant.
Model 5 adds controls for region, given the strong regional patterns observed in Figure
A.1. The odds of diagnosis are significantly higher for students in the south than for stu-
dents in the northeast. Separate analyses (not shown) suggest that the odds of diagnosis
are significantly higher for students in the south than for students in all other regions.
2.6.3 Predictors of Drug Treatment and Special Education Enroll-
ment
The next set of models predict whether a child that has been diagnosed with ADHD is
receiving treatment at the time of the survey in the form of pharmaceutical treatment,
school special education placement (IEP), or both. Table 2.2 shows odds ratios from a
multinomial model predicting prescription drug use and IEP status, conditional on ADHD
diagnosis.15 The base category for the dependent variable is no pharmaceutical treatment
15I did not use a random effects model because a likelihood ratio test that compared the random effects
model to this model was not significant.
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and no IEP and represents 15 percent of the students diagnosed with ADHD; the other
categories are IEP only (15 percent), pharmaceutical treatment only (the medicalization
paradigm and 40 percent), and both IEP and pharmaceutical treatment (30 percent). I
use the same predictors included in the models predicting diagnosis, except that I also in-
clude controls for the number of chronic conditions with which a student has been diag-
nosed to account for the possibility that socio-demographic differences in symptom severity
are influencing the results.16
Among the diagnosed, there is no gender difference in the likelihood of using a drug
treatment compared to having no treatment, but boys have greater odds than girls of hav-
ing an IEP. Black, Hispanic and other race students have lower odds of having a drug
treatment (with or without an IEP) than white students. Children from families with
larger incomes have significantly higher odds of having a drug treatment (with or without
an IEP). In other words, higher income white students have a pattern of use that seems
consistent with a medicalization process, but I will argue indicates performance enhance-
ment. Table 2.2 provides no support for the social control hypothesis, because white, high
income children are more likely to receive drug treatments, once diagnosed.
With respect to the state-level predictors, state regulation of pharmaceutical market-
ing reduces the odds that a child in the state who is diagnosed with ADHD will receive
a prescription drug treatment, which supports the medicalization hypothesis. However,
the odds of an IEP are higher in states where there is greater physician density. This is
consistent with the learning disabilities model that I discuss below; it suggests that the ed-
ucational disability categories (and IEPs) are more dependent on availability of medical
specialists (presumably for psychometric testing). This assumption is further buttressed
by the fact that substituting psychiatrists for MDs increases the magnitude of the effects.
Furthermore, stricter school accountability laws reduce the odds of having an IEP, which
suggests that schools that are more “accountable” for the proficiency levels of students
16Table A.2 displays comorbid conditions for children with ADHD diagnoses, by race.
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Table 2.2: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Pharmaceutical Treatment and IEP Status
on Individual- and State-level Predictors, Conditional on ADHD Diagnosis. Reference
Category is Modal Category of Pharmaceutical Treatment without Special Education
Enrollment. Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
(1) IEP Only (2) Drug Only (3) IEP/Drug
OR Std.Err. OR Std.Err. OR Std.Err.
Male 1.293** (0.127) 1.013 (0.073) 1.445*** (0.122)
Race, ref white
Hispanic 0.864 (0.130) 0.616*** (0.074) 0.546*** (0.075)
Black 1.202 (0.183) 0.493*** (0.062) 0.635** (0.088)
Other race 0.936 (0.144) 0.694** (0.083) 0.675** (0.092)
Pov. level (PL), ref  PL
> PL,  200% PL 1.026 (0.148) 1.272* (0.144) 1.155 (0.146)
> 200% PL,  400% PL 1.276+ (0.177) 1.572*** (0.171) 1.430** (0.174)
> 400% PL 1.240 (0.179) 2.081*** (0.231) 1.765*** (0.221)
Level of school, ref early elem.
Late elem./middle school 1.490** (0.220) 1.178 (0.123) 1.390** (0.167)
High school 1.213 (0.174) 0.555*** (0.057) 0.751* (0.089)
Uninsured 0.932 (0.200) 0.507*** (0.091) 0.241*** (0.062)
Single parent family 0.945 (0.097) 1.095 (0.085) 1.190* (0.105)
DTC marketing regulated 0.995 (0.127) 0.844+ (0.082) 0.954 (0.105)
# MDs per capita x 10,000 1.032* (0.013) 1.012 (0.010) 1.017 (0.011)
Disciplinary climate 0.981 (0.053) 1.017 (0.039) 0.966 (0.044)
Per capita income (log) 1.971 (1.032) 0.751 (0.299) 1.787 (0.812)
School spending index 0.998 (0.005) 0.998 (0.004) 0.997 (0.004)
School equity index 0.988 (0.014) 1.005 (0.011) 0.997 (0.012)
Proficiency index 0.892 (0.066) 0.984 (0.057) 0.967 (0.064)
Standards and accountability 0.651*** (0.080) 0.887 (0.082) 0.748** (0.079)
Region, ref northeast
Midwest 1.031 (0.217) 1.407* (0.232) 1.129 (0.207)
South 1.098 (0.240) 1.407* (0.240) 1.239 (0.236)
West 1.207 (0.260) 0.921 (0.159) 0.789 (0.151)
Number of conditions 2.522*** (0.093) 1.876*** (0.062) 3.289*** (0.114)
Constant 0.000+ (0.000) 6.207 (26.344) 0.000+ (0.001)
Observations 7531
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with disabilities are more likely to place those students in general education environments
where they learn the material required to perform on standardized tests (see a similar ex-
planation in Harr-Robins et al., 2013, 2015).
Table 2.2 does not provide direct support for the idea that minority students are sig-
nificantly more likely to be enrolled in special education programs than to receive no treat-
ment. However, reversing the reference category to ask how likely minority students are
to be placed in all other categories compared to the medicalized (drug only) category,
the racial gap appears. Children from all other racial groups compared to white students
are more likely to be in the no treatment or the IEP treatment categories compared to
the drug-only treatment category. This finding is consistent with evidence that poor and
minority students are disproportionally placed in special education programs (Coutinho
et al., 2002; Hibel et al., 2010; Kelman and Lester, 1998; Lerner, 2004; Skiba et al., 2005)
and with evidence that special education has a negative or nonsignificant effect on many
learning and behavioral outcomes (Morgan et al., 2010). Overall, there is evidence of a
two-tiered public-private system in which the children of richer parents avoid the stigma
and association with lower class children by buying pharmaceutical treatment privately.
Treatment is an enhancer that allows them to avoid being part of special education. Poor
parents do not have the resources, the information networks, or the confidence to do the
same, and they also might lack the capacity to resist the special education placement. One
possibility, suggested by these findings, is that the medical diagnosis is a funnel for two
groups – wealthier households who use the diagnosis to obtain prescription drug treat-
ments and poorer households that are pushed towards the diagnosis as a pathway to ob-
taining services for their children.
2.6.4 Determinants of ADHD Drug Type
The effectiveness of different types of drugs varies by individual and is not subject to easy
generalizations, so the conclusions that can be drawn from an analysis of the socio-demographic
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determinants of the types of drugs that are prescribed are quite limited. Stimulant drugs
for children with ADHD have been widely used, and they have been validated to vary-
ing degrees in long-term effectiveness studies (MTA Cooperative Group, 1999b,a, 2004).
Strattera (atomoxetine) also has been approved for use in treating ADHD, and it has been
the subject of effectiveness studies (Vakula et al., 2010). The use of antipsychotic drugs
in treating children with ADHD has increased, but this use is considered off-label and has
not been the subject of safety and effectiveness studies (Olfson et al., 2012). One medical
expert explained that methylphenidate and amphetamines (the stimulants, or performance
enhancers) are considered first line in the treatment of ADHD, the second line is Strattera,
and the last resort is antipsychotics (Stubbe, 2006).
Accepting that ordering for these purposes, the next question is whether there are race
or income effects associated with the type of drugs prescribed for students with ADHD. I
used the 2009-10 CSHCN to answer this question. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.3 show odds
ratios from models predicting whether a child has received a stimulant drug, an antipsy-
chotic drug, or atomoxetine (Strattera), conditional on diagnosis and drug treatment. I use
state fixed effects to account for unobserved differences between states, because I am pri-
marily interested in testing the social control hypothesis. Because the CSHCN also asked
respondents whether the child received special education services and whether children re-
ceived behavioral treatment for ADHD (defined as classroom management, peer interven-
tions, social skills training, or cognitive-behavioral therapy), I estimated separate models
with those treatments are the dependent variables. Those models are conditional on diag-
nosis, and the findings are shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 suggests that boys have higher odds than girls of using antipsychotic med-
ications to treat their conditions, but there are no gender effects in the use of atomoxe-
tine or stimulant drugs. There are notable racial differences in the use of drugs of different
types. Black children have significantly lower odds of using atomoxetine than white chil-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































than white children. Hispanic children also have higher odds of using antipsychotic med-
ications than white children. With respect to income level, children living in households
with higher income levels have higher odds of using stimulant drugs than children living in
low-income households; similarly, children living in higher-income households have lower
odds of using antipsychotic drugs than children living in low-income households. The fi-
nal two columns display comparison models that use behavioral therapy treatment and
IEP as the dependent variables, conditional on diagnosis. Consistent with earlier mod-
els, black students and poorer students are more likely to have IEPs than white students
and richer students, respectively. It is often thought that psychosocial treatments are used
most heavily by white, upper class students. However, these data suggest that poor and
minority students are more likely to have behavioral therapy than rich and white students,
respectively, which is probably attributable to the broad definition of behavioral therapy
(including such things as classroom management and peer interventions that could be
forms of classroom discipline).
These findings are inconsistent with the view that stimulant drugs are being used as a
social control device. It is the wealthier and white children who are given stimulant drugs
to treat their ADHD symptoms, while black and poor children are more likely to be sub-
jected to the traditional social control treatment of antipsychotic medications. This, again,
is reflective of a two-tiered system – with performance enhancement for those of higher so-
cial class status and social control for those of lower social class status.17 Although one
could argue that performance enhancement is the form the medicalization process takes
as it reaches the upper classes – a process in which the need to compete in school is re-
sponded to with a medical solution – I argue that it is better seen as a looping effect of
an initial medicalization process. The medicalization as social control story works for the
poorer, minority kids, but they are only half the story. The other half is performance en-
17King et al. (2014), for example, find that medical adaptation to academic pressure – measured by
selective use of stimulants only during the academic year – is more common for socioeconomically advan-
taged children than for less advantaged children.
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hancement, which was not a concern at the time the behaviors were “made medical.” The
reason for this, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, is that this new coalition forms around a la-
bel that is no longer just “medical.”
2.6.5 Comparing Pediatric Mental Disorders
Finally, I consider whether ADHD is more completely medicalized than other pediatric
mental disorders. First, I ask the baseline question: Are children with ADHD more likely
to use a pharmaceutical treatment than children with other mental disorders? To examine
this question, I used the 2011 NSCH to estimate the proportions of children (ages 4-17)
that have been diagnosed with five other pediatric mental disorders and that use a phar-
maceutical treatment to treat problems with emotions, concentration or behavior. I found
that a higher proportion of children diagnosed with ADHD than children diagnosed with
other disorders use medication. Yet, more than one-third of children with diagnoses for
other major pediatric mental disorders use a drug treatment. Compared to ADHD where
66 percent of children with the disorder use medication, 42 percent with autism, 34 per-
cent with learning disabilities, 57 percent with behavior disorders, 58 percent with depres-
sion, and 52 percent with anxiety disorders use prescription medications.
Going a step further, I estimated random-effects models comparable to Model 5 of
Table 2.1 to consider whether physician density is a better predictor of the likelihood of
receiving an ADHD diagnosis than of the comparable likelihood of receiving a diagnosis
for another pediatric mental disorder. Table 2.4 reports the results, with columns for five
other pediatric mental disorders – autism, learning disabilities, behavior disorder, anxiety,
and depression – which were the dependent variables in these models.
Table 2.4 suggests that the effects of physician density on diagnosis are most substan-
tial for learning disabilities and anxiety disorders. This is likely a result of the fact that
learning disorders depend on neuropsychological assessments and pedagogies. Restrictions


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































diagnosis of a learning disability. These data suggest that what is seen as a learning dis-
ability or anxiety disorder might be interpreted as ADHD in another environment. The
regional dummies are consistent with this explanation. Although there is a strong regional
pattern exhibiting high ADHD prevalence in southern states, learning disabilities are less
common in southern states. What this really says is that ADHD diagnoses are more com-
mon where there are fewer doctors and fewer medical resources; in effect, they become an
alternative to medicalization or a form of infra-medicalization.
Black children have significantly lower odds of receiving each of these diagnoses com-
pared to white children, except for behavior disorders. Further, the odds of receiving a di-
agnosis for any pediatric mental disorder in the study are lower at higher levels of income,
compared to children living in households with income levels below the poverty level. In
other words, those with lower income levels have poorer health outcomes. The lesser de-
cline in the odds ratios at successively higher income categories for autism and ADHD sug-
gests that those categories are less likely to be used as instruments of social control.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I use nationally representative survey data to address the prominent claim
that ADHD results from a medicalization process in which medical professionals and phar-
maceutical companies collaborate with schools and parents to produce a medical category
that facilitates the control of deviant behaviors. I examine the predictors of ADHD di-
agnoses, the use and types of drug treatments for children with ADHD, and the enroll-
ment of children with ADHD in special education programs, with a view to understand-
ing the extent to which medical institutional factors, racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
background, and state-level resources contribute to diagnosis and treatment outcomes.
Overall, my findings suggest that medical dominance is not a useful way to understand
diagnostic rates. Inconsistent with the medical dominance hypothesis, I find that the den-
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sity of medical professionals is only weakly predictive or not predictive of the odds of an
ADHD diagnosis after accounting for individual-level factors and state average incomes
and other state-level measures. Physician density and marketing restrictions appear to
have the opposite effects on ADHD and learning disabilities. In other words, physician
density increases the odds of diagnosis for learning disorders but not the odds of diagno-
sis for ADHD, and marketing restrictions increase the odds of diagnosis for learning dis-
orders but not the odds of diagnosis for ADHD. This suggests that ADHD might work, in
part, as a residual category for students with learning problems who live in the south. Fur-
thermore, I find substantial evidence that ADHD is not related to social distance. Black
children have substantially lower odds than white children of receiving an ADHD diagnosis
and of receiving prescription drug treatments if diagnosed; black children have higher odds
than white children of being placed in special education and of receiving antipsychotic
medications if treated with drugs. Similarly, children from wealthier households have lower
odds of diagnosis than children living in poverty, but are significantly more likely to re-
ceive prescription drug treatments if diagnosed and stimulant drug treatments if treated
with prescription drugs. I suggest that the findings are consistent with the presence of at
least two different phenomena – a class effect in which rich, white children pursue a per-
formance enhancement route and poor, minority children are funneled into special educa-
tion, and a strong regional effect. I argue, therefore, that even if the medicalization/social
control hypothesis was correct when it was formulated in 1970s, there have been looping
processes that make it much less relevant today.
My findings are limited in some respects. I do not have a measure of symptoms that
is adequate to account for differences in neurological function or severity of symptoms. I
do not have a measure of different physician practices, so it is not possible to disentangle
whether different patterns of diagnosis and treatment are caused by the lack of access to
medical care or variations in the tendency to diagnose and treat. A survey of physicians,
for example, revealed differences in physician perceptions of the severity of ADHD symp-
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toms (Sheldrick et al., 2015). Finally, the data are not clustered to allow for examination
of school effects. Additional research is needed to focus specifically on the interaction of
the medical object with knowledge practices that reside within schools. Despite those limi-
tations, this research attempts to show the difficulties of a theory that only follows medical
actors. Although some facts can be adduced to support the argument, it seems clear that
this account is incomplete. The medicalization critique contains a compelling argument,
but this research shows that significant contingency exists for one of its core examples.
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Chapter 3
The Importance of Parents, Teachers,
and School Environments for ADHD
Diagnoses
106
The previous chapter examined the claim that ADHD results from a medicalization
process. After documenting variations in diagnosis and treatment according to age, gen-
der, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status on the individual level and according
to region and resources and education policies in the state in which a student resides, I
argued that the findings display class effects such that children are funneled into the di-
agnosis to fulfill two different functions: performance enhancement if they are white or
high socioeconomic status or social control if they are non-white or low socioeconomic sta-
tus. Medicalization does not supply an obvious explanation for the duality. I suggested
that the use of the diagnosis for performance enhancement or social control can depend on
macro-level institutions, including resource availability, state-level school disciplinary cul-
ture, and state-level academic achievement culture. I also suggested that ADHD is more
likely to substitute for learning disabilities in certain regions. Chapter 2 thus alluded to
the possibility that schools play a role in advancing the diagnosis, but did not test the con-
tributions of schools to diagnostic prevalence.
The cognitive and behavioral attributes of children are so interlinked with education
that any theory of the disorder’s prevalence must account for the roles of teachers and
schools in addition to the macro-level factors that influence schools. The medicalization
literature views schools as passive agents of pharmaceutical companies and medical ex-
perts or as their willing collaborators. That perspective assumes either that teachers and
schools accept that ADHD is a medical problem — one best left to the expertise of medi-
cal experts — or that schools recognize the beneficial effects of stimulant drug treatments
on classroom behavior and performance. Thus, medicalization explains the emergence and
widespread use of the ADHD diagnostic label, at least in part, by pointing to the need
to achieve social control of deviant children within schools, particularly when other disci-
plinary measures are inadequate. To that end, medicalization theory would predict that
the disorder primarily is a reaction to behavioral non-conformity rather than cognitive dif-
ficulty that results in sub-standard academic performance.
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Although my analysis sets off both medicalization and biological determinism as al-
ternate theories, there is at least one variant of medicalization that seems consistent with
the findings from Chapter 2. The idea that parent activists are key drivers of diagnostic
expansion seems incontestable. Given the incomplete effectiveness of pharmaceutical treat-
ments,1 there is likely to be an ongoing negotiation and contention among students, par-
ents, teachers, and schools. Schools both produce and embed cultural knowledge about
children’s behavior and approaches to treatment (Singh, 2006; Malacrida, 2004), so we
would expect to find variations in the perception and tolerance of young children’s behav-
ior, educational and behavioral goals for children, and styles of treating problem behaviors.
Malacrida (2004), for example, compares the more extensively medicalized version of the
disorder in Canada with the less medicalized version in Britain and points to the relative
difficulty in Canada of suspending or expelling children from schools (essentially a macro-
level explanation). Her interviews, however, suggest that the differences in disciplinary sys-
tems enabled an interactional process in which Canadian educators were more likely to
suggest the need for medical treatment to parents, while British educators were ambiva-
lent or even hostile to the medical label and instead more likely to suggest that families
seek psychotherapy to address the emotional needs of their children. Given the variability
in the school-parent interaction, it is a stretch to say that the “definitional center” remains
“constant” in the category that emerges, as medicalization theory would claim (Conrad,
2005, p. 10). In this chapter, therefore, I investigate the school determinants of symptom
levels and diagnoses.
There has been little research into the contributions of teachers and schools to the
1As discussed in Chapter 1, medications do not improve inattention or impulsivity symptoms in all
children (Committee on Children and Disabilities and Committee on Drugs, 1996), and even when they do
minimize those symptoms temporarily, the effects tend to diminish over time (MTA Cooperative Group,
2004). Further, medications sometimes improve one set of symptoms, while worsening another (Committee
on Children and Disabilities and Committee on Drugs, 1996; Hale et al., 2011; Swanson et al., 1991), and
the side effects may require accommodations in the school environment (Committee on Children and Dis-
abilities and Committee on Drugs, 1996). Finally, abuse and misuse are notable problems (Wilens et al.,
2008).
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identification of the underlying behaviors and cognitive attributes of students that result
in a diagnosis. It also remains unclear whether such systematic differences in diagnostic
rates are explained by different symptom profiles as they manifest in school contexts. Fur-
thermore, the parental response to the school identification or failure to identify symp-
toms remains unexamined. To that end, this chapter uses a longitudinal study that tracks
a 1999 cohort of kindergarten children through eighth grade to examine the contributions
of teachers and schools to parent-reported incidence of ADHD. This chapter embraces the
notion of parents as drivers of diagnostic expansion by examining how teachers respond
and react to the non-cognitive skills of children and how those responses relate to ADHD
prevalence. In what follows, I provide an overview of the school effects literature related
to ADHD. I then describe my hypotheses and empirical approach. Finally, I present the
results and discuss their implications.
3.1 Existing Research
School effects research typically investigates the association between student achievement
and aggregate school characteristics or institutional school attributes. In this chapter,
however, I consider the association of school characteristics and medical intervention in
the form of diagnosis for attention deficit disorders. This approach provides insight into
the school-related factors that are associated with diagnostic prevalence. Under the tradi-
tional medical model, diagnosis occurs during an interaction between the patient and fam-
ily and a physician, during which the physician responds to the absolute level of the pa-
tient’s symptoms. Variation in diagnosis and treatment is attributed to differential access
to medical care or local medical culture, and any coincidental variation in school preva-
lence would be attributed to the average characteristics of the student body. Social sci-
entists, however, have identified several ways in which school characteristics relate to the
identification of symptoms and to diagnosis and treatment.
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3.1.1 Schools and Teachers and the Identification of ADHD Symp-
toms
Starting with the identification of symptoms, the role of the teacher is apparent. Because
teachers are often the first to identify ADHD symptoms (Mayes et al., 2008; Sax and Kautz,
2003), variation in the likelihood that teachers will recognize and act on the symptoms is
expected. Symptoms typically do not appear until a child is placed in a learning environ-
ment in which demands on attention and behavior emerge. The diagnostic criteria, for ex-
ample, directly connect the disorder to the school setting when they list symptoms such as
“makes careless mistakes in schoolwork,” “often blurts out an answer,” “has difficulty wait-
ing his or her turn,” and “often leaves seat.” More fundamentally, the diagnostic criteria
accord teachers a formal role in the process with the mandate that symptoms be observed
in two or more settings and that confirmation of symptoms across settings be based on
consultation with informants in those settings. Furthermore, teacher rating scales assume
that assessments consider the context of what is appropriate for children of the same age
(Brock et al., 2009; National Institute of Mental Health, 2008), which suggests the possi-
bility of comparative judgments within a class or school.2 These comparisons vary with
teacher characteristics and experience and are influenced by the child’s background (as
well as the advocacy of parents). Nevertheless, teacher and school incentives do not al-
ways align with those of parents. Teachers have an interest in detecting and managing dis-
ruptive children, but they might have beliefs about psychiatric disorders that lead them
to dissuade parents of the need for diagnosis or treatment (Malacrida, 2004). Teachers
also are employed by schools that might wish to deter the special education placements
or other accommodations that can follow a diagnosis.
Student behaviors also vary with school context. Behavioral or learning problems might
2The principal interaction between the teacher and physician is indirect. It occurs in the context of
the diagnostic process where the teacher completes a rating scale assessing the child’s symptoms in the
school setting; in some cases, there are follow-ups with the teacher who monitors the therapeutic effects of
different medication dosages as they are gradually increased (Sprague and Gadow, 1976).
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be sensitive to class size, teacher experience or quality (Jennings and DiPrete, 2010; Dee
and West, 2011), or to the structures used to accommodate different learning styles within
the regular curriculum. Peer influence also affects the behaviors and learning motivations
of students (Neidell and Waldfogel, 2010; Gottfried, 2014), which could influence the ap-
pearance of symptoms (and their recognition and evaluation by teachers). One possibility
is that high SES students are found in more competitive academic environments that also
discourage problem behaviors. Deviance from a demanding standard might be more likely
to result in diagnosis. Alternatively, schools with more resources might accommodate dif-
ferent learning styles more readily. If so, students attending poorer schools (presumably
low SES schools) might be more likely to exhibit symptoms.
3.1.2 Relative Age Effects and ADHD Diagnoses
The research that examines contextual factors associated with ADHD diagnosis and treat-
ment is narrowly framed. One prominent claim in the literature is that children who turn
5 shortly before the kindergarten eligibility cutoff date under state law are more likely to
seem hyperactive and to diagnosed with ADHD, with the implication being that teach-
ers – and parents, indirectly – are forming and applying classroom expectations on a rel-
ative basis rather than against some independent benchmark for age-appropriate behav-
ior and development. Studies in the United States, Canada, and Iceland have found that
children who are young within grade level are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD at
some time in their elementary or middle school years (Elder, 2010; Elder and Lubotsky,
2009; Evans et al., 2010; Krabbe et al., 2014; Morrow et al., 2012; Zoëga et al., 2012b).3
Using data from the ECLS-K, Elder (2010, p. 642) finds that “the key mechanism” driving
relative age effects in diagnosis is kindergarten teacher ratings of sociobehavioral skills (im-
plying that teachers rate students in comparison with their peers rather than against some
3At least one other study finds no such effects (Biederman et al., 2012), but this study did not account
for actual kindergarten entry or the aggregate age characteristics of the child’s school or state.
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external developmental benchmark). He found larger discontinuities around eligibility cut-
offs in teacher reports than in parent reports.4 The conclusion those authors draw is that
younger children are developmentally immature and might not actually “have” ADHD. El-
der (2010, pp. 641-42), for example, argues that the relationship between school starting
age and ADHD suggests that teacher ratings are “subjective” and the resulting diagnoses
are “inappropriate”; he estimates that 20 percent of children who use stimulants “have been
misdiagnosed.” Evans et al. (2010, p. 660) reach similar conclusions using data from the
NHIS and suggest that the findings “represent true misdiagnosis of ADHD.” The policy
implications are considerable. A New York Times editorial, for example, raises a concern
that universal pre-kindergarten will lead to an “epidemic” of 4- and 5-year olds “being
wrongfully told that they have” ADHD (Hinshaw and Scheffler, 2014a).
Although the existing studies do not situate the effects along the longitudinal path-
ways to diagnosis and treatment,5 the implication is that younger elementary students
are simply too immature, in many cases, to conform with the demands of formal school-
ing. Elder and Lubotsky (2009, p. 667), for example, suggest that younger children are
“more likely to suffer from shortcomings in skills or maturity by the end of kindergarten,
and these deficits lead teachers and parents to suggest professional evaluation and grade
repetition.” Nevertheless, the outcome variable in their study – ever being diagnosed –
is measured as a positive response during any survey year, which obscures the process
through which kindergarten immaturity might lead to diagnosis. Those studies also as-
sume that state cutoff dates for kindergarten entry are a meaningful predictor of relative
4This research generally assumes agreement among parents and teachers or parent passivity, neither
of which is necessarily true. The extent of agreement between teachers and parents as to symptom levels
is an empirical question; Wolraich et al. (2004), for instance, reports low agreement between parent and
teacher reports of ADHD symptoms. And in the absence of agreement about symptoms, the consequences
of disagreement for diagnosis are not clear.
5Evans et al. (2010) find that the effects of relative age on diagnosis in the United States are somewhat
larger for the 7-12 cross sectional age groups than for the 13-17 age group, but they do not use longi-
tudinal data or information about school context. In a study of Canadian schools, Zoëga et al. (2012b)
identified effects on the probability that students took stimulant drugs at some time between the fourth
and seventh grades.
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age, but they do not consider whether or to what extent school districts (and parents) ob-
serve those cutoffs. In addition, they exclude data for students in a significant number of
large states that do not have state-wide cutoff dates. Even more fundamentally, however,
that research does not test the ultimate question whether teachers form relative judgments
about students compared to their peers within the same schools.
3.1.3 School and Teacher Attributes and ADHD Diagnoses
Schneider and Eisenberg (2006) is the only study (to my knowledge) that directly exam-
ines teacher and school characteristics as predictors of ADHD diagnoses. Schneider and
Eisenberg find that having an older teacher increases the odds of diagnosis relative to hav-
ing a younger teacher, and that having a white teacher decreases the odds of diagnosis rel-
ative to having a nonwhite teacher. Net of other factors, class size had no effect on the
odds of diagnosis in that study. In their model, however, independent variables measured
in the third-grade year were used to predict a diagnosis as of the third grade, so diagno-
sis in many cases preceded the measurement of the independent variables. As a result, the
findings could represent the consequences of a diagnosis rather than the causes. For exam-
ple, having a white teacher or an older teacher could be an artifact of having a special ed-
ucation placement; this seems like a probable assumption because special education teach-
ers usually have advanced degrees or certifications. Thus, that study provides only limited
support for the notion that the institutional features of schools play a role in predicting
diagnosis.
3.2 Main Hypotheses
The current study extends previous work by looking more broadly at the contextual de-
terminants of symptom recognition and response. In this study, the context includes both
the longitudinal progression of socio-behavioral skills (and any medical response) and the
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school environment (both in terms of teacher and school attributes and school composi-
tion). I use a nationwide sample of kindergarten children, nested within schools, who were
followed through the eighth grade. The advantage of the dataset for this project is that it
has socio-behavioral evaluations from teachers and parents, taken at several points in time,
that correspond to the specific symptoms that form the basis for a diagnosis of ADHD. I
use these data, in connection with data about the student’s background and school, to ex-
amine the correlates of symptom levels and ADHD diagnoses. In doing so, I close a gap
from the previous chapter by examining the mediating effect of symptom levels on diagno-
sis. In addition, I provide a broader explanation of school effects – one that situates rela-
tive age effects in the context of school effects more generally.
Based on research that documents lower non-cognitive skills in children with low fam-
ily SES or from racial minority groups (Hsin and Xie, 2012), I expect to find that children
who are nonwhite or who are from low SES backgrounds will have higher symptom lev-
els (both as reported by teachers and by parents and across grades in school) (H1). Fur-
thermore, based on the research that documents relative-age effects in ADHD diagnoses
and the underlying symptoms (Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Elder, 2010; Evans et al., 2010;
Zoëga et al., 2012b), I expect to find that the youngest students within the grade/school
will have higher symptom levels (H2).
Existing research documents a low level of agreement between parent and teacher re-
ports of ADHD symptoms (Wolraich et al., 2004). The lack of agreement could imply that
ADHD is used as a social control mechanism (if teachers have higher symptom ratings
than parents) or that parents desire the benefits of the ADHD label (if parents have higher
symptom ratings than teachers). In Chapter 2, I identified different groups of diagnosed
students based on their treatment regimens – high SES, white children (more likely to re-
ceive stimulants as performance enhancers) and low SES, minority group children (more
likely to be controlled by anti-psychotic medications or to be placed in special education).
The duality in treatments suggested that the diagnosis functions in different ways for dif-
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ferent types of children, which, in turn, suggested that both social control and parental
agency might be explanatory factors for children depending on their race and class po-
sition. Accordingly, I hypothesize that there will be greater levels of agreement among
teachers and parents for white children than for minority group children (H3). This fol-
lows from the attribution of medical explanations for poor behavior or academic function-
ing when children come from higher status backgrounds, while alternative explanations are
likely to be attributed to children from lower status backgrounds.6
At the same time, I hypothesize that, where there is disagreement, parent-rated symp-
tom levels will be higher on average than teacher-rated symptom levels for white children,
and parent-rated symptom levels will be lower on average than teacher-rated symptom
levels for minority-group children (H4). Those effects, in turn, are likely to vary by symp-
tom type; parents will be more likely to over estimate (relative to teachers) the symptom
of inattention, and parents will be more likely to under estimate the symptom of impul-
sivity. The reason for this is the relation of inattention to academic domains and the fact
that the attribution of academic difficulty to a medical problem is likely to be especially
common among high SES parents of slow-developing children.
My next set of hypotheses relate to the consequences of parent-teacher agreement (or
lack thereof) for diagnosis of children from different racial and class backgrounds. McLeod
et al.’s (2007) data from the National Stigma Study-Children show that members of mi-
nority groups are less likely to know about the disorder and to believe that it is a real dis-
ease.7 Thus, my hypothesis is that the reduced odds of diagnosis for black and Hispanic
6The classic medical explanation that ties appearance of symptoms directly with treatment faces sev-
eral obstacles even after teachers identify and label symptomatic behaviors as such. Parents face the
additional challenge of recognizing and accepting their child’s behaviors as problematic. Then, they must
construct an interpretation that is medical and act upon it. For many parents, it might be difficult to
differentiate between age-appropriate behaviors and those that are not. Moreover, different levels of agree-
ment between parent and teacher ratings of ADHD symptoms might stem from different perceptions of the
problem behavior by parents and teachers, medication effects, or actual observed differences in behavior
(e.g., disruptive behaviors exhibited at home but not school).
7McLeod et al. (2007) found that just under two-thirds of respondents had heard of ADHD. Female
respondents, white respondents, and respondents with higher levels of education were more likely to have
heard of ADHD. Among respondents who had heard of ADHD, female respondents, white respondents,
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children compared to white children (reported in Chapter 2) will persist even when I ac-
count for parent- and teacher-rated symptoms; if minority group children, on average, have
worse health outcomes and reduced access to medical care compared to white children,
they should have even lower odds of diagnosis after symptoms are netted out (H5). How-
ever, I expect to find that the reduced odds of diagnosis for children of higher SES are an
artifact of having improved health outcomes (fewer symptoms), so I hypothesize that chil-
dren with higher levels of SES will have increased odds of diagnosis net of symptoms (H6).
If parent- and teacher-rated symptom levels have independent effects, the lack of teacher-
parent agreement will reduce the odds of diagnosis. Accordingly, I consider whether there
are race and class differences in the returns to parent-reported symptoms, net of teacher-
reported symptoms. I hypothesize that parent over estimates of symptom levels (compared
to teachers) will be more predictive of diagnosis for high SES children than for low SES
children and for white children than for minority group children (H7). By implication, par-
ents of high SES or white children will have greater agency and fewer resource constraints
so that they can act on their children’s symptoms even when teachers disagree.
My final hypotheses relate to the cognitive dimensions of ADHD. First, I expect the
aggregate inattention and impulsivity levels to be lower as the aggregate socio-economic
status of the children in a school increases; this follows from the inverse relationship be-
tween SES and non-cognitive skills at the individual level. Furthermore, if ADHD in fact
represents a performance-enhancement strategy for high SES children, the aggregate socio-
economic status of the children within a school should be a positive predictor of the likeli-
hood of diagnosis (H8). Given the higher odds of diagnosis for high SES children, I expect
that inattention is a stronger predictor of diagnosis than impulsivity for those students.
Some corroboration for this comes from Leffers’ (1997) qualitative study, which found that
minority children were more likely to be identified with ADHD for unruly behavior while
white middle class children were more often referred for evaluation for academic under-
and respondents with higher incomes most often endorsed the belief that ADHD was a real disease.
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achievement in addition to unruly behavior.
3.3 Data and Methods
The Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten cohort (ECLS-K), is a nation-
ally representative sample of 21,400 kindergarteners who were tracked from kindergarten
through eighth grade.8 In the fall of 1998, NCES randomly sampled schools (the primary
sampling units) from across the United States. Within each school, all kindergarten class-
rooms were selected, and children were randomly drawn from classrooms. Followup studies
were conducted the spring of the years 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007.9
As part of the study, the NCES submitted questionnaires to each child’s parents, teach-
ers, and school administrators. I used several questions from the parent questionnaires (in
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007) to construct the ADHD diagnosis measure. The first
stem question was: “Does {Child} pay attention ... (1) Better than children {his/her}
age, (2) As well as other children, (3) Slightly less well than other children, or (4) Much
less well than other children.” If the child has problems with paying attention [3 or 4], the
parent was asked: “Has {Child} been evaluated by a professional in response to {his/her}
ability to pay attention or learn?” If the parent answered yes, the parent then was asked:
“Did you obtain a diagnosis of a problem from a professional?” Again, if the answer was
yes, the parent was asked: “What was the primary diagnosis.” The response categories for
the question included the items “attention deficit disorder” and “attention deficit hyper-
active disorder.” The series of questions is then repeated for the child’s “overall activity
level.” In this case, “hyperactivity” is included as an additional response category. Using
those questions, I created a binary variable for ADHD diagnosis (coded 1 if the child is re-
8All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 pursuant to the NCES restrictive data use agreement.
9A freshening process occurred in the springs of kindergarten and first grade, when a subset of movers
were followed to their new schools. The remaining movers were replaced by a new sample of students from
the original schools. The freshening process was discontinued after the first grade, resulting in sample
attrition as children moved to new schools.
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ported to have a diagnosis of hyperactivity, attention deficit disorder, or attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder). In the final three waves, there were additional stem questions that
used attention disorders as response categories. For those years, all relevant stem questions
were included in constructing the binary measures.
The parent and teacher questionnaires include contemporaneous reports of the child’s
sociobehavioral skills that I use as a proxy for symptoms. In the fall and spring semesters
of kindergarten, teachers were asked to rate individual students on different dimensions
measuring social, emotional, and cognitive development. Those questionnaires were re-
peated in the spring of first, third, and fifth grade. Parents also provided similar assess-
ments in the fall and spring of kindergarten and in the spring of first grade, reflecting be-
havior in the home. The items are adapted from the Social Skills Rating System (SSRS)
developed by Gresham and Elliott (1990),10 which is a norm-referenced instrument de-
signed to identify social competence and adaptive behavior in children across three do-
mains – social skills, problem behaviors, and academic competence (Tourangeau et al.,
2006). Among other things, teachers were asked whether the child “pays attention well”
or “acts impulsively.” Parents were asked how often the child “acts impulsively,” “concen-
trates on a task and ignores distractions,” or is “hyperactive.” The items are rated on a
scale of 1 (never) to 4 (very often), which I invert, as necessary, so that higher values rep-
resent higher symptom levels. I standardize each parent and teacher measure separately so
that the resulting variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This allows me
to compare the magnitude of the symptoms represented by those variables across raters
and years.
I used the teacher questionnaire to obtain the age, gender, and race of the child’s teacher.
The school administrator questionnaire indicates the school’s public/private status, class
size, school size, location information (whether urban, suburban or rural, and whether lo-
10Copyright © 1990 NCS Pearson, Inc. Used with permission. All rights reserved. “SSRS is a trade-
mark, in the US and/or other countries, of Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliate(s).
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cated in the south), and the share of the student body that is a racial minority. To obtain
school SES, I fit school random effects models that predict individual SES from the ur-
banicity, region, school type, school percent minority, and reading and math IRT scores. I
then use an average of the predictions for the students within each school along with the
random component.11
The regression models in this chapter control for variables that have been associated
in previous research with students’ academic and social and behavioral skills. These vari-
ables include race (coded black, white, Hispanic, Asian, or other), gender, socioeconomic
status,12 single parent status, insurance status, whether a student has been retained or
has chosen to “red shirt,” as well as age as of September 1 of the survey year (all obtained
from the parent questionnaire). Low birthweight is taken from the parent questionnaire
and defined as birth weight under 5 pounds.
Of the approximately 21,400 students in the dataset, I excluded about 2240 from the
sample to fulfill various research goals. In brief, I excluded the children who were not first-
time kindergarteners in the fall of 1998, the children who were already enrolled in non-
mainstream special education schools, and those whose parents reported a prior evaluation
for behavioral or learning problems. To explain the school-related factors contributing to
diagnosis, it was necessary to start with a sample of children who did not experience seri-
ous academic or behavioral issues before starting kindergarten; otherwise, I cannot account
for reverse causation running from diagnosis to the reporting of socio-behavioral skills.
About 5 percent of the entire dataset had a prior evaluation for behavioral or learning
problems. About 4 percent of the dataset constituted children who were repeating kinder-
11To address the problem that some schools have a small number of students, I use empirical Bayes es-
timates from multilevel models. This approach relies on “shrinkage” estimates that are a weighted sum of
the estimates from a single school and the estimates predicted for that school by data for the larger pop-
ulation. The basic idea is that estimates for schools with a large number of students put more weight on
the school-specific estimate, while estimates for schools with a small number of students put more weight
on the overall estimate pulling it more strongly towards the overall mean.
12The socioeconomic (SES) index is comprised of five variables: family income, the parents’ highest lev-
els of educational attainment, and the parents’ occupational prestige rankings. The index is normalized to
have a mean of zero and standard deviation equal to one.
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garten; children who were white and from high SES backgrounds were less likely to be re-
peating the grade. About 3 percent of the dataset represented children already in special
education schools. Because of overlap, those restrictions amounted to about 10 percent of
the dataset, which likely excludes the children with the most severe symptoms.13
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Individual Level Patterns
Parent-reported ADHD incidence increased as the children in the study progressed from
kindergarten through the eighth grade. As of the spring of the first grade, about 1 per-
cent of the first-time kindergarteners in the sample had an ADHD diagnosis. By third
grade, about 3.5 percent of the children had reported a diagnosis in at least one survey
year, and by 5th grade, about 5 percent of the children had reported a diagnosis in at least
one survey year (Figure 3.4.1). Medication use among those diagnosed with the disorder
decreased from about 57 percent in first grade to about 40 percent in eighth grade. Spe-
cial education enrollment conditional upon diagnosis increased from about 15 percent of
the children in first grade to about 30 percent of those diagnosed as of fifth grade. Most of
the children with IEPs (more than 80 percent in third grade) were placed in general edu-
cation environments. In first grade, most of the students diagnosed with ADHD who had
an IEP were in the speech-impaired category or the learning disabilities category; by the
third grade, most of the children were in the learning disabilities category. In Chapter 4,
I return to this topic when I examine parent and school disputes about the appropriate
eligibility category for students with ADHD.
13It also should be noted that about 7 percent of the children in the full sample were “redshirted”
(meaning that they started kindergarten the year after they were initially eligible). Children who were
white, or from high SES backgrounds, were more likely to be in that group. Those children remain in the
dataset.
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Note: Sample excludes children with a prior evaluation for attention or behavioral prob-
lems, prior special education placement, or who had been retained in kindergarten. In the
excluded the group, approximately 11 percent had been diagnosed with ADHD. Because
the treatment questions were not asked in all waves, I do not have the same number of
bars for each subfigure.
3.4.2 School Level Patterns
Of the approximately 1020 schools, about 380 do not have a child in this dataset that re-
ceived a diagnosis by the eighth grade. The number of diagnoses ranges from 1 to 7 for the
remaining schools. At the school level, there are negative relationships between average so-
cioeconomic status and teacher-reported impulsivity and between average socioeconomic
status and teacher-reported inattention. Conversely, there are positive relationships be-
tween teacher-reported inattention and ADHD prevalence and between teacher-reported
impulsivity and ADHD prevalence (Figure 3.4.2). The result of those offsetting patterns
is a slight yet significantly positive relationship between school prevalence of ADHD and
school average socioeconomic status, which is consistent with both a compositional effect
– high SES students are more likely to be in schools with other high SES students and are
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more likely to have ADHD – and a normative effect – high SES schools demand better at-
tention or behavior.
Figure 3.4.2: Scatterplots Depicting Relationships Among SES, ADHD Prevalence, and
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Socio-demographic Determinants of Symptoms
Having established that there is higher prevalence of ADHD in higher SES schools – de-
spite the lower aggregate levels of symptoms – my next step is to estimate models that
regress individual symptom levels on race, gender, socio-economic status, and relative age
within school. I estimate separate models for each symptom subtype (inattention and im-
pulsivity), each rater (parent and teacher), and for different stages in the early elementary
years (kindergarten and first grade).14 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 contains the results for the inat-
14This analysis is based on kindergarten and first grade ratings because parent ratings were not ob-
tained after the first-grade wave. I do not use hyperactivity ratings, because teachers were not asked
about hyperactive behaviors.
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tention and impulsivity models, respectively.15
Table 3.1 suggests that parent- and teacher-reported inattention levels both increase,
on average, between kindergarten and first grade, consistent with the increased academic
demands placed on children in the first grade. Parent and teacher ratings for inattention
are of roughly the same magnitude for white students in kindergarten and first grade.
Black students had higher symptom levels than white students in both waves and across
both raters net of SES and age (H1); however, the average black-white race gap in inat-
tention was larger in kindergarten for both raters, and the black-white race gap was larger
in the teacher ratings than in the corresponding parent ratings for both years. Those find-
ings suggest that teachers are more likely than parents to observe racial differences in at-
tention skills, and they suggest that parents of black students are more likely to underes-
timate inattention levels, while parents of white students are more likely to overestimate
inattention levels (H4). Inattention levels also vary by socio-economic status, with higher
levels of inattention among poorer students (H1); the magnitudes of the SES differences
are fairly uniform across raters, but the SES gaps grow somewhat larger in the first grade
compared to kindergarten (as academic demands increase). Inattention levels also vary
with the child’s age relative to other kindergarteners in the same school; the oldest chil-
dren in a school experience lower symptom levels across raters and years (H2). However,
relative age effects are much larger in magnitude in the teacher ratings than in the corre-
sponding parent ratings, which is expected because parents are less likely to be in a posi-
tion to make comparisons across students within a school. At the same time, relative age
effects do not decline significantly between kindergarten and first grade, contrary to the
relative immaturity suggestion in the literature. Models that regress third- and fifth-grade
inattention levels on relative age and other covariates suggest that relative age effects on
teacher-reported inattention levels persist throughout the elementary years.
15I conducted separate analyses that use the externalizing behavior and approaches to learning scales as
alternative measures of symptoms; impulsivity and inattention are included as items within those factors.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2 shows that teacher- and parent-reported impulsivity levels increase slightly
between kindergarten and the first grade, suggesting that the demands on behavior are
higher in first grade. Black students had higher teacher ratings for impulsivity than white
students in both waves (H1), and the race gaps were larger in first grade than in kinder-
garten. However, the black-white race gap was negative or insignificant in the parent rat-
ings. These findings suggest that parents of black students are more likely to underesti-
mate impulsivity levels, while parents of white students are more likely to overestimate
inattention levels (H4). Impulsivity levels are slightly smaller in the higher SES quintiles
than in the lower quintiles, particularly in the first grade (H1). Teacher-rated impulsiv-
ity levels vary with the child’s age relative to other students in the same school, but to a
lesser degree than the differences in inattention (H2). Finally, teacher ratings of the impul-
sivity levels of white students were lower than the comparable parent ratings. Parents of
white children might experience less stigma than parents of black children in the admission
that their children are impulsive; at the same time, teachers might be less likely to view
behavior through a lens of impulsivity when children are white.
Next, I estimate separate models that isolate parent- and teacher-rating correspon-
dence across groups of children. Table 3.3 displays coefficients from regressions of teacher-
rated skills – either inattention or impulsivity – on the corresponding parent-rated skill,
along with race, gender, and socioeconomic status controls, and their interactions with the
parent-rated skill. The coefficient for the parent-rated skill represents the relationship to
the corresponding teacher rating for white boys in the lowest SES quintile. The coefficients
for the interaction terms represent the extent to which parent- and teacher-ratings are cor-
related more or less closely for other groups.
As shown in Table 3.3, the correlation between parent and teacher ratings is low, par-
ticularly in kindergarten where a one standard deviation increase in parent-reported im-
pulsivity is associated with one-tenth of a standard deviation increase in teacher-reported



















































































































































































































































































































































































and for inattention (compared to impulsivity). The difference in correlation across grades
suggests that parents obtain a better understanding of their child’s school performance
during the kindergarten year, which is represented in their ratings in the first grade. With
respect to race and ethnicity, the models confirm that there is lower correlation between
parent and teacher ratings for black children than for white children in the inattention do-
main during the first grade (H3). There is also lower correlation for Asian children than
for white children in teacher- and parent-reported inattention ratings, because parents
over-estimate inattention levels relative to teachers. There is significantly higher correla-
tion for boys’ impulsivity ratings than for girls’ impulsivity ratings. One likely explana-
tion for this difference is that boy behaviors are seen by parents and teachers as typical of
ADHD. This finding indicates a process of looping; when symptoms occur, there is more
likely to be agreement among caretakers. An understanding of the category thus becomes
part of a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” explaining the higher ADHD prevalence among boys.
Further support for this finding comes from evidence that the gender differences in symp-
tom levels are not present when adolescents serve as the informants (Leren, 2008).
Next, given the positive relationship between ADHD prevalence and school SES, I es-
timate models that predict whether ADHD symptoms in schools (evidenced by teacher-
reported ratings) also vary by school SES. Table 3.4 displays the results.
As shown in Table 3.4, school SES is associated with higher levels of teacher reported-
inattention, reversing the school-level pattern shown in Figure 3.4.2. That finding could
imply that students in high SES schools have higher symptom levels in some absolute
sense, or it could imply that the demands on attention are greater in high-SES schools.
The latter implication makes more sense, because of the inverse relationship between in-
dividual SES levels and teacher-reported inattention. In other words, controlling for indi-
vidual SES reverses the negative correlation between inattention and school SES that was
displayed in Figure 3.4.2. It also is worth noting that there is no significant relationship
between school SES and average impulsivity levels, suggesting that demands for behavioral
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Table 3.4: Regression of Teacher-Rated Symptom Levels On Parent Ratings and School
SES (First Grade)
Inattention Impulsivity
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Parent rating 0.192*** (0.00951) 0.154*** (0.00971)
Student SES -0.205*** (0.0160) -0.0897*** (0.0163)
School SES 0.120*** (0.0258) -0.0270 (0.0264)
School age (1st quartile, youngest)
Second quartile -0.140*** (0.0249) -0.0944*** (0.0255)
Third quartile -0.197*** (0.0247) -0.0883*** (0.0253)
Fourth (oldest) quartile -0.330*** (0.0272) -0.139*** (0.0279)
Race (white)
Black 0.224*** (0.0310) 0.205*** (0.0319)
Hispanic 0.0250 (0.0278) -0.0795** (0.0287)
Asian -0.216*** (0.0441) -0.119** (0.0457)
Other 0.0942* (0.0420) 0.0678 (0.0431)
Male 0.381*** (0.0186) 0.447*** (0.0190)
Constant -0.0941*** (0.0204) -0.177*** (0.0209)
Number of observations 10020 9940
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
conformity do not vary systematically with school SES.
To recapitulate, there is more variation across socio-demographic groups in inattention
symptoms than in impulsivity symptoms. Although parent-rated inattention levels only
weakly correlate with corresponding teacher ratings, the parents of white children over-
and under-estimate inattention levels to roughly the same extent. By contrast, the par-
ents of Asian students over-estimate inattention levels (relative to teachers), and the par-
ents of black students generally under-estimate inattention and impulsivity levels (relative
to teachers). Finally, individual SES is negatively related to teacher ratings for inatten-
tion (as predicted), but school SES is positively related to teacher ratings for inattention
(controlling for individual SES). With that background, I now examine the individual- and
school-level determinants of diagnosis.
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3.4.3 Importance of Teacher- and Parent-Ratings for Diagnosis
Because the datasets that I used in Chapter 2 did not have a longitudinal structure or a
measure of symptom levels, that chapter was not able to address the question I turn to
to now: whether differences in the effects of race and SES on the likelihood of diagnosis
are affected by the severity of the symptoms. I start by replicating the model from Chap-
ter 2 (with ECLS-K data) and placing that model alongside a specification that accounts
for symptoms. Table 3.5 shows odds ratios from two logistic regression models – the first
predicts the odds that a child has an ADHD diagnosis based on race, class, whether the
child is insured, and whether the child is in a single-parent family (comparable to Table
2.1 (Model 1)), and the second adds controls for teacher- and parent-reported symptoms
to ascertain whether race- and class-based differences in diagnosis are explained by race- or
class-based differences in symptoms. I estimate the model for students whose diagnosis is
first reported in the first-grade wave and then for students whose diagnosis is first reported
in the third grade wave. I use the symptom levels from the previous wave to predict diag-
nosis in the wave in question.
The odds ratios in Model 1 are similar to those in Table 2.1 (Model 1). Black and His-
panic children have lower odds of diagnosis than white children, and there are lower odds
of diagnosis at higher levels of SES. However, Model 2 shows that the symptoms of kinder-
garten children are strongly predictive of being diagnosed before the spring of first grade.
With those controls, the odds ratios for the minority race variables decrease – suggesting
that children from racial minority groups have even lower odds of being diagnosed after ac-
counting for sociobehavioral skills (H5). I have already shown that white children, on av-
erage, have lower symptom levels than black and Hispanic children, especially as measured
by teacher ratings. Symptom levels also explain a significant portion of the gender differ-
ences in the likelihood of diagnosis. However, the SES variables change direction (and lose
significance): controlling for sociobehavioral skills, children with higher levels of SES have























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































idea that the diagnosis has a “performance enhancement” function for high SES students.
At the same time, the findings are consistent with the limited access explanation for poor
and racial minority group children. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate the indepen-
dent importance of each of the parent- and teacher-symptoms; the higher odds ratio for
teacher-rated inattention suggests that it is the symptom that is the strongest predictor
of diagnosis. The models predicting diagnosis during the period beginning in the spring of
first grade and ending in the spring of third grade based on first-grade symptoms (Models
3 and 4) reveal similar patterns.16 The increased importance of parent-reported symptoms
(comparing third grade to the first grade) is apparent, and teacher-rated inattention be-
comes an even stronger predictor of diagnosis in the later wave.
Next, I estimate differences in the returns to parent-rated inattention and impulsivity
by race. The dependent variable is whether the child’s parents ever reported an ADHD
diagnosis, conditional upon being undiagnosed and at grade level during the first grade
wave. The independent variables are the teacher ratings for impulsivity and inattention,
the difference between parent and teacher ratings for impulsivity and inattention, race,
gender, socio-economic status, relative age quartiles, and the interaction of the differenced
ratings and race and gender. The results are shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 confirms that white students receive significant returns for diagnosis to par-
ent ratings of inattention and impulsivity independent of the teacher ratings. However,
black students receive significantly lower returns to parent-reported inattention, and are
significantly less likely than white students to be diagnosed even net of the parent-reported
over-estimate of inattention (H7). To put it differently, if I re-estimate this model using
only white students and then assign black students the white returns to the coefficients,
the probability of diagnosis for black students would nearly double.
16Additional models (not shown) that predict diagnosis from spring of third grade through eighth grade
produce comparable results.
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Table 3.6: Logistic Regression of ADHD Diagnosis On Parent Over-Estimates of Symptom
Levels
Odds Ratio S.E.
Teacher-rated inattention 2.896*** (0.221)
Teacher-rated impulsivity 1.759*** (0.109)
Inattention difference (P-T) 1.523*** (0.136)







Black x Impulsivity difference 1.001 (0.103)
Hispanic x Impulsivity difference 1.034 (0.121)
Asian x Impulsivity difference 0.719 (0.386)
Other race x Impulsivity difference 1.157 (0.165)
Male x Impulsivity difference 0.949 (0.0718)
Black x Inattention difference 0.741* (0.101)
Hispanic x Inattention difference 0.987 (0.142)
Asian x Inattention difference 0.642 (0.436)
Other race x Inattention difference 1.172 (0.209)
Male x Inattention difference 0.995 (0.0908)
SES 1.210** (0.0822)
N 10970
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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3.4.4 The Importance of School Effects
Turning to the relevance of the school context, in the next model I estimate the returns
to school-level factors for ADHD diagnosis. The dependent variable is whether a child –
undiagnosed as of first grade – is diagnosed at any time through the eighth grade. I start
with the individual-level predictors in the previous model, and I add school SES, gender,
age, and race of the child’s first-grade teacher, the type of school (with public as the ref-
erence category), class size, and the child’s relative age position in the school. The results
are found in Table 3.7.
Most of the first-grade teacher and school attributes have no significant relationship to
diagnosis in later grades. Children in larger first-grade classes have lower odds of receiving
a diagnosis, which is consistent with the idea that children in larger classes are less likely
to be identified as needing intervention, but it cuts against the idea that children in larger
classes receive less individualized attention (necessitating medical intervention). The most
important finding is that school SES has a positive effect on diagnosis, which is consis-
tent with the higher levels of inattention (net of individual SES) – and, by inference, the
higher normative demands for attention – in those schools (H8). The model also suggests
that relative-age effects (i.e., the greater level of symptoms for those who are younger than
their classmates) extend to the likelihood of diagnosis even after accounting for symptom
levels.17
3.4.5 Relative Symptom Levels
One final (and consequential) way to think about the school context is to look directly
at relative symptom levels for children within the same school. Table 3.8 shows odds ra-
tios from a set of models that predict whether a child has an ADHD diagnosis at any time
through the eighth grade, based on the compositional effects attributable to contagion or
17When I restrict the analysis to those who are first diagnosed as of the first, third, fifth grade, or eighth
grades, the relative age effects are confined to the third grade model.
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Table 3.7: Logistic Regression of ADHD Diagnosis On School and Teacher Attributes
Odds Ratio S.E.
Teacher-rated inattention 2.917*** (0.260)
Teacher-rated impulsivity 1.720*** (0.124)
Inattention difference (P-T) 1.497*** (0.155)







Black x Impulsivity difference 0.981 (0.121)
Hispanic x Impulsivity difference 0.937 (0.136)
Asian x Impulsivity difference 0.636 (0.497)
Other race x Impulsivity difference 1.119 (0.175)
Male x Impulsivity difference 0.961 (0.0837)
Black x Inattention difference 0.711* (0.118)
Hispanic x Inattention difference 1.080 (0.189)
Asian x Inattention difference 1.091 (0.982)
Other race x Inattention difference 0.970 (0.199)
Male x Inattention difference 1.034 (0.110)
School age (1st quartile)
Second quartile 0.873 (0.125)
Third quartile 0.665** (0.102)
Fourth (oldest) quartile 0.620* (0.117)
SES 1.133 (0.114)
Redshirted 1.159 (0.282)
Low birthweight 1.439 (0.324)
Single parent 0.937 (0.143)
Class size 0.971* (0.0137)
Male teacher 0.355 (0.215)
Teacher age (under 35)
Between 35 and 49 1.129 (0.155)






Other religious 0.727 (0.182)
Other private 0.483 (0.236)
School SES 1.458* (0.254)
N 8410
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 135
peer effects (separating those attributable to aggregate characteristics of the students in a
school) and relative position effects. The specification is in the form:
logit(Yij) =  0 +  1(Xij   X̄) +  2X̄j +  0Z + eij + uj (3.4.1)
where Y ij denotes the student i in school j has a diagnosis, (Xij   X̄j) represents the vec-
tor of school-centered individual sociobehavioral ratings for impulsivity and attentiveness,
X̄j represents the vector of school-average sociobehavioral rating for impulsivity and at-
tentiveness, and  0Z is the vector of regression coefficients and corresponding matrix of
explanatory variables. The error term varying between students within a school is denoted
by eij, and the error term uj varies between schools.
The school-centered variables target the differentiation of students within the school –
specifically, the degree to which the relative position of students within the school affects
the likelihood of a diagnosis when controlling for the average sociobehavioral skills of stu-
dents within the school (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2001). Positive estimates for the effect of
these variables ( 1) indicate that as the relative levels of symptoms of students within the
school increases, so does their predicted likelihood of diagnosis. As specified in equation
3.4.1, the estimate  2 includes both the compositional and aggregate effects of the individ-
ual sociobehavioral skills; in other words, the model does not control for the uncentered in-
dividual sociobehavioral skills. To isolate the compositional effect, I net out the aggregate
of students’ sociobehavioral skills by subtracting the corresponding  1 from  2 and then
bootstrapping for the standard errors of the differences between the groups of coefficients
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2001). Positive estimates for this difference would suggest that
students are more likely to be diagnosed as symptom levels in a school increase, regardless
of the students’ relative positions. Table 3.8 contains the results.
As shown in Table 3.8, a deviation from the school mean for teacher-reported impul-
























































































































































































































































(measured by the differencing of the impulsivity coefficients) does not significantly affect
the likelihood of diagnosis. A deviation from the school mean for inattention is an even
stronger predictor of diagnosis, contradicting the social control explanation for ADHD.
The attention culture does relate to the likelihood of diagnosis: higher levels of inatten-
tion in a school are associated with a lower likelihood of diagnosis, net of relative inat-
tention levels. Put differently, students in schools with higher levels of attentiveness face
higher expectations, which leads to higher prevalence. My earlier explanation was that
school SES is related to an increased inattention score (net of individual SES), and that
this explains the higher rate of diagnosis. In this model, I separately identify school SES,
individual SES, relative position, and average symptom levels, and I find that SES, and
school SES are no longer significant when the average level of inattention in schools is in-
cluded in the model (H8). The relative inattention position of a child within a school is
the strongest overall predictor of diagnosis (net of other factors). The difference between
the inattention and impulsivity trajectories is consistent with the idea that inattention
represents a high status route of enhancement.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I used longitudinal data to examine pathways to diagnosis and variations
across schools. The chapter makes three contributions. The main contribution is to show
that schools contribute to the differential evaluation of children’s attention skills and that
those differences influence ADHD prevalence. ADHD is (in practice) a cognitive disorder
that responds to poor attention levels. Inattention problems are heightened in schools
where the normative demands on attention are high. As a result, ADHD prevalence is
somewhat higher in schools with higher average SES levels; however, the relative position-
ing of one’s symptoms within a school is the primary driver of diagnosis. Furthermore,
this chapter shows how pathways to diagnosis vary for children from different racial and
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ethnic groups. Black students are less likely to be diagnosed in part because the parent
ratings of symptom levels are lower than the comparable teacher ratings, and even when
the parent ratings are high, the likelihood of diagnosis for black students is less responsive
to parent-reported inattention levels than for white students. Finally, this chapter shows
that relative age effects on diagnosis run primarily through teacher assessments of inatten-
tion (not impulsivity) and that they in fact represent comparative judgments by teachers
within schools (a finding not previously documented).
My findings are limited in several respects. First, socio-behavioral ratings of parents
and teachers completing these questionnaires might not relate closely to ratings provided
to medical specialists for purposes of diagnosis. Teachers assigning these ratings might
make comparative judgments because they believe it is likely to improve the quality of the
survey, even though they would have a different motivation when completing a form pro-
vided by a medical specialist. Second, the size of the sample, the rarity of diagnosis, and
the limitations of the questionnaires make it difficult to estimate the effects of all of the
factors that contribute to diagnosis. Still, the findings are significant because they validate
a performance-enhancement explanation for diagnosis in high SES schools that is driven
by the existence of more stringent norms in high-SES schools.
Although I find little evidence that school and teacher attributes influence diagnosis, I
find strong evidence that parents are drivers of diagnostic expansion through their interac-
tions with teachers. Parents are working with teachers and schools to construct a category
that privileges students in strong schools, with strong normative demands on attention,
that are performing relatively worse than their peers and that have the resources to chal-
lenge interpretations of performance and behavior by teachers that are odds with parent
interpretations. This is consistent with a version of medicalization – namely that parent
activism became one of the key “engines of medicalization.” But, as I argue in the next
chapter, the neurobiological foundations of “attention” are contested, and educators have
not conceded jurisdiction over learning and behavior problems that arise in schools. This
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means that medicalization is, at best, a partial story.
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Chapter 4
Where Regimes Collide: ADHD as an
Educational, Medical, and Legal
Category
141
Two Anecdotes and a Disclaimer
Anecdote #1: The mother of a six-year-old boy described a situation at her son’s school.
His first-grade teacher suggests that the boy see a physician because he would not sit still
in the classroom despite frequent reminders. Taking away privileges – including timeouts
during recess and removal of privileges – does not seem to alter his behavior. The boy does
well on spelling tests and is able to memorize math facts. He is not interested in reading
but is able to keep up with his assigned reading group (one of the middle groups). At home,
the boy can be unruly, but his mother attributed his behavior to normal development until
the teacher began to express her concerns. The mother infers that the teacher is recom-
mending stimulant medication but is concerned about medicating her son at such an early
age. At the same time, she worries both that her son will fall behind in school and that his
teacher will be less cooperative with her and her son if she does not take some action.
***
Anecdote #2: A high-achieving student at an elite college preparatory school described
a male classmate that she holds in particularly high regard. He is several years ahead of
the other students in his math coursework (i.e., calculus in tenth grade), and he has an ex-
tremely devoted work ethic. Her classmate is an older student, having turned 16 during the
summer before his 10th grade year. His age relative to classmates suggests that he either
repeated a grade or was “redshirted,” the latter being more likely. The student in question
indicated that her classmate receives “extra time” on tests. She went on to explain that he
has a “legitimate neurological deficit” and that many other students in her grade do as well.
When asked about how many students received testing accommodations, she responded “at
least 10% of my grade.”
***
Disclaimer: As a former practicing lawyer, I represented parents of children with dis-
abilities in special education due process hearings and related federal court litigation. Later,
I became the parent of a girl who has a genetic condition that is associated with attention
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difficulties and visuospatial, mathematical, and memory deficits. My daughter receives spe-
cial education services and takes stimulant drugs. Given my background – as a graduate
student writing about ADHD, a parent of a child with a disability, and an attorney – I
hear many stories from other parents and teachers about the problems they have faced with
the special education process, the medical establishment, and home life. Although my back-
ground gives me a multifaceted perspective on the practical significance of the disorder in
the modern education system, my stories are anecdotal and colored by context, necessitating
this disclaimer.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the recognition of ADHD in the context of the legal system that
provides for and requires “special” education programs and services for children with dis-
abilities. Programs for “slow” learners extend back to the establishment of compulsory ed-
ucation by the States, but special education programs and services were not mandated by
federal law until the 1970s, as part of a larger effort to equalize access to and improve the
adequacy of public education across the United States. Federal involvement in education
had a substantial impact on the creation of the category ADHD. To summarize the argu-
ment from Chapter 1, the pre-war problematization of the poor self-control of poor, minor-
ity, immigrant kids led into the grouping of a large range of symptoms under the minimal
brain dysfunction label. That label became unworkable once a need arose for the develop-
ment of alternative approaches to educating students with learning difficulties. The polit-
ical advocates of a response to academic under-achievement had little interest in waiting
for neurological evidence to document specific cognitive processing deficits, and educators
were not interested in medical categories that contributed only indirectly to the remedia-
tion of classroom problems. So, the category learning disabilities was created, and educa-
tors used it to construct a jurisdictional space around high-incidence, low-severity learning
143
and behavioral problems that surface in mainstream classrooms. Neurological advances
since that time have enhanced the clinical validity of attention disorders, but, as I argue
below, the neurobiological ontology of the disorder remains contested and educators have
not responded by conceding jurisdiction over learning and behavior problems that arise in
schools (with one important caveat that I discuss below).
My approach in this chapter is to examine the structure and content of the special ed-
ucation laws as they pertain to ADHD, with a particular emphasis on the resolution of in-
dividual legal disputes between school districts and parents or guardians regarding appro-
priate special education programs and services for children with ADHD. In those disputes,
as in disputes about children with other disabilities, school districts defend the educational
plans they devise to ensure that resources are allocated equitably, and staff present testi-
mony as knowledgeable witnesses to children’s abilities and behaviors. School district staff
also serve as experts in pedagogy or assessment. Medical professionals offer expertise as
to children’s medical diagnoses and their significance for the issues in dispute. Parents of-
fer their perspectives as to the unique needs of their children. The legal system, in turn,
integrates the different perspectives in the form of a legal decision that resolves the dis-
pute. Through this process, adjudicators filter competing claims through the lens of law,
which contributes to a repackaging of the medical disorder into the disability classificatory
schemes set forth in the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act or the Rehabilita-
tion Act. Studying legal decisions provides a rich understanding of the way that the legal
system contributes to the reconfiguration of categories previously controlled by expert ju-
risdictions. This process addresses the needs of educators and the needs of parents and
children through the joint maintenance of a medical and educational category.
To preview my findings, the disputes suggest that the diagnosis ADHD and the med-
ication treatment often are successful in translating the interests and coordinating the ac-
tions of different parties. They do so because the parties do not need to agree on ontology
most of the time. Medication and classroom accommodations can serve school, teacher,
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parent, and child needs in the ordinary case. In other words, medicine is able to trans-
late everybody’s interests, arriving at a provisional working arrangement. The hearings
are useful because they document the times when the diagnosis is unable to perform this
translation. When that happens, there are clashing ontologies or differing narratives of
causation. To the extent that in those clashes one finds a medical ontology on one side,
and a different ontology on the other side, it shows that “normally” the diagnosis works by
papering over the ontological dispute and being able to be at one and the same time med-
ical and pedagogic. As a result, the meaning of ADHD is shaped by the considerations of
school districts such that ADHD is not purely a medical category but also a category of
neurology, cognitive psychology, special education law, and special education and school
district administration. In other words, schools, the legal system, medical professionals,
and parents coordinate to achieve a “layering of institutional control” (Medina and Mc-
Cranie, 2011, p. 139) over problems related to classroom performance.
As is often the case, medical knowledge is used in this context to individualize prob-
lems, both in defining them and in prescribing their treatment. Individualization removes
responsibility from the problem child (and his or her parents) and, at the same time, places
responsibility beyond the reach of schools – either the problem is placed under the care of
experts, or it is subjected it to the realm of science and the technologies of science (Freid-
son, 1984, 2006; Parsons, 1951). As a result, the underlying diagnosis is used to represent
an object that is more objective and stable than the categories maintained by educators.
Furthermore, medicine is used to internalize the problem so that – although it can be in-
fluenced by the environment – cannot be caused by the environment. As a result, parents
(particularly mothers) are not to blame for their childrens’ problems, but they can work
alongside experts in an attempt to dictate how the school environment should be adjusted
in order to alleviate the student’s internal symptoms. In this respect, the medical cate-
gory is solicited not to secure medication and thus remove problems from the public realm
(Conrad, 2005), but to provide a means through which parents can challenge and question
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the way their children are treated at school and within other institutional settings (Ed-
wards et al., 2014).
Pursuant to this broader jurisdictional space that educators have retained, educators
relegate the symptoms of hyperactivity and impulsivity to the realm of medicine, at least
for treatment purposes. I show that educators have little need to contest the medical cat-
egory if a drug treatment successfully regulates the more overt problems of classroom per-
formance. Thus, in the ordinary course, educators work with experts and parents in the
pursuit of a medical approach to treating behavioral issues in regular classrooms – some-
times forcefully. The prototypical case – a young boy that can’t sit still in school – repre-
sented by the first anecdote above – hints at the way force can be applied. This mother
asks herself: Is the school overreaching? Is the child developing naturally or is something
“wrong” with him or her? Is the problem a “medical” one? Is the child likely to fall further
behind if the parents are not proactive about seeking medical attention, particularly when
academic demands increase? And, most importantly, will the school retaliate in some un-
known way if the parent is not responsive to the school’s concerns?
Medicalization is limited, however, by the ability of medicine to supply a solution to
an underlying problem (Medina and McCranie, 2011). Thus, the collaboration around a
medical solution breaks down when the drug treatment fails,1 which can happen if the
medications do not improve the symptoms or side effects (or personal preference) limit
their use. Friction between parents and students, on the one hand, and teachers and schools,
on the other hand,2 occurs when parents remain dissatisfied with their child’s academic
performance or when teachers/schools believe that student behavior interferes with class-
room management or the fulfillment of observable performance goals.
1Medina and McCranie (2011, p. 150) show that the lack of a “silver bullet” treatment for the condition
of psychopathy means that “medicine remains largely impotent with regard to containing the problem”
although it is “ordered using medical language.” As a result, psychopathy is an illness category that is
controlled through criminal punishment.
2This is an oversimplification. Teachers do not always follow the direction of the school administra-
tors, and parents and students are sometimes at odds with each other. Analysis of those issues does not
materially advance my objective here.
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Resource limitations contribute to much of the friction between parents and schools.3
By training and professional identity, educators work to distribute limited resources in a
way that is equitable and beneficial. That task has become increasingly complex in recent
decades, with the increased state and federal roles in schools.4 With larger infusions of
aid, the federal government has overhauled the administrative aspects of its involvement
in education and has imposed significant unfunded mandates, meaning that there are mas-
sive increases in costs at the state and local levels. Those mandates require school districts
to demonstrate access and adequacy for all students, including students with disabilities
and from disadvantaged backgrounds. They do this not only by evaluating performance on
tests (the highly publicized accountability regimes), but federal and state governments also
have begun to condition funds on satisfactory evidence of student safety and crime pre-
vention in schools. The latter effort has led some scholars to claim that school discipline
has been criminalized (Ramey, 2015), which has important ramifications for students with
ADHD.5
With resources directed to satisfying these accountability and safety measures, one
could argue that other aspects of school quality are neglected. Resource limitations at the
3One study estimates that it costs schools $5007 more per student to educate a child with ADHD than
it costs to educate a child without ADHD (Robb et al., 2011). This estimate is derived by calculating the
costs associated with special education, grade retention, and disciplinary action. Whatever one thinks
about the measurement strategy – or even the ability to quantify such factors – it is doubtless true that
students with ADHD diagnoses impose additional costs on schools.
4School district funding and resource constraints have been highly politicized since the 1970s. Prior to
the 1970s, the vast majority of school funding was raised at the local level (through local property taxes).
This produced rampant inequality of resources, which ultimately led state supreme courts in many states
to mandate centralized funding.
5The relationships among school discipline, accountability regimes, and the special education system
create perverse incentives, as discussed in part in Chapter 2. It is well known that students with behavior
problems score lower on standardized tests than students without behavior problems and that disruptive
behavior has a negative impact on classmate’s performance (Figlio, 2006; Ramey, 2015). But research also
shows that schools respond to the accountability incentive by reshaping the testing pool through selec-
tive discipline (i.e., suspensions during standardized testing windows) (Figlio, 2006) and by systematically
placing students from low socio-economic status backgrounds and historically low-performing students into
special education categories that are exempt from the accountability system (Figlio and Getzler, 2006).
Research also shows that schools and districts with relatively larger minority and poor populations are
more likely to implement criminalized disciplinary policies, and less likely to medicalize students through
behavioral plans put in place through Section 504 or IDEA (Ramey, 2015).
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state, school district, and school levels directly affect the availability and qualifications of
personnel — including teachers, psychologists, therapists (speech, occupational, physical,
etc.), reading and other specialists, computer technicians, nurses, nutritionists, and aides
and paraprofessionals. They also affect the physical learning environment, which supports
the ability to engage in diverse pedagogies, use current technologies, facilitate social inter-
action as well as physical activity, and provide a safe, secure environment that is relatively
free from distractions (Kuuskorpi and González, 2011). To be sure, educators face more
pressure than ever to improve achievement levels, which should align parent and school in-
centives to an extent. However, the emphasis on average test scores does not necessarily
benefit a particular student that would better respond to a more diverse set of instruc-
tional methods.
There are several narratives in the opinions that reveal the thinking about which stu-
dents are “deserving” of school resources. The biggest unknown – and hence the biggest
issue in many cases – relates to the student’s potential, both in the sense of an academic
trajectory and the ability to meaningfully participate in a school setting. Potential is a
latent concept, which, by its very nature, cannot be observed, only assessed, either with
standardized tests or by expert opinion. The second anecdote is a fairly extreme case (I
think) that illustrates the dynamic between fundamental fairness (from the perspective
of schools) and a child’s potential (from the perspective of parents). What should be the
realized potential of a student with ADHD – the top reading group, an honors class, or
even high grades in an honors class or at an elite school? What if the medical evidence of
ADHD is not definitive? Even if a child truly has a neurological impairment that impairs
learning, should the child receive accommodations or programs designed to reach a poten-
tial that many, if not most, other students cannot reach, particularly if the same accom-
modations or programs would benefit the non-impaired students? The immediate question
is framed in legal terms as whether the deficit “adversely affects a child’s educational per-
formance,” but this requirement is juxtaposed against a competing emphasis on equality
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of access and outcomes.6 By contrast, in medical terms (DSM-5), the framing is whether
“the symptoms interfere with, or reduce the quality of ... academic functioning,” and the
broader context is the internal focus derived from medicine’s approach to physical illness.
Another set of narratives involves causation. Did a neurological deficit cause a lack of
motivation or is the supposed neurological deficit a post hoc justification for a lack of mo-
tivation that was the underlying cause? Did a neurological deficit cause impulsive behavior
that led to disciplinary action or did the student’s deliberate actions override the suppos-
edly impulse-driven aspects of the student’s behavior? Again, those are largely matters for
expert opinion. Parents can bring medical experts to speak to these issues, but those ex-
perts face school experts – teachers, psychologists, and therapists – who see the student
on a regular basis. Those issues become increasingly complex as the student progresses
through school and causation begins to run both ways.
At bottom, I show that medical knowledge is contested not just when it individualizes
student nonconformity (because educational categories do this too),7 but when it confronts
the jurisdiction of educators. From the perspective of educational advocates, the law jux-
taposes learning issues — an educator’s task — and behavioral issues — medicine’s task.
As a result, schools sometimes construct opposition between medicine and education: if
an issue is behavioral and thus medical, then no school intervention is needed; if an issue
relates to learning, then it is better evaluated under the learning disabilities framework.
This dichotomous approach is demonstrated by the reluctance of educators to apply the
OHI disability label, because it is identified with medicine. The strength of the ADHD
category comes from the underlying duality of behavioral and cognitive symptoms, but
6This is part of the definition for the Other Health Impaired (OHI) disability category. The DSM
category is in even greater tension with the specific learning disabilities (SLD) category maintained by
educators that directly embeds the concept of potential within it by using the discrepancy test.
7In the United States, disabilities are individualized (see Chapter 1), but this is not always the case
elsewhere. Cooper and Ideus (1995), for example, describes the way that ADHD is altering views on emo-
tional and behavioral difficulties in the United Kingdom, because of the focus on individual deficits as
causes, and the associated danger that schools could become victims if ADHD is used to remove focus on
the broader context – the curriculum, the school environment, and the relationships between teachers and
students.
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that duality is at odds with the dichotomous approach of educators. Nevertheless, I show
that in the ordinary case ADHD serves as boundary object that facilities coordinated ac-
tion without agreement as to ontology (Bowker and Star, 2000; Star and Griesemer, 1989).
4.2 Contestation at the Institutional Level
The school system has been described as a “mediating mechanism to diagnosis” (Singh,
2006, p. 445) and ADHD as a “disorder of educational performance” (Phillips, 2006, p.
e182). The medicalization literature views teachers as “sickness brokers” (Phillips, 2006, p.
e182), emphasizing the creation and expansion of ADHD as a medical category through
the actions of teachers that work in concert with medical or other actors that advance
a medical label. Some say that – even if they wished to do so – teachers lack the profes-
sional status to rival medicine in the management of disruptive pupils (Brancaccio, 2000;
Rose, 1985, p. 102). Those accounts, however, pay little attention to local struggles be-
tween medical categories and other classification systems for children with learning and be-
havioral challenges. Ultimately, collaboration around a medical understanding, the broad-
ening of which serves the interests of all parties, is presumed, not proven or explained.8
In The System of Professions, Andrew Abbott (1988) maintains that professionals
make jurisdictional claims in three arenas: public opinion, the workplace, and the legal
system. Although public controversy about the disorder has been in the forefront (see
Chapter 1), the battles between educators and parents as to the significance of the diag-
nosis for educational purposes are an area of great interest that has received less attention
in the literature. One notable exception is Claudia Malacrida (2004), who draws on data
from interviews with Canadian and British mothers of children with ADHD to link the
8Moreira’s (2006) study of sleep disorders shows that collaboration does not necessarily indicate a
medicalization process. He argues that by relying on the framing of sleep problems as “medical,” medi-
calization ignores the way that researchers, clinicians, and patients interactively deploy the knowledge,
techniques and technologies through which different sleep problems are understood and managed. He
shows that the medical category is the outcome of collaborative links between sleep researchers, chest
physicians, and the patients that opted to selectively use medical treatments.
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more medicalized version of the disorder in Canada (compared to Britain) with the rela-
tive absence of alternative forms of discipline. In both countries, educators usually are the
first to identify problem children; however, in Canada educators are likely to suggest the
need for medical treatment, while in Britain, educators are ambivalent or even hostile to
the medical label and instead are likely to suggest that families seek therapies to address
the emotional, social, or behavioral needs of their children. Her analysis demonstrates that
parents, teachers, and medical specialists must collaborate to maintain a successful diag-
nostic category; the absence of such collaboration in Britain presented a practical obsta-
cle to its spread. Although Malacrida assumes that the country differences are explained
by differences in the forms of discipline available to schools, I suspect the explanation is
much broader.9 The budgetary constraints on schools create a substantial incentive to con-
trol the translation of medical categories into disability categories. At the same time, the
nearly complete integration of the symptoms within the school setting enhances the ability
of educators to do so. The existing literature ignores the duality of behavioral and cog-
nitive symptoms that form the disorder and the way that differences in the expression of
those symptoms influence the relevance of medical expertise.
The following analysis therefore looks specifically at institutional contestation to map
the influence of medical experts in these fora in addition to the influence of other forms
of expertise. The analysis focuses on both the macro organizational level and the micro-
level (the clashing of parent demands and teacher needs in very specific instances). To do
this, I begin by providing a brief account of the special education laws as they pertain to
ADHD.10 I continue with a description of a dataset that I have compiled of legal decisions
between parents and school districts related to programs, services, and accommodations
for children with symptoms of ADHD. Then, I proceed with the main part of the analysis,
which considers the relevance of medical approaches for legal disability in the contexts of
9She couches this as an assumption that fits the data; this rationale does not surface in her interviews.
10In this Chapter, the term special education refers to the educational programs and services provided
by school districts in accordance with federal law.
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disputes about diagnosis, eligibility, provision of services, drug therapies, and student dis-
cipline. Contrary to the medicalization perspective, I show that educators are not “keep-
ers” of the gate that leads to ADHD diagnosis and treatment. Rather, educators attempt
to assert jurisdiction by treating the cognitive aspects of the disorder as a form of learn-
ing disability, because “learning” is their domain and because misbehavior is not seen as
a symptom of a learning disability. Educators blame parents and children for behavioral
problems (or they attribute them to a medically-recognized emotional disturbance); ed-
ucators abjure the ramifications of any broader medical understanding of the behavioral
symptoms. Finally, schools usually (but not always) prefer that students use drug treat-
ments, and there are several ways in which they can exert pressure on families to pursue
such treatments.
4.3 Background on Special Education Provisions Per-
taining to ADHD
4.3.1 History of Federal Involvement in Special Education
Although special education programs date to the origins of compulsory education (Laz-
erson, 1983), it was not until the 1950s that the federal government began a coordinated
response to the problem of educating children with handicaps. Federal funding initially
targeted children who faced severe handicaps (many of whom would have been institu-
tionalized in earlier years) (Lazerson, 1983). Early federal legislation (from 1958 to 1961)
funded training for teachers of children with intellectual disabilities and children who were
deaf (Public Laws 86-158, 85-926, and 87-276). Federal funding of in-school programs and
services for children with economic disadvantages and disabilities began in the 1960s, when
President Johnson’s Administration set the aspirational goal of placing children on a level
playing field for educational purposes without regard to economic disadvantage or disabil-
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ity (U.S. Department of Education, 2010; Martin et al., 1996). The first major piece of
legislation that addressed economic inequality of students, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) (Public Law 89-10), established a formula grant program
that provided financial assistance to local education agencies on the basis of concentra-
tions of children from low-income families in the areas to which they served. In the same
year, Congress provided federal funds to support special educational services for institu-
tionalized handicapped children through the State Schools Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-
313). Then, Congress amended the ESEA in 1966 (Public Law 89-750) in two important
respects. It established the Bureau of Education of the Handicapped to administer pro-
grams for the specific benefit of handicapped students, and it provided direct grant assis-
tance to states for the benefit of institutions and schools that served students with disabil-
ities (Kroll, 1983). The 1966 ESEA Amendment was the first piece of federal legislation
to define categories of “handicapped” children: “handicap” was defined to include children
who were “mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped,
seriously emotionally disturbed, crippled, or other health impaired children who by rea-
son thereof require special education and related services” (emphasis added). Despite the
far-reaching nature of the ESEA and amendments, those statutes simply provided partial
funding to state and local governments and did not include a mandate that programs be
made available for all children with disabilities (Martin et al., 1996).11
State legislatures were the first to pass laws requiring special education programs. Be-
tween the mid 1960s and early 1970s, most state legislatures passed legislation that man-
dated or provided funding for special education programs (Martin et al., 1996). Those pro-
grams were inadequately funded (even with federal assistance) and contained major ex-
11In the late 1960s, Congress also enacted statutes targeted at early childhood education for children
with disabilities, including the Handicapped Children’s Early Education Assistance Act of 1968 (Public
Law 90-538), which authorized experimental programs for handicapped children of pre-school age, and
the Economic Opportunities Amendments of 1972 (Public Law 92-424), which authorized support for and
increased Head Start enrollment for young children with disabilities (the Head Start program began in
1965).
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ceptions, including the ability to exclude “uneducable” children. As of 1970, U.S. schools
educated only one in five children with disabilities (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).
Challenging the implementation of those laws, in the early 1970s, landmark federal court
decisions interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to bar schools from discriminating against
students on the basis of disability; this, of course, was on the heels of the expansive inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954). The
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v. Commonwealth (1971) and Mills v.
Board of Education of the District of Columbia (1972) decisions overturned state laws
that allowed schools to deny services to disabled children either because of the severity of
the disability or because of a lack of resources (Lazerson, 1983; Martin et al., 1996). Once
state laws and federal court decisions made clear the states’ responsibility for providing a
free public education to all children, regardless of the severity of a disability, states joined
advocates in seeking the passage of federal legislation that would subsidize the costs of
special education (Martin et al., 1996).
In the 1970s, Congress enacted two major reforms that responded to this need: a nondis-
crimination requirement (the Rehabilitation Act) and a more comprehensive educational
grant program (through the Education for All Handicapped Children Act). The Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 (Public Law 93–112) was part of a larger initiative to provide for vo-
cational rehabilitation and removal of barriers that faced persons with disabilities. Part of
the legislation – Section 504 – provided that any recipient of federal financial assistance
(including state and local educational agencies that accepted federal funds) must end dis-
crimination in the offering of its services to persons with disabilities. Section 504, however,
included no funding for special education programs.12 The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (the EAHCA or Public Law 94-142), enacted in 1975, expressly extended
12As discussed below, the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 expanded the rights
of people with disabilities to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public ser-
vices, and accommodations. It has become a major avenue for litigation about disabilities in education.
The Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (2009) expanded those protections by clarifying that
Congress had intended a broad interpretation of the term “disability.”
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the right to access a public education to all disabled children, guaranteeing each child a
“free appropriate public education” in the “least restrictive environment.” The EAHCA
provided partial federal funding to states and local educational agencies to support spe-
cial education programs.13 States that accepted federal funding were required to provide
equal access to education for children with physical and mental disabilities (ages 6-21).14
The EAHCA required states to ensure that public schools identify and evaluate all hand-
icapped children and create individualized educational programs with parental input that
would emulate as closely as possible the educational experiences of non-handicapped stu-
dents (89 Stat. 775, 781). The Act also required states to ensure that school districts pro-
vide an administrative process so that parents of disabled children could dispute decisions
made about their children’s education. A key assumption was that the provision of proce-
dural due process would lead to systematic legal pressure on school systems, which would
lead to uniformity of treatment (89 Stat. 781, 788). Although the Rehabilitation Act did
not use a categorical approach to defining “handicapped individual,” the EAHCA retained
the categorical approach to defining “handicap” from the ESEA, and – due to the outpour-
ing of political advocacy on behalf of those with learning disabilities – added the category
SLD, which opened special education to children with mild, high-incidence disabilities (see
Chapter 1).15
Congress reauthorized the EAHCA in 1990 (Public Law 101-476), at which time it was
revised and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Congress
changed the terminology from “handicapped children” to “individuals with disabilities”
13The fiscal year 2014 Department of Education Budget lists 15 percent as the federal contribution, with
an estimated $1,767 cost per pupil for states (www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget14/index.html).
14Public Law 99-457, enacted in 1986, amended the EAHCA to require states to make available appro-
priate and free public education to children ages 3 through 5 who are disabled.
15The category actually was first used in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of
1969 (Public Law 91-230), which extended the ESEA and consolidated existing legislation pertaining to
children with disabilities. The category was added at the urging of the Bureau of Education for the Handi-
capped (BEH, the predecessor to OSEP). BEH rebutted claim that the OHI category would reach children
with educational disabilities, on the grounds that the OHI category was too dependent on neurological
evidence, which might not be definitive (United States House of Representatives, 1969, p. 9). So, even as
of the late 1960s, OHI was seen as a medical disability.
155
(104 Stat. 1103). Despite the shift in emphasis from the handicap to the individual, the
statute continued to define disability using a categorical approach. Intense lobbying led to
the addition of two new categories – autism and traumatic brain injury – and the rejection
of a new category for attention deficit disorders.16 The reauthorization of IDEA in 2004
(Public Law 108-446) retained the major components of IDEA but changed some of the
details and addressed new concerns that had arisen. Many of the changes brought IDEA
in alignment with the No Child Left Behind Act (a reauthorization of the ESEA). For ex-
ample, it required that all special education teachers be certified in special education (118
Stat. 2654). A new provision released schools from the SLD requirement to show a severe
discrepancy between achievement and intellectual ability, allowing schools instead to use
a research-based intervention as part of the evaluation process (118 Stat. 2706). And it
imposed an obstacle to full-scale medicalization of the disorder by prohibiting State and
local educational agency personnel from requiring a child to obtain a prescription for a
substance covered by the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) as a condition
of attending school, receiving an evaluation, or receiving services (118 Stat. 2691).
4.3.2 Federal Regulation of Special Education Programs, Services,
and Accommodations for Students with ADHD
Despite federal and state backing, special education programs constitute a large share of
local school district budgets (Parrish et al., 2003). The potential funneling of roughly 10
percent of the school-age population into special education programs is an impediment
to viewing ADHD (and other high-incidence disabilities) as educational deficits. Schools
therefore have an incentive to refer ADHD to the exclusive province of the medical pro-
16Disability is defined by 20 U.S.C. 1401(3)(A) to include a child who by reason of one of the following
conditions needs special education and related services: mental retardation, hearing impairments (includ-
ing deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 (PL 105-17)
created a noncategorical classification, development delay, for children ages 3 through 9.
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fessions – to act as if medication is a complete treatment for ADHD such that no special
programs or accommodations are necessary in the classroom. At the same time, ADHD
includes a heterogeneous set of symptoms that pose different problems for classroom man-
agement and achievement and that respond differently to medication.17 Parents and advo-
cates have worked to achieve recognition of ADHD as an educational category independent
of the medication aspect of the medical domain (see Chapter 2). Subjected to greater lev-
els of federal oversight designed to make schools “accountable” for educating all students,
schools increasingly have incentives to strengthen the quality of education received by stu-
dents with learning challenges (Harr-Robins et al., 2013, 2015).
Within the special education domain, ADHD has a growing presence, but it remains
an amorphous category because – despite efforts by advocates seeking full incorporation
into the law – ADHD was submerged in the regulatory law. ADHD (like autism) was not
mentioned in the original text of the EAHCA but rather was covered, if at all, by im-
plicit treatment in other categories. Although autism and traumatic brain injury gained
explicit statutory recognition in 1990, the same legislation required the Office of Special
Education Programs (OSEP), at the U.S. Department of Education, to collect public com-
ments on the appropriate components of a definition of ADHD and to report the findings
to Congress (104 Stat. 1105). The failure to recognize ADHD as a disability category re-
sulted from contentious debates in which parent advocates argued that ADHD should be
a qualifying disability, while educators contended that ADHD students should receive ser-
vices only if they met the more stringent requirements for establishing an SLD (United
States House of Representatives, 1990).
After receiving more than 2000 written comments, OSEP – in conjunction with the
Office for Civil Rights – attempted to quell the parent advocacy effort by issuing a mem-
orandum that restated the position that students with ADHD were eligible under existing
17Although the research is not definitive, it appears that attentiveness is more closely linked to achieve-
ment and other social and behavioral skills are more closely linked to classroom functioning; of course,
those skills are likely to be interdependent (Duncan et al., 2007).
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IDEA categories including SLD, serious emotional disturbance (ED), and OHI.18 Estab-
lishing eligibility as a child with an ED was not seen as a useful path for parents, because
of the connotation of serious emotional and behavioral challenges and the concomitant
likelihood of a placement in a specialized school. Parent advocacy groups therefore pur-
sued a dual-prong approach of pushing the application of the SLD and OHI categories; the
goal was to convince the Department of Education to recognize ADHD as a subcategory of
either of those general statutory categories, so that a medical diagnosis of ADHD would be
conclusive (or nearly so) of special education eligibility (Joint Policy Memorandum).
The problem with the SLD category was that educators had distanced themselves from
neurological evidence by insisting that there be a demonstrable effect on learning, i.e., a
severe discrepancy between actual and potential achievement. Because SLD was defined
as “a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes ... [including] such con-
ditions as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and
developmental aphasia,” the National Center for Law and Learning Disabilities asked the
Department to clarify that ADHD is expressly covered by IDEA as a form of SLD because
“minimal brain dysfunction” is the predecessor term for ADHD.19 This approach was re-
jected on the grounds that a medical condition, such as minimal brain dysfunction, would
not qualify a student as SLD, in the absence of a severe discrepancy between ability and
achievement. In any event, the Department was firm that ADHD alone would be insuf-
ficient to establish eligibility (Letter to Latham 1994). Parent advocates walked a very
fine line: on the one hand, they did not want the disorder to be defined by the behav-
ioral/emotional characteristic of impulsiveness; at the same time, they wanted to avoid
the stringent test to qualify as SLD. Attention is the linchpin of the category because it is
polysemic and can capture the hybrid nature of the disorder.
18Joint Policy Memorandum, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (“Joint Policy
Memorandum”), 18 IDELR 116 (Dept. of Education 1991).
19Letter to Latham, Office of Special Education Programs (1994), 21 IDELR 1179; see also Letter to
Bentsen, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (1990), 16 IDELR 961; In the Matter of a
Child with Disabilities, Michigan State Agency (1989), 16 IDELR 574.
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OHI therefore emerged as the parents’ preferred category, but a controversy also arose
over the application of the definition of OHI to students with ADHD. The initial regula-
tion defined OHI as “limited strength, vitality, or alertness” due to certain health prob-
lems including lead poisoning, epilepsy, and others. Educators and parents disagreed over
whether this language covered the distractibility associated with ADHD. This ultimately
forced the Department to issue another memorandum – hoping to alleviate parent com-
plaints – that stated that a student with ADHD may have a limited ability to attend to
academic tasks if the disorder causes the student to be overly alert to the general environ-
ment.20 Eventually, as the number of students taking advantage of that informal advice
rose, the regulation was amended to include ADHD specifically within the OHI category.
The regulatory definition for OHI now states:
Other health impairment means having limited strength, vitality, or alertness,
including a heightened alertness to environmental stimuli, that results in lim-
ited alertness with respect to the educational environment, that –
(i) Is due to chronic or acute health problems such as asthma, attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, diabetes, epilepsy, a heart
condition, hemophilia, lead poisoning, leukemia, nephritis, rheumatic fever,
sickle cell anemia, and Tourette syndrome; and
(ii) Adversely affects a child’s educational performance.21
The Department issued additional “guidance” to clarify that a medical diagnosis of ADHD
is not sufficient to justify services.22 Rather, parents must establish that the disorder ad-
versely affects the child’s educational performance. It is common for IDEA coverage to be
refused despite a medical diagnosis. This concern first came out in testimony before the
congressional subcommittee considering bills that would add ADD to the list of officially
recognized disabilities (United States House of Representatives, 1990) when Judy Schrag,
the Director of OSEP, explained that “physicians use a medical model, ..., [that] does not
20Letter to Cohen, Office of Special Education Programs (1993), 20 IDELR 73.
2134 Code of Federal Regulations sec. 300.8(c)(9).
22See Letter to Gallagher, Office of Special Education Programs (1996), 24 IDELR 177.
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have an education threshold.” However, because DSM-5 requires that a diagnosis be based
on “clear evidence” of reduction in the quality of academic functioning, the educational
qualifier is substantively superfluous. Placing the determination in the hands of educators
(and the legal system) is what is consequential. And despite the amendment to the regu-
lation and the advice of the Department of Education, I show below that educators still
prefer to place students with ADHD in the SLD and ED categories.
4.4 Data
The data come from legal opinions in cases across the United States that were decided
during the period between 1990 and 2010 and that refer to the strings attention*, ADD,
ADHD, Ritalin, Adderall, hyperactivity, and stimulant*. The IDEA includes rules for re-
solving disputes between parents and schools; the rules allow for mediation, due process
hearings, and appeals to state or federal court. A large share of the disputes are resolved
through mediation. But when a dispute is resolved through due process hearing, it is usu-
ally an adversarial trial, including battles of expert witnesses. These decisions then can
be appealed in federal court. There also is a complaint resolution process in the Office
for Civil Rights, which has jursidiction over complaints for discrimination, harassment,
or retaliation on the basis of disability. Finally, in limited circumstances, original actions
can be filed in federal or state court that involve disputes between parents/children and
schools. I collected hearing decisions from individual state websites and agencies, and I
supplemented the sample with decisions from a legal reporter, the Individuals with Disabil-
ities in Education Act Report (IDELR), which publishes selected decisions of interest. This
was necessary because the legal reporter has earlier coverage than is available through
some state agencies. I also included complaint resolutions of the Office for Civil Rights,
as well as state and federal court decisions that relate to ADHD in schools. Despite some
gaps, this is the most comprehensive compilation of cases involving students with ADHD
160
Table 4.1: Distribution of Decisions by Jurisdiction
Number of Decisions
Office for Civil Rights 520
State Courts 55
Federal Courts 680
State Education Agencies 1200
of which I am aware. For each decision, I collected a copy of the opinion, along with a case
identifier, the date of decision, the legal jurisdiction that issued the decision, the basis of
the hearing request (e.g., placement, eligibility, discipline, assessments), the outcome of the
hearing, and a brief summary of the ruling. The resulting dataset contains approximately
2500 cases, which can be broken down by jurisdiction as shown in Table 4.1. The decisions
of State Education Agencies come from 44 states (including the District of Columbia) (see
Table A.2) and involve issues concerning eligibility, discipline, and placement (see Table
A.3). Of those, only about half contain more than a passing reference to the disorder or to
attention issues. Within that more limited sample, I read the cases carefully with a view
to identifying recurrent themes, using an iterative process of categorizing and reanalyzing
the data. Using keywords related to the categories that emerged from the data, I used the
lexical search feature in MaxQDA to categorize and label cases along certain dimensions of
interest. I found all cases involving diagnostic issues under the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) or diagnostic tools including the prominent behavioral scales, medication
issues (with discussions of Ritalin, Adderall, or stimulants), behaviors such as lack of moti-
vation or lack of interest, manifestations of disability, experts including psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, pediatricians, or physicians, eligibility or eligibility category issues, and issues
pertaining to academic progress.
With this research design, I was not able to address some aspects of the tension be-
tween medical and educational approaches. Due process hearings are a strategic site cho-
sen because resistance to medical approaches exists – almost by definition. An examina-
tion of disputes would be misleading if there are a substantial group of children that are
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treated within the medical regime without any school involvement. On this topic, first re-
call that not all diagnosed students receive accommodations or special education services;
state-level estimates suggest that 30 to 70 percent of those diagnosed with ADHD receive
special education services (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.6.1).23 This means that medical treat-
ments are an adequate solution for some students with an ADHD diagnosis, and some stu-
dents are able to procure effective classroom interventions outside the special education
system. On the other hand, this concern is undercut by the DSM requirement that diag-
nosticians solicit and score teacher ratings, making teacher input a necessary but insuffi-
cient step towards receiving a diagnosis. Still, it is likely that schools remain unaware of
the diagnoses of some children and that in some cases they act as gatekeepers for medical
professionals. Accordingly, I cannot use the existence of disputes to quantify the amount of
disagreement or to demonstrate how children with ADHD are managed in the classroom in
the absence of a dispute.
At the same time, the proportion of IEPs that result in disputes and the proportion
of disputes that are resolved by hearings are both quite low.24 This suggests that an ex-
amination of reported legal decisions obscures a substantial amount of disagreement that
occurs during IEP meetings and pre-hearing stages. Moreover, although certain popula-
tions may be more or less likely to experience deprivations of educational rights, to inter-
pret them as violations, and to seek due process, it remains unclear where such bias might
lie. Are more educated individuals likely to file given their greater access to resources? Or,
are lower status individuals more likely to file given that they attend schools where vio-
lations are more prevalent? There are no studies that resolve these questions. Such bias
23I am not aware of any national data regarding the proportion of students (either overall or with
ADHD) who receive accommodations in schools.
24In 2009, approximately 6.5 million students, aged 3-21, were served under IDEA in the 50 states
and the District of Columbia (representing about 8 percent of the resident population aged 3-21). About
18,000 due process complaints were received during 2009 through the dispute resolution process for stu-
dents ages 3-21 served under IDEA, and about 69 percent of the complaints were resolved without a
hearing. (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, 2014).
About 27 percent of students served under IDEA are reported to have ADHD (Schnoes et al., 2006; Office
of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, 2003).
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should not be problematic for the analytical aims of this chapter, however, because the in-
tent is not to predict overall levels of legal violation. Rather, the principal aim is to clarify
how the medical category functions in school contexts and the various ways in which it is
reconfigured.
Another challenge is that legal decisions give only one side of the story. The opinions
are narratives that omit discussion of many of the arguments and much of the evidence
presented by the parties. Although the data indicate that school districts win roughly 55
percent of these cases outright (defining a “win” as a case where the parents prevailed on
few if any issues), I cannot actually quantify the level of success that parents or schools
have in these proceedings because hearing officers and judges have a great deal of latitude
in deciding how to frame the issues decided.
At bottom, my strategy is to use the disputes to assess the nature of contestation be-
tween the interested parties and the species of arguments that are raised when disputes
emerge between parents and educators (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006). The relatively
small number of disputes given the huge numbers of diagnoses might be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways. It might suggest that school districts defer to the medical category in the vast
majority of cases. Or, it might reflect a normal state of affairs in which the category is
regulated by educators to avoid medicalization and to protect jurisdiction. I focus specifi-
cally on the capacity of the medical model to extend into other contexts, as medicalization
theory would predict, and the specific nature of the friction that emerges. If the diagnos-
tic category is recognized fully oustide of medical institutions, it might open the door for
treatment, reimbursement, and public insurance, which it assuredly does, as well as dis-
ability status and special education, where its significance is less clear. My overall objec-
tive is to use this narrow slice of disputes to shed light on how medical expertise is recon-
figured in the schools and in the legal system.
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4.5 The Insufficiency of Medical Approaches for Educa-
tional and Legal Understandings of Disability
Looking ahead, the main points of the analysis are as follows. Legal disputes about ADHD
arise out of attempts by schools to calibrate interests in maintaining classroom order and
meeting performance goals while facing resource constraints. Medical approaches can be
an impediment to the ability of schools to achieve those goals. Educators prefer a classifi-
cation of SLD or ED – with medication, so that they can implement disciplinary measures
and allocate resources in an equitable way. Medical approaches also interfere with the the
equitable enforcement of the special education laws. Expansive enforcement of special ed-
ucation laws has become particularly controversial as applied to high-incidence disabili-
ties such as learning disabilities and ADHD, with some scholars going so far as to refer
to the entire framework as affirmative action for elites (Kelman and Lester, 1998; Lerner,
2004). Those public concerns are sometimes reflected in the explicit resolution of disputes.
The following analysis works through these points in a rough chronological fashion – mov-
ing from diagnosis, to eligibility, to placement, and concluding with some of the ramifi-
cations of treating behaviors as symptomatic of the disorder. I start with a brief look at
drug therapies and schools.
4.5.1 Drug Therapies
Pharmaceutical companies are said to be an “engine” driving the expansion of the med-
ical category (Conrad, 2005). Through aggressive marketing, pharmaceutical companies
appeal to parents to seek drug solutions; they also have campaigns designed to reach ed-
ucators (Phillips, 2006). The 2004 IDEA amendments prohibit schools from requiring a
child to use stimulant drugs as a condition of attending school, receiving an evaluation,
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or receiving services.25 That legislation provides indirect evidence that overuse is a so-
cial problem and that schools have been complicit in promoting drug use. However, it is
unlikely that the law alone altered school practices completely. The duty to provide ap-
propriate programs and services to children with a disability means that schools remain
actively involved in questions about the usage and effectiveness of medications, and the
anecdote that began this chapter suggests that coercion falling short of (or amounting to)
conduct that would violate the law might occur.
Questions about the use of medications to treat ADHD symptoms have led to disputes
between parents and schools regarding the proper role of schools with respect to the use
of medications. But the disputes cut different ways; there is no singular perspective on the
appropriate use of drugs to treat ADHD symptoms in schools. One area of dispute relates
to whether a school is “on notice” of a potential disability when it learns that a child is
using medications for ADHD. In one case that illustrates this point, the grandparent of a
student with ADHD filed a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that
the school district suspended the student twice for behavior that was related to his disabil-
ity.26 According to the complaint, the student had been temporarily taken off his medica-
tion, and this resulted in his misbehavior. OCR concluded the district failed to promptly
hold a Section 504 meeting to address the student’s behavior. Once the district was aware
of the change in the student’s medication and the change in his behavior, it was required
to develop an individual behavior management plan for the student. In other words, the
district could not simply ignore the child’s use (or discontinuation of use) of medication.
Medication is not a private matter; schools are involved in its administration (see examples
25Federal court decisions and state legislation addressed forced medication well before Congress enacted
the IDEA amendment (Berntsen, 2005). Valerie J. v. Derry Cooperative School District, 771 F. Supp.
483, 490 (D.N.H. 1991), for example, was a widely-publicized case that held that a student’s “right to a
free appropriate public education could not be premised on the condition that he be medicated without
his parents’ consent.” Thus, explicit coercion was probably relatively rare throughout the period covered
by this dataset.
26Westside Union Sch. Dist., Office for Civil Rights, Western Division, San Francisco (California), Case
No. 09-95-1129-I, November 22, 1995, 24 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 182.
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below), and schools cannot treat ADHD as a fully medicalized condition by ignoring the
consequences of medication secession.
Not only are schools involved in the distribution of medication,27 but they can be re-
sponsible for failing to administer a midday dosage of medication correctly. Consistent
with ethnographic work that suggests a strong professional identity attached to concerns
about the potential for harm to children from overmedication (Rafalovich, 2007), disputes
arise out of challenges from parents claiming that schools failed to administer medica-
tion to their children consistently. In one case, OCR found that a school district’s failure
to ensure that a student consistently took her prescription medication violated the stu-
dent’s right to an appropriate education.28 In another case, when parents of a student
with ADHD complained that the student did not receive his dosage of Ritalin at school,29
the school took the position that the student “forgot” to come to the principal’s office to
have the medication administered to him. Finding that the administration of medication
is a related service under the Rehabilitation Act if the medication is necessary to assist a
child in benefiting from his educational program, the hearing officer found that the school
violated the Act by failing to ensure that the student received his Ritalin on a number of
instances.
Resistance also took the form of a school nurse’s refusal to administer the dosage pre-
scribed by a student’s physician. An elementary school student from Missouri with an
ADHD diagnosis had been given his prescription medication by the school nurse for ap-
proximately two years.30 The nurse then determined that the student’s dosage was in ex-
27According to follow-up studies of the subjects in the MTA Study when they were in high school,
school staff reported that medication was administered for 15.6 percent of the students (Murray et al.,
2014).
28San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., Office for Civil Rights, Western Division, San Francisco (California),
Case No. 09-93-1090, July 6, 1993, 20 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 549.
29San Ramon Valley Unified Sch. Dist., Office for Civil Rights, Western Division, San Francisco (Cal-
ifornia), Case No. 09-91-1198, October 3, 1991, 18 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report
465.
30Davis v. Francis Howell School District, 104 F.3d 204, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, January
9, 1997.
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cess of the dosage recommended in the Physician’s Desk Reference. She asked the parents
to get a second doctor’s opinion concerning the safety of the dose. Even though the second
opinion confirmed the dosage, the nurse refused to continue administering the student’s
medication. The school district backed the nurse’s decision, but allowed the parents to
come to the student’s school and administer his medication. The parents filed suit in fed-
eral district court, alleging the district’s refusal to give the student his medication violated
federal law. On appeal of a decision in favor of the school district, the circuit court con-
cluded that the refusal to administer the student’s medication was not a violation of law.
According to the court, the district based its refusal on a policy prohibiting the adminis-
tration of medication in excess of the recommended dosage, which was justified by liability
concerns and health reasons.
Those cases suggest school resistance to involvement with medication, but they do not
suggest that schools implicitly require use of medication. But other cases do display com-
pulsion on the part of schools. For example, in response to serious behavior problems of
a high school student with severe ADHD, a school district placed him at an adolescent
day treatment center.31 At the center, the student performed well academically and im-
proved his behavior, but his behavior problems at home did not subside. As a result, his
parents unilaterally placed him in an out-of-state residential care facility and sought re-
imbursement for that placement at a due process hearing.32 The evidence indicated a fac-
tual dispute over the question of whether the student had been allowed to attend the day
treatment center during periods he was unmedicated. The student’s mother testified that
school officials would not allow her son to attend without his medication, so she removed
the child from the center when she felt that he had reached the point where the medica-
31Oregon City School District, #62, Oregon State Educational Agency, Case No. 95-126, January 5,
1996, 23 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 688.
32This fact pattern actually is not uncommon. When students are removed from mainstream environ-
ments, it is easier for schools to accommodate them and to conclude that the medication is working. At
the same time, the parents might feel that the student is not learning enough or that his/her behavior at
home has deteriorated (due to low self esteem or for other reasons).
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tion was no longer working. The school district denied that it conditioned enrollment on
continued use of medication, saying it was only a recommendation. Influenced by that de-
nial and the fact that plans were in place for the residential center before the medication
dispute arose, the hearing officer ruled in favor of the school district. Regardless of the
specific facts of this case, the case highlights the fact that the pressure to use medication
can come from schools and not only from doctors.33
The legal and moral responsibility of parents for their children’s behavior also can be a
form of coercion. One notable case that reached a state supreme court involved a fourth-
grade student who took a stimulant drug for a short period.34 After his parents decided
to stop administering that drug to him without informing the school, the student became
unruly and his special education teacher was called to a regular classroom to control him
(his placement was split between regular and special education). The student pulled the
teacher’s hair and she fell to the floor, injuring her neck. The teacher sued the parents’
insurance company for damages, and a state trial court entered a jury verdict in favor
of the teacher. On a second appeal, the state supreme court held that the student’s par-
ents had a duty to take reasonable steps to control the student’s behavior. Although the
court agreed with the insurance company that the parents’ decision to take their son off of
the medication in and of itself did not constitute negligence, it found that jury reasonably
found that the parents were negligent when they failed to inform the school district about
the discontinued drug use. According to the court, had the district known about the par-
ents’ actions, it could have responded by developing a plan to manage the student’s behav-
ior. Holding parents responsible for the consequences of discontinued drug use is another
way in which the pressure to use medication comes from schools.
Another set of issues relates to the significance of a schools’ express adoption of a med-
33Even though this case was decided before the 2004 amendment, many states and local school districts
had laws and policies that precluded mandatory medication before that statute was implemented. I use
the case as an example of types of coercion that might occur without a direct ultimatum.
34Nieuwendorp v. American Family Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 779, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, December
21, 1993. Reversed by Wisconsin Supreme Court, 529 N.W.2d 594, April 5, 1995.
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icalized perspective – that medication (if taken) would treat the symptoms so that no ac-
commodations and or special education programs are needed. This itself can be a form of
implicit coercion. One common fact pattern occurs when schools attribute student under-
performance to the failure to use drug treatments. Congress amended the ADA in 2009
to make clear that the “ameliorative” effects of “mitigating” measures, such as medication,
should not be considered in a disability determination under the Rehabilitation Act.35 The
OCR has interpreted this statutory amendment to mean that, in making disability deter-
minations, a school district must consider a student’s symptoms without the ameliorating
effects of his stimulant medication.36 Before that amendment, schools did take account of
the potentially ameliorative effects of medication in making disability determinations. For
example, a discrimination case from 1992 involving a student from Michigan with ADHD,
involved the requirement imposed by a school district that one of the student’s parents
accompany him on a field trip due to his poor behavior.37 Because neither of the parents
could take off from work, the student consequently was not allowed to participate in field
trips. The parents claimed discrimination on the basis of disability, and OCR found that
the district’s awareness of the student’s academic and behavioral problems associated with
his ADHD prior to the field trip, and its failure to conduct an evaluation, constituted a vi-
olation of Section 504. While in second grade, the student was diagnosed, and since that
time, the student had been taking Cylert, prescribed by a doctor, to control symptoms as-
sociated with his ADHD. The school administered prescribed medication to the student
throughout the school year to control symptoms related to ADHD. The staff did not refer
the student for an evaluation because they believed the student was intelligent and could
control his behavior when he chose to do so, and they believed the student did not have
35It is important to note, however, that this statutory requirement does not directly apply to the IDEA
determination of eligibility.
36Virginia Beach City Public Schools, Office for Civil Rights, Southern Division, D.C. (Virginia), Case
No. 11-09-1158, October 22, 2009, 54 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 202.
37Decatur Pub. Sch., Office for Civil Rights, Midwestern Division, Cleveland (Michigan), Case No.
15-92-1207, November 19, 1992, 19 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 592.
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problems as long as he took medication prescribed for his ADHD and received extra help
in the classroom.
In sum, teachers and schools embrace medication as a way to treat symptoms. Educa-
tors work with medical diagnosticians and parents in the pursuit of a medical approach to
treating problems in regular classrooms. They do this by being the first to identify relative
deficiencies in students and by completing rating scales to assist parents and medical spe-
cialists who are seeking a diagnosis. Sometimes schools embrace medical approaches force-
fully, and I show above a few different ways that implicit coercion might occur. However,
there is also evidence that schools prefer to avoid direct involvement in medicating chil-
dren in schools, perhaps because of concerns about medicating children or perhaps because
handling medication is administratively burdensome and risky.
4.5.2 Diagnostic Credibility
Although teachers often are the first to recognize symptoms (see Anecdote #1, Mayes
et al. 2008; Sax and Kautz 2003), there are few disputes involving school efforts to per-
suade parents to seek medical diagnoses on the basis of ADHD-type symptoms. This might
seem surprising given the evidence that disadvantaged children are more likely to be fun-
neled into special education placements, suggesting a type of social control that might
seem objectionable to parents (see Chapter 2). The parents of disadvantaged children,
however, are less likely to think that a medical diagnosis is useful in securing an appropri-
ate eligibility classification or placement and probably are unable or unlikely to challenge
school efforts to move them into such placements.
Legal disputes start to surface when parents seek medical help for their children from
professionals who apply medical diagnostic criteria to explain “symptoms.” Medicalization
theory assumes that medical diagnostic tools have wide-ranging application in institutions
such as schools. If so, educational and medical diagnostic tools would overlap to a con-
siderable extent, and medical diagnostic categories would circulate fluidly within educa-
170
tional institutions. Although schools might apply higher thresholds to determine special
education eligibility, they would embrace or at least acknowledge medical categories with-
out questioning the reliability of medical professionals, tests, or classifications. The data,
however, suggest that something quite different occurs with regularity. In my examina-
tion of disputes, I found that medical diagnoses do not always circulate fluidly through the
special education administrative process. Although a medical diagnosis can trigger a dis-
trict’s obligation to identify a student with suspected disabilities, the credibility of medical
diagnoses often is disputed. School districts have questioned the qualifications of medical
specialists to diagnose the disorder as well as the procedures used to make diagnoses. As
a result, the disputes reveal a tension regarding the relevance of medical expertise for edu-
cational and legal understandings of disability, wholly apart from a desire to minimize the
obligation to provide costly services.
Concerns about the credibility of medical diagnoses expressed in special education dis-
putes reflect sentiments similar to those seen in the press and public opinion. Specifically,
schools argue that the diagnostic process is too cursory, that it is performed by unqualified
specialists, that it merely substitutes a medical label for what educators understand to be
a lack of motivation, bad parenting, or immaturity, and that proof of biological etiology is
lacking (see generally Reid and Maag, 1993). For example, in a case from Illinois, decided
in 2010, a school district challenged both the qualifications of a medical specialist that di-
agnosed a student with ADHD and the process through which the diagnosis was made.38
The student’s mother filed a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act after her
son was ruled ineligible to participate in high-school athletics. She claimed that her son
was unable to meet his academic requirements without appropriate treatment or accom-
modations for his disability. A “licensed clinical professional counselor” had diagnosed the
student with ADHD, and a family physician prescribed stimulant medication following a
38Rademaker v. Midwest Central High School, Case No. 10-3332, U.S. Dist. Ct. C.D. Ill., December 22,
2010.
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telephone call with the counselor who told the physician that the student was “positive on
the ADHD scale.” Rather than accepting the diagnosis at face value, the school district
argued that the counselor was not competent to diagnose the disorder (as a matter of pro-
fessional credentials) and that the physician’s implicit acceptance of the diagnosis was in-
sufficient to establish the existence of the disorder without an independent examination of
the student. The court agreed and held that, without a valid diagnosis, there was no basis
for a claim of discrimination.
Because only licensed physicians can prescribe medication, it is common to see refer-
rals for medication purposes only, as in the Illinois case. The DSM itself is agnostic as to
which types of medical specialists can diagnose patients; mental health and other health
professionals, including psychiatrists and other physicians, social workers, nurses, occupa-
tional and rehabilitation therapists, and counselors all can apply the criteria.39 Individual
healthcare professionals are regulated through state licensing laws, but there is no indi-
cation that the cases to which I refer involved unlicensed activity. If a counselor is a li-
censed professional with authority to make a diagnosis (one that is respected by a licensed
physician), why should a school question that medical determination? The Illinois deci-
sion directly confronts the ability of the medical profession to self regulate (through the
apparatus of state law). And the ruling was not an isolated occurrence. Nor does it apply
only to “counselors.” It was not uncommon for school districts to challenge the diagnoses
of clinical psychologists as being insufficient to establish that students had the disorder,
and school districts often challenged physician diagnoses for the purposes of prescribing
medication as insufficient because they were not based on independent examinations of the
students. The legal decisions are not always decided in favor of school districts, but the
reasoning often indicates distrust of the medical profession’s ability to determine who can
apply the diagnostic criteria.
The DSM criteria systematize diagnosis by clinicians of different theoretical orienta-
39According to the website, http://www.dsm5.org/about/.
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tions who seldom, if ever, directly observe typical behaviors in the classroom setting. Yet
the criteria depend on subjective assessments of behavior. Recommendations for ADHD
diagnosis vary by specialty, but all include a clinical history and ADHD-focused rating
scales (Gualtieri and Johnson, 2005). Depending on the medical specialty, a diagnostic
process also might include a vision and hearing screening, mental status examination, de-
velopmental testing, school reports, and computerized tests of attention or other cogni-
tive testing (Brock et al., 2009; Gualtieri and Johnson, 2005). Obviously, a pediatrician is
more likely to conduct a vision and hearing screening, while a psychologist is more likely
to use cognitive or developmental tests. Some states and school districts allow school psy-
chologists to make ADHD diagnoses, but others do not (Brock et al., 2009). Nevertheless,
schools are required to screen students for ADHD and to make referrals if school profes-
sionals identify warning signs of ADHD. In either case, schools rely heavily on personal
observation, narrow- and broad-band rating scales (testing for ADHD alone or a broader
set of behavioral, emotional, and learning issues), and psychological testing to assess for
learning and behavioral problems. The lack of personal involvement with the child under-
lies much of the skepticism that educators express with regards to the medical diagnostic
process.40
School districts also have challenged the application of medical diagnostic criteria to
students. A 1997 case from Texas is illustrative.41 In that case, a school district challenged
a diagnosis in the context of a claim for reimbursement of the costs of private school after
a student’s public school refused to place the student in a special education program. The
student had minor “issues” in elementary school, but during the transition to middle school
the student began to have serious behavioral and academic problems. In seventh grade,
40Educators draw a contrast to the diagnostic practices of medicine by pointing to their parallel pro-
cess that necessarily involves personal attention – including personal evaluation of learning differences.
This is, in part, a boundary-drawing exercise that allows educators to maintain control over their realm of
expertise, which is learning (Gieryn, 1983)
41Humble Independent School District, Texas State Educational Agency, Case No. 040-SE-996, May 20,
1997, 26 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 204.
173
he was diagnosed with ADHD – based in part on a teacher rating scale – and he began
to take Ritalin. Although he responded well to Ritalin, the student did not take the drug
consistently. Following an incident during ninth grade that was not described, the princi-
pal recommended expulsion, at which time the student’s mother finally asked the school
district to complete an assessment of her son for purposes of determining his eligibility for
special education. The school district completed the assessment and determined that the
student was ineligible, ruling out an ADHD diagnosis. The district’s psychologist deter-
mined that a “neurological” impairment would not occur “suddenly” in middle school. He
also found that the student’s behavior was “too variable” to be consistent with ADHD. At
a due process hearing, several experts for the school district testified that the student did
not have ADHD and that his problems in school were attributable to typical misbehav-
ior and lack of motivation (the causation narrative described above). The parents’ experts
testified that the student’s trajectory was consistent with ADHD and that the variability
of symptoms was a “telltale sign” of the disorder. The hearing officer ruled for the school
district. Because the student had received “mostly passing grades” and had only “minor
behavioral problems” during his elementary school years, the hearing officer found that
there was no evidence of onset of symptoms by the age of 7 (one of the key elements of
the diagnostic criteria at the time, see the Appendix). Without commenting on the testi-
mony of the student’s expert, the hearing officer accepted the school district expert’s tes-
timony about the variability of symptoms and its inconsistency with ADHD. The hearing
officer did not acknowledge the possibility that the inconsistent use of Ritalin would lead
to symptom variability. In this case, it appears that the evidence required to shift the nar-
rative from medical to undermotivation/misbehavior was the personal connection between
the school district’s psychologist and the child; the school district’s narrative regarding the
child was consistent with a typical adjustment process that occurs during the transition to
middle school (a topic well within the school psychologist’s expertise).
A consequence of the lack of direct, in-school observation as a part of the medical di-
174
agnostic process is that a medical professional cannot easily rebut a school district’s case
when the student’s teachers do not see evidence of ADHD in school. At least within the
domain of special education, teachers are regarded highly as experts in all matters involv-
ing learning; this can present a problem for children diagnosed with the predominantly
inattentive dimension. An illustrative case from 2010 involved an Illinois elementary school
student with inattention symptoms.42 The student’s mother testified that she had con-
cerns about the student’s education as early as preschool. When the student’s second
grade teacher became concerned about her “inattention,” the student’s mother took the
student to a physician for an evaluation. The student’s primary care physician found pos-
sible ADD; he recommended an ear-nose-throat evaluation to rule out other problems, fol-
lowed by a trial of medication if the ear-nose-throat evaluation did not reveal any treatable
problems. The student’s parents requested a formal evaluation from the school, but this
was not undertaken until fourth grade (apparently because the school was pursuing var-
ious response-to-intervention strategies and waiting for the results of hearing and speech
tests). The school district’s psychoeducational assessment did not reveal a severe discrep-
ancy between achievement and ability (the test for SLD), and behavior ratings were “in-
conclusive” for hyperactivity and impulsivity. The school ultimately found that the stu-
dent was not eligible, at which time the parents obtained an independent evaluation by a
licensed psychologist. The psychologist conducted a test battery of 33 assessments (some
of which involved rating scales completed by the teacher) and an interview before diagnos-
ing the student with combined type ADHD. The opinion does not identify the 33 assess-
ments, but it was likely to have been a full neuropsychological evaluation, designed both
to test for ADHD and to exclude other causes. Two of those assessments revealed clini-
cally significant symptoms; however, the psychologist testified that those two assessments
42Meridian School District 223, Illinois State Educational Agency, Case No. 2010-0234, September 9,
2010, 56 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 30. A similar case where school witnesses saw
no evidence of inattention is Newport-Mesa Unified School District, California State Educational Agency,
Case No. SN02-01489, May 11, 2004.
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– the Conners’ Continuous Performance Test-II and the Integrated Visual and Auditory
Continuous Performance Test – were considered the “gold standard” for assessing ADHD
(but see Brock et al., 2009; Gualtieri and Johnson, 2005, who say there is no gold standard
test).43 The hearing officer found the data “inconclusive, at least as it applies to the school
setting,” because the student’s current teacher testified that she does not see evidence of
ADHD at school” and the “behavior scales [the teacher] completed as part of the indepen-
dent evaluation showed scores within normal limits.” Unlike the previous cases, this case
involved what was apparently a very thorough evaluation by an independent psychologist
(which was consistent with a previous teacher’s concerns), but the current teacher’s obser-
vations took precedence over the results of that evaluation (probably because this was a
case involving learning – the predominantly inattentive dimension – and not behavior).
It is not surprising that school districts express a preference for their own experts and
diagnostic tools, but it is not possible to document how often schools and medical experts
use different diagnostic instruments. Still, my analysis of disputes suggests that school dis-
tricts often use separate instruments to evaluate for learning disabilities (where schools
document IQ – through an instrument such as the WISC-IV – and achievement – through
an instrument such as the Woodcock Johnson Achievement Test) and for behavioral prob-
lems (through a broad-band instrument such as the Behavior Assessment System for Chil-
dren (BASC), which measures a broad range of emotional, social, and behavioral problems
(Brock et al., 2009)). The differentiation of the cognitive and the behavioral dimensions
has implications for identifying ADHD if the use of those tests substitutes for the use of a
narrow-band instrument designed to test specifically for ADHD. In one case, a school dis-
trict was admonished for restricting its assessment to the BASC and not using “an ADHD
43Continuous performance tasks are computerized assessments of attention-related problems that index
the subject’s performance in areas of inattentiveness, impulsivity, sustained attention, and vigilance. As
noted above, most researchers in fact recommend the use of rating scales, personal observations, parent
and child interviews, medical examinations, and psychological laboratory tests (such as the continuous
performance tests) in diagnosing students with ADHD (Brock et al., 2009, p. 63). At the same time, it is
recognized that the burden of such an approach can be cost prohibitive (Gualtieri and Johnson, 2005).
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screening instrument.”44 The BASC, however, was mentioned as a diagnostic tool used
by school districts in more than 100 cases, which represents the vast majority of the cases
that discuss any specific diagnostic instrument. The BASC is about behavior, impulsive-
ness, disruptiveness, and less about “attention,” which is harder to assess and harder to
distinguish from academic weakness, unless by the SLD test, which does not always work
in favor of the parents/child as shown in the Illinois case discussed above.
As shown in these cases, hearing officers and courts defer heavily to the expertise of
teachers, even when teachers directly contradict the findings from neuropsychological eval-
uations (which usually account for teacher inputs). The next logical question is whether
hearing officers and courts always defer to school district experts and, if so, what this tells
us about the integration of medical knowledge within the legal system. Judges and hear-
ing officers, in fact, do not always side with schools, but they exhibit considerable concern
about the ramifications of broad deference to medical labels (particularly those obtained
in apparent haste). Furthermore, hearing officers and courts tend to follow school districts
unless it is clear that a ruling can be narrowly circumscribed. A case from Wisconsin pro-
vides an apt example of an effort by a hearing officer narrowly to define his ruling.45 That
case involved the expulsion of a student that had previously been classified as eligible for
special education due to a learning disability. In the course of the evaluation that led to
the student’s eligibility, the school psychologist recommended that the student’s parents
might “want to consider having [the student] evaluated for a suspected Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder.” It is not clear whether the parents ever acted upon that sugges-
tion. Over the course of his high school years, the student had many disciplinary referrals,
so when vandals destroyed school property, the student was identified on a list of possible
suspects. After the student admitted his role in the incident, the school district expelled
44Redlands Unified School District, California State Educational Agency, Case No. SN03-00953A, June
18, 2003, 39 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 249.
45Richland School District v. Thomas P., Case No. 00-C-0139-X, U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Wisc. May 24,
2000.
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him, finding that vandalism was not a manifestation of a learning disability. The parents
challenged that determination and hired a licensed clinical psychologist to evaluate their
son. Based on interviews with the student and a review of his school records, including the
school psychologist’s prior evaluation, the student’s private psychologist concluded that
the student suffered from ADD and a mood disorder. In other words, in this case the par-
ents want to utilize the misbehavior/impulsiveness side of the diagnosis, because of the
reasons that led to the dispute. The student’s psychologist testified that the student was
considerably more impulsive than other students his age, and that the student’s involve-
ment in the vandalism incident was a manifestation of both of his disorders. I suspect that
the student’s parents asked the psychologist to use school records (rather than soliciting a
new teacher rating scale) because they were concerned about asking the student’s teachers
to complete a rating scale during the disciplinary process. The school district challenged
its own psychologist’s earlier evaluation, which formed the basis of the evaluation of the
student’s independent psychologist, on grounds that it was not based on DSM-IV crite-
ria.46 The court rejected the school’s argument, finding that there is no “magic formula”
for diagnosing the disorder. Having said that, the court made a very pointed effort to say
that the decision should not be read to equate misbehavior and ADD:
This opinion should not be read to suggest that a student who commits rep-
rehensible acts may avoid disciplinary action by running to a psychologist and
obtaining a post-hoc diagnosis of attention deficit disorder. Despite what seems
to be a trend towards equating bad behavior with ADD or ADHD, they are
not one in the same. P. presented credible evidence to show that he is among
the small percentage of the population that suffers from this disorder.
The concern with a post-hoc and cursory diagnosis is overcome in this particular case with
the assurance that he was in a small group that actually suffered from ADHD. Whether
this is true or not is debatable, but the court’s concern about establishing a precedent
that would encourage future litigants to seek medical diagnoses to excuse wrongful be-
46It is worth noting that the school district takes advantage of a grey area in diagnostic practices, i.e.,
whether or not it is required to or allowed to apply DSM criteria.
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havior likely was overcome by the fact that the school district’s position was in tension
with its own psychologist’s evaluation (which suggests that the evidence of pre-incident on-
set, albeit undiagnosed, was crucial). What is interesting, however, is the manifest concern
about narrowing the decision to this specific dispute.
To recap, medical dominance is contested when schools express a preference for their
own experts and diagnostic tools, especially when confronted with the results of assess-
ments performed by independent medical experts. But the relatively small number of hear-
ings (given the huge numbers with the diagnosis) suggests that the diagnosis is accepted in
the vast majority of cases. It is possible, of course, that some diagnostic disputes are re-
solved in mediation or even informally. Still, some hearings arise, and when they do, the
veil of the medical diagnosis can be pierced. In most cases, the diagnosis coordinates the
interests of the parties involved and hence a dispute is avoided. But the moment an onto-
logical dispute arises, the diagnosis becomes much weaker, especially the cognitive psychol-
ogy ontology of “attention,” which is very hard to correlate to classroom realities (teachers
have pedagogic expertise). In other words, ADHD is stronger as a flexibly-interpreted ob-
ject that facilitates coordinated action without agreement about its ontology (Bowker and
Star, 2000).
4.5.3 Eligibility
School districts can challenge eligibility not just by objecting to a medical diagnosis, but
also by disputing the applicability of specific legal categories to students. Viewing the dis-
order as an instance of medical social control implies that schools are more likely to label
students with behavioral problems than students who are underperforming academically.
That view implies that a special education placement removes deviant children from gen-
eral education classrooms, allowing schools to focus on the education of “normal” children.
But the treatment of students with attention deficit disorders is more complex than the
social control hypothesis would suggest. Legal disputes between school districts and par-
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ents suggest variability in outcomes depending on the type and severity of the symptoms.
A significant number of disputes (approximately 15 percent of the due process hearings in
the dataset) involved eligibility issues – either related to initial or continuing eligibility for
services or the applicability of particular eligibility categories. In 7-8 percent of due pro-
cess hearings, students were found ineligible for special education programs or services.
The rarity of disputes suggests that the ADHD diagnosis ordinarily is successful in
translating the interests of the parties. That might be because the child’s symptoms are
severe enough that there is no dispute about eligibility or because they are mild enough
with medication that no IEP is necessary. Hearings occur when the diagnosis is unable to
translate the interests of the parties (and the parties have sufficient resources to pursue
the disputes process). That typically happens when there are ontological disputes, espe-
cially when the ontology of “attention” is raised.
Schools manage these ontology differences, in part, through selective application of el-
igibility categories. Although the Department of Education amended federal regulations
to make clear that the OHI category would apply to students with an ADHD diagnosis if
they met the threshold condition of an adverse effect on “educational performance,” the re-
ality is that students with special education placements and ADHD diagnoses are placed
in several categories – most commonly, SLD, ED, speech impairment, and OHI. Data from
the ECLS-K (discussed in Chapter 3) show that in first grade, most of the students diag-
nosed with ADHD who had an IEP were in the speech-impaired or learning disabilities
categories; by the third grade, most of the children were in the learning disabilities cate-
gory. Data from the Special Education Elementary Longitudinal Study, a nationally rep-
resentative study of students ages 6-12 receiving special education, show that the students
with ADHD constitute the majority of students in the categories of ED and OHI; students
with ADHD constitute one fifth of the students classified as mentally retarded or SLD. As
to the distribution of students with ADHD across disability categories, roughly half were
in the learning disabilities category (Schnoes et al., 2006). Wagner et al. (2003) reports
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comparable data from the National Longitudinal Transition Study-2 (NLTS2), a nationally
representative study of students ages 13-16. Follow-up studies of the subjects in the MTA
Study (when they were in high school) show the primary disability category for those who
received services as “learning disability” for 46.4 percent, “ADD/ADHD” for 23.5 percent
(an unrecognized category), and “emotional/behavior disorder” for 17.6 percent (Murray
et al., 2014).
A 2002 case from California, involving a 13-year-old girls’ eligibility for special educa-
tion on the basis of an ADHD (inattentive subtype) diagnosis, illustrates the dynamic be-
tween the ontology of “attention” and classroom performance.47 During the girl’s early pri-
mary years, a school district found her eligible for special education services with an SLD,
on the basis of a discrepancy between her ability (measured by I.Q. score) and achieve-
ment. The district provided services for several years; however, during fifth grade, the
school psychologist administered a new psychoeducational assessment that suggested that
the student’s I.Q. score had fallen (from 89 to 80), as a result of which there was no longer
a severe discrepancy between cognitive ability and achievement.48 Based primarily on her
grades, achievement scores, and the school psychologist’s direct observations, the school
district determined that the student’s ADHD did not affect her educational performance
(so she could not qualify as OHI). Constructing an opposition between medical and educa-
tional categories, the district argued that the student’s use of the stimulant drug Adderall
should have reduced the symptoms and thus obviated the need for special education. The
school district thus acted as if the condition was fully medicalized so that educational re-
mediation was not required. At a hearing challenging the eligibility determination, a psy-
chiatrist’s testimony on behalf of the student explained that ADHD impaired her executive
functioning, which in turn impaired her memory and slowed her processing speed, all of
which led to a “limited strength, vitality, or alertness in the classroom,” in the words of
47Manhattan Beach Unified School District, California State Educational Agency, Case No. SN02-01513,
December 6, 2002, 38 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 255.
48It is not clear from the opinion whether the score dropped because the test was renormed.
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the OHI regulation. The student’s expert also testified that although Adderall improves
blood flow to the frontal lobes and helps the user to focus attention, it does not improve
the executive functioning, which requires “practice, practice, practice.” The student’s sixth
grade teacher confirmed that the student continued to exhibit symptoms despite taking
a large dose of Adderall. Ultimately, the hearing officer found that the student’s expert
was “credible and well qualified to medically explain the relationship of ADHD to mem-
ory, processing speed, reasoning, and other aspects of mental functioning,” as a result of
which the hearing officer found that the student in fact was eligible as OHI. Although the
hearing officer credited the neurological evidence over the school psychologist’s testimony,
the outcome likely depended on the fact that the student’s special education teacher (who
knew the student better than the school’s psychologist) believed that the student required
small-group, structured instruction and a modified curriculum. Thus, a conflict between
school experts probably was outcome-determinative. But the fact that the dispute reached
a hearing shows the difficulty in obtaining recognition for the medical consequences of a
predominantly-inattentive ADHD diagnosis.
When a student’s executive dysfunction issues manifest in minor disciplinary issues
and few other overt symptoms, the case for eligibility can be difficult to make. In a 2002
case from Texas,49 a hearing officer denied eligibility (agreeing with the school district)
for a 13-year-old girl who was said to be progressing at “an average level commensurate
with her intellectual capabilities.” The student’s multiple disciplinary referrals during sev-
enth grade (mainly for tardiness and failure to attend detention) led to a concern that she
was not advancing academically, in part because of missing class time while she was being
disciplined for behaviors that were related to her disability. In this case, the student had
never been found eligible for special education services, even though she was diagnosed
with ADHD at the age of 5, but she had been found eligible for accommodations under
49Gregory-Portland Independent School District, Texas State Educational Agency, Case No. 330-SE-
0502, October 17, 2002, 38 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 168.
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and received preferential seating, simplified instruc-
tions on assignments, extended time for assignments, and assistance with organization.
With those accommodations, the student maintained average grades in most subjects.
The hearing officer denied eligibility for special education services, largely on the basis of
her passing grades: “Understandably, [her] parents would like to see higher grades and a
stronger showing of academic success; however the standard for educational need of special
education services is not whether a student could do better, but whether a student is ade-
quately progressing without the services.” As to the parents’ concern that the student was
being disciplined for acts related to her disability, the hearing officer relied on a common
narrative. The hearing officer agreed that the student was “at risk” for developing a dis-
order that could result in an educational need but found that at present her acts did not
constitute a threat to her ability to benefit from a regular education program. In a similar
New York case decided in 1994, a hearing officer upheld a school district’s determination
that an eight-year-old student’s ADHD did not adversely impact his educational perfor-
mance (for purposes of eligibility) despite testimony from a private psychologist that the
student would be expected to encounter academic difficulty if her perceptual (cognitive)
difficulties were not taken into account.50 The student had the predominantly-inattentive
subtype of ADHD, experienced some “processing issues” that were treated by stimulant
medications, but was not significantly behind in school (at least as of the second grade).
In both cases, the parents were concerned about their child’s ability to reach their po-
tential, but the hearing officer sided with the schools based on the facts presented at the
hearings. As shown in those cases, the “at risk” narrative represents a way for hearing of-
ficers to give school districts the benefit of the doubt as to the adequacy of a regular edu-
cational program until a student’s representatives can present concrete evidence of the in-
sufficiency of regular education – a burden that extended far beyond obtaining an ADHD
50Board of Education of the East Syracuse-Minoa Central School District, New York State Educational
Agency, Case No. 94-36, December 8, 1994, 21 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 1024.
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diagnosis. In those cases, testimony that behaviors were consistent with ADHD was not
enough. These examples show how the ADHD diagnosis and associated medication can be
molded to serve school needs/interests and explains why there are comparatively few dis-
putes. They also show how the medication works to translate everybody’s interests, allow-
ing the parties to arrive at a provisional working arrangement (until it no longer works).
As shown, the cases that involve inattention are difficult because they do not fit easily
into the SLD or ED categories. School districts prefer the SLD category, as shown during
the hearings concerning the possible extension of the IDEA to students with ADHD. The
hearings make clear that the reasoning for this goes beyond a simple desire to limit initial
eligibility. Its constitution as an educational label also makes it easier to avoid due pro-
cess requirements for student discipline. Conversely, where there is a pattern of significant
behavioral problems, school districts apply the ED category because it connotes that the
student’s issues stem from emotional factors, justifying removal from mainstream environ-
ments. Parents, by contrast, tend to prefer the OHI label, the broadening of which they
lobbied for successfully. This preference stems from the fact that OHI is the most closely
synonymous with a medical category.
The school preference for the SLD category arises in part from the fact that learn-
ing disabilities are not characterized by behavioral problems (even though those problems
sometimes occur if the student has a “comorbid condition”), as is shown a 2001 case from
Texas.51 That case involved a school district that had imposed numerous disciplinary re-
movals from class and twice contacted law enforcement about the student’s behavior. The
school was aware of several evaluations by psychologists that diagnosed the student with
ADHD as well as the student’s long-term history of taking Ritalin. Yet the school district
refused to qualify the student as OHI. Instead, they proposed to serve him only as a stu-
dent with SLD, and they did not provide the student with a behavioral plan. By doing
51Ingram Independent School District, Texas State Educational Agency, Case No. 232-SE-0401, June 11,
2001, 35 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 143.
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so, the district did not acknowledge (and was not confronted with) the possibility that the
student’s behaviors were manifestations of a medical disorder. Given the insufficiency of
the district’s approach and the student’s longstanding diagnosis and medication treatment,
the hearing officer ordered the district to classify the student as OHI and to provide a be-
havioral plan.
The preference for the SLD category also was apparent in a 2003 decision from New
Jersey,52 where despite repeated episodes of violence toward other children and adults,
running from his classroom and hiding in the school building, sleeping under water foun-
tains and destroying classrooms, a student’s classification remained SLD. Numerous mani-
festation determinations had been decided against the student. When a due process hear-
ing finally was requested, a hearing officer reversed a manifestation determination, ad-
monishing the school district of the need to “check [their] egos at the door” because “if
we don’t intercept this child’s needs at this juncture, how are we going to be able to ad-
dress his escalating needs as he gets older and bigger and less easily managed and less
easily controlled.” This case had a similar outcome as the previous one, but it shows the
business-as-usual approach of schools in dealing with student disciplinary problems.
Another reason for preferring the SLD category is that it is easier to declassify stu-
dents with ADHD if they initially obtain eligibility in that category, as is shown in a case
from New Hampshire.53 A neurologist had diagnosed the student with “minimal brain dys-
function manifested by an attention deficit disorder” at age 7. She recommended to the
student’s pediatrician and parents a trial of Ritalin, but the student’s parents did not be-
lieve that Ritalin should be used at that time. Through fifth grade, the student was clas-
sified as learning disabled. He was removed from special education when his achievement
and IQ scores converged, even though his academic performance had deteriorated. The
52South River Board of Education, New Jersey State Educational Agency, Case No. EDS873-02, May
12, 2003, 39 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 88.
53Manchester School District, New Hampshire State Educational Agency, Case No. 90-60, December 6,
1990, 18 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 425.
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school attributed the student’s worsening grades to poor motivation, because the student
was not turning in assignments or finishing written work. He also tended to “fade out.”
School officials also suggested that the student use Ritalin (a case decided before the 2004
IDEA amendment that prohibited schools from insisting on medication). In a challenge
to the school district’s determination that the student was no longer eligible, the hearing
officer held for the student, finding that the school district’s personnel on the IEP team
were predisposed to disqualify the student; the hearing officer ordered a new evaluation of
student to determine the real source of his difficulties.
That case shows that school districts are not always successful in controlling the appli-
cation of the SLD category, but the cases clearly show why the school districts prefer the
category. It is easier to declassify the student because the school district’s psychologist has
full jurisdiction over the determination, in the sense that all of the information and assess-
ments can be generated in-house. In addition, the substance of the category is educational,
rather than medical – a terrain on which the parents (and their experts) are necessarily
at a disadvantage. In the New Hampshire case, the parents of a student who was initially
classified as learning disabled disputed the district’s determination that their son was no
longer eligible for special education services.
Another decision that raises a declassification issue involves an 18-year-old student
from Vermont who had been diagnosed with ADHD and whose parents requested a resi-
dential program after their son’s third unsuccessful attempt to complete the ninth grade.54
Due to excessive absences, the student had been placed in the same grade for three consec-
utive years. He quit taking Ritalin because it exacerbated his Tourette Syndrome symp-
toms. The school district maintained that the student’s poor academic performance was
caused by a lack of motivation, not his disabling conditions (he had been found eligible
in the SLD category some number of years earlier), and that the student should be held
54In the Matter of a Child with Disabilities, Vermont State Educational Agency, Case No. 92-12, De-
cember 4, 1992, 19 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 448.
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accountable for his own education. Although the school district questioned eligibility, it
offered 45 minutes each per day of resource room and counseling as a special education
placement. The school district did not take into consideration the ADHD diagnosis given
by the student’s private psychologist because it had not been confirmed by a neurologist
or other medical doctor. Based on expert testimony and the student’s demonstrated lack
of progress, the hearing officer held that the current IEP was inadequate to provide the
student with an educational benefit and that the student required residential placement.
The case involved a narrative dispute: is this a story about neglect that turned into
lack of motivation, or a story about lack of motivation for which post-hoc diagnosis is an
excuse? The taking of medication plainly did not avert this dispute, but it is implied that
the failure to do so is the parents’ “fault” or that any residual problems are the student’s
“fault.” This case turned on a battle of experts, but the student won. Over the years, the
student had seen at least 5 specialists, one of whom (the first) said that he was poorly mo-
tivated. Two subsequent years of failure undercut that expert’s testimony. In particular,
the hearing officer concluded that the student’s poor attendance record was a manifesta-
tion of his ADHD, combined with ineffective programming, and that any attempt to place
responsibility on the student for his lack of academic progress was unacceptable. However,
the hearing officer found insufficient evidence that the student had been denied an appro-
priate education during the previous two school years; he limited his order to the final year
and required a residential placement for a period of one year. Essentially, the student was
given one year to rehabilitate. The disagreement as to whether he is an underachiever or a
student with a cognitive deficit (that contributes to poor motivation) will be tested by his
progress in the residential placement. The student was given the benefit of the doubt be-
cause of the years of underperformance; this hearing officer simply did not wish to assume
(given these extreme facts) that the medical explanation was invalid.
More often than not, however, these narratives are resolved in favor of school districts.
A case involving a student whose failing grades and problem behaviors were attributed to
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ADHD was not successful in a due process hearing because of her drug and alcohol addic-
tions.55 The hearing officer accepted the district’s argument without considering the fact
that drug and alcohol problems are associated with ADHD. In a similar case,56 a “very,
very smart” student’s academic problems throughout elementary school were attributed
to a choice not to do the work. In this case, the student’s potential worked against him.
When the student entered sixth grade, he was then found eligible as a student with an ED
due to an escalation of “extreme outbursts” during school.
4.5.4 Placement
As demonstrated in the case of the 18-year-old Vermont student, disputes regarding the
student’s special education placement (referred to as an individualized education program,
or IEP) remain common even when a school recognizes a medical diagnosis and finds that
a student is eligible for special education. About 75 percent of the due process hearings
involved placement issues – the type of school or classroom in which a student would be
assigned, the type of services or personnel that would be provided, the type of accommo-
dations that would be available,57 or simply whether the programs and services specified
in the IEP were being provided. The IDEA requires that schools provide a “free appropri-
ate public education” to students with disabilities, but there is considerable disagreement
55Elk Grove Unified School District, California State Educational Agency, Case No. N2005090739,
February 22, 2006, 46 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 56.
56Board of Education of the Oysterponds Union Free School District, New York State Educational
Agency, Case No. 05-012, March 9 2005, 43 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 98.
57Disputes about accommodations are relatively rare, but they do occur. In one case, for example, a
high school student with ADHD who had average grades in a school of “hyper-achieving students” was
given extended time for some school tests on an informal basis. For purposes of the Standardized Achieve-
ment Test, however, the Educational Testing Service considers whether a student has a formal Section 504
plan from the school district. The school district refused to formalize the student’s plan, on the gounds
that she was not disabled. Montgomery County Public Schools, Maryland State Educational Agency, Case
No. DOE-MONT-02-03-27139, September 23, 2003, 40 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Re-
port 24. It is my anecdotal impression that school districts usually provide testing accommodations to
students with documented medical diagnoses, simply because they have the infrastructure in place to read-
ily accommodate those requests. The process used by the Educational Testing Service is documented at
https://www.ets.org/gre/revised_general/register/disabilities/accommodations/.
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about what placements are appropriate for students with ADHD.58 Disputes arise primar-
ily because the “prototype” special education programs that have been designed by educa-
tors and institutionalized within school districts – such as segregated schools or classrooms
or resource room support – are too restrictive or provide little direct benefit to students
with ADHD. In short, the programs that are most directly suited for students with ADHD
are not always found within existing programs designed for students with “educational dis-
abilities” – both because of institutional oversight or disinterest and because of difficulty
providing those services in a common setting. Furthermore, school districts often treat
learning and behavioral problems as separate issues, which is in tension with the medical
understanding of ADHD.
What constitutes an appropriate program varies with the type of symptoms exhibited
by the student and their severity, both of which are influenced by the mainstream school
environment. Programs for students with ADHD fall into three general categories – ac-
commodations, behavioral plans, and academic, social, or behavioral instruction or sup-
port.59 Accommodations within the physical and learning environments of the classroom
can benefit children with ADHD. The most commonly-used accommodations involve pref-
erential seating and technology designed to assist with organization (a binder and daily
58Follow-up studies of the subjects in the MTA Study (Murray et al., 2014) show that by high school
51.6 percent of the sample were receiving services through an IEP (47 percent) or a 504 plan (4 percent).
Very few services (except tutoring) were provided outside of an IEP or 504 plan. Almost all students with
services received some type of academic intervention, whereas only half received any behavioral support
or learning strategy. Thirty five percent of students with ADHD spent time in special education classes;
among those students there was a teacher’s aide in addition to a teacher for 59 percent and a 1:1 instruc-
tional assistant for 8.3 percent. The most common accommodations were extended time on tests, progress
monitoring, and additional time to complete assignments.
59This summary is derived from an OSEP report on teaching students with ADHD (U.S. Department of
Education, 2008). Zentall (1993) summarizes accommodations uniquely targeted to students with ADHD.
More recently, Harrison et al. (2013) distinguishes accommodations (changes to hold a disabled student
to the same standard as non-disabled students), interventions (systemic processes to develop skills), and
modifications (changes that reduce expectations). The authors note that accommodations take the form
of changes in the way that instruction is presented, changes in the way that students are permitted to
respond, changes in the location for completing assignments, and changes in the time allocated for assig-
ments. Although several potential strategies are beneficial to children with ADHD, the authors conclude
that there is very little evidence supporting the effectiveness of many commonly recommended accommo-
dations for youth with ADHD.
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check on use of the binder). If accommodations are successful, they reduce the need for
more labor-intensive interventions in the academic environment. Behavioral interventions
are strategies designed to help students learn how to control their actions; they include
techniques such as verbal reinforcement of pre-defined behaviors, social skills classes, or
one-on-one problem-solving sessions. Academic instruction includes practices such as fre-
quent reviews of previous lessons, simplified instructions, use of oral and written directions
with frequent follow-ups, lower noise levels in the classroom, smaller units of work, and
reduction of timed tests. For children with ADHD who have language arts or math chal-
lenges, practices vary widely depending on level school but can include partner-reading
activities, storyboards, playacting, mnemonics, memory skills, color coding of symbols, and
any of the strategies designed for students with learning disabilities.
If a student is able to establish eligibility at a young age – which is not always easy
(as discussed), it remains difficult to show that a particular program will not satisfy his
or her educational needs. For young students, academic demands are relatively low, and
school districts are likely to offer a limited intervention before moving to a more inten-
sive (and possibly more restrictive) program. This is exemplified by a case involving a
five-year-old with ADHD whose parents challenged a placement in a public school’s reg-
ular kindergarten program that included special education support services but no “ex-
tended year” services.60 The student’s expert, a psychiatrist, recommended a summer
school program because of the likelihood that any academic and social gains that accrued
during the school year would be lost, as well as a full-day academic program with a low
student-to-teacher ratio and a structured class environment. The school district, in turn,
proposed a program with a 20-person class in a half-day, regular classroom, accompa-
nied by an aide and the availability of a special education teacher across the hall. Find-
ing that the district’s proposed program was an appropriate placement, the hearing officer
60Richfield Joint School District No. 1, Wisconsin State Educational Agency, September 9, 1991, 18
Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 168.
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was influenced by testimony from the proposed kindergarten teacher to the effect that her
classroom would be “structured” because all children need structure, not just those with
ADHD. The hearing officer also relied on testimony that there was not yet any evidence
that the absence of full-day program or an extended year would cause regression; at that
point in the student’s academic career, the psychiatrist’s claim – based on experience with
other children – was speculative. Although parents might be proactive in helping the child
meet his or her potential, it is not surprising that school districts would have significant
latitude to define appropriate programs. In short, at this early stage, it is commonly un-
derstood that all children benefit from structure and individualized attention, and children
with ADHD – whose symptoms are only beginning to manifest as “warning signs” – have
not had the occasion to fall far behind.
Placement issues become more complex as academic demands increase. A regular ed-
ucation placement with resource room services, for example, was found to be inappro-
priate for a second-grade student whose disability was known in kindergarten and whose
performance had deteriorated since that time.61 As a result of his declining performance,
the student’s parents enrolled their son in private school at Christmas break of the sec-
ond grade year and sought reimbursement. The student’s first-grade teacher apparently
had been somewhat successful teaching the student even though his performance deterio-
rated somewhat. During the second grade year, the situation unraveled. The student be-
gan taking Ritalin, but the drug had inconsistent effects. The boy’s parents claimed that
he “cannot function independently in a classroom without constant teacher attention.”
They also brought the “potential” narrative into play, asserting that he is “very bright”
but not working to his capabilities. The school acknowledged that it had placed the stu-
dent in “the third reading group not because he was a poor reader, but because it was [the
teacher’s] opinion that he would be unable to do and complete the heavier writing assign-
61Livingston Board of Education, New Jersey State Educational Agency, Case No. 90-3550, April 28,
1992, 18 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 1070.
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ments which were placed upon the students in the higher reading groups.” Ruling in favor
of the student, the hearing officer found that the resource room assignment was “misdi-
rected” and accomplished “nothing more than a place for completing work.” The fact that
the student’s potential was seen as high – by both parties – influenced the hearing officer’s
decision; the resource room and low reading group placement were not targeted to a stu-
dent that had high potential but was in need of constant redirection.
Even when schools agree to an IEP that provides an appropriate program, disputes
can arise if teachers refuse to implement it. An example of this involved an 8th-grade stu-
dent from Massachusetts who had been diagnosed with ADHD and was receiving medica-
tion and special education services.62 This student’s disorder was characterized by math,
auditory and visual memory, and visual-spatial deficits, as well as difficulty with written
responses; she had strengths in verbal reasoning and social skills. Her parents preferred a
placement at a private special education school, believing that she would thrive with small
group instruction and support in all of her academic classes. But the student’s IEP pro-
vided for small group instruction for her math class (her weakest subject), along with spe-
cial education “support” in the regular education setting for her remaining courses. Her
parents disagreed with the IEP, but also claimed that it was not being implemented in
full; they emphasized that the effectiveness of this program was contingent on handpicked
teachers who were able to modify the curriculum. The school district acknowledged that
the school was not implementing the IEP in full but pointed to her good grades. The dis-
trict also suggested that her teachers believed that singling her out (pursuant to the IEP)
was stigmatizing. This hearing officer was concerned about the student’s progress, pointing
to the fact that her test and quiz grades were much lower than her overall grades.63 The
62Tewksbury Public Schools, Massachusetts State Educational Agency, Case No. 94-1344, April 20,
1994, 21 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 582.
63Because of the frequency with which grades are used to show progress, there is OSEP guidance on
this point. In Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments for Students with Disabilities Attending
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, the Office of Civil Rights, the OCR made clear that “[s]chool
districts should not assume that [a] student’s academic success necessarily means that the student is not
substantially limited in a major life activity,” meaning that “grades alone are an insufficient basis upon
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hearing officer ruled in favor of the school district, however, because the private special
education school was too restrictive. The hearing officer ordered the school to amend and
follow a new IEP that would require multisensory teaching, use of mnemonics, teaching
in smaller segments, close monitoring of the student’s focus, and use of drill and repeti-
tion. In denying the parents’ preferred placement, the hearing officer was influenced by the
girl’s “significant strengths.” Here, the student’s high potential works against the restric-
tive placement.
In the Massachusetts case, the school district provided a program (that it refused to
implement) designed to remediate learning issues without specifically addressing atten-
tion issues. This approach arises directly out of the tension between the medical category
ADHD and “learning disabilities” (which, for educators, encompass all perceptual issues).
In a similar case, a school district proposed an IEP for a 7th-grade student from Mas-
sachusetts with an ADHD diagnosis and eligibility through the SLD category.64 The IEP
placed the student in a school with a small language group and supports for other classes
in the form of tutoring for three days a week, a full time aide, and speech therapy twice a
week. The student’s parents rejected the IEP, requesting that the district place the stu-
dent in a private, residential school. The parents unilaterally placed the student in the res-
idential school and requested a due process hearing. The evidence showed that the student
had increased difficulty with his academic work throughout his elementary years, but he
managed to get by with tutoring. His problems escalated in sixth grade. The school dis-
trict had been aware of the student’s academic problems in his regular education classes
which to determine whether a student has a disability.” Grades are just one factor and do not provide
information on how much effort was required for the student to achieve those grades. The Committee on
Education and Labor in the House of Representatives cautioned that “an individual with an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity should not be penalized when seeking protection under the
ADA simply because he or she managed their own adaptive strategies or received informal or undocu-
mented accommodations that have the effect of lessening the deleterious impacts of their disability.” See
H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15 (2008). This guidance emphasizes the possibility that students with
neurological impairment are required to expend additional effort to achieve their grades. As the Mas-
sachussetts case suggests, an additional concern is the fact that grades are within the control of schools.
64West Boylston Public Schools, Massachusetts State Educational Agency, Case No. 97-0118, April 11,
1997, 25 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 920.
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for several years, but continued to place him in regular education classes. The student’s
grades fell in sixth grade – from passing to all D’s and F’s by the end of the year. The
hearing officer found that both programs were inappropriate. The school district’s pro-
gram did not address the student’s attentional and organizational deficiencies. However,
the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of the private school because
it was too restrictive for the student, which was demonstrated by the fact that the student
made no progress during the period between the placement and the hearing. Put simply,
the law restricts the parents’ ability to resolve a tradeoff between mainstreaming and the
need for frequent redirection.65
Besides placing students with inattentive symptoms in learning disabled-type place-
ments (i.e., tutoring, language support, etc.) that are not tailored specifically to the atten-
tion and organizational weaknesses of students with ADHD, school districts also treated
learning and behavioral problems as separate issues. This differentiation contradicts the
medical understanding of ADHD as a hybrid disorder. The consequences of being placed
in programs for children with behavioral problems caused several parents to dispute the
primacy of particular symptom groupings. There was a case from Pennsylvania in which
the student’s parents challenged a proposed placement in a combination learning disabil-
ity/emotional disturbance program; they preferred a full-time classroom for students with
learning disabilities.66 The parents believed that the classroom with students with emo-
tional difficulties would expose their child to a high level of stimulation that would impair
his ability to learn. As a result, they removed him from the public school and placed him
65Although my views are anecdotal, private schools often use the same approach as public schools in
responding to behavioral and cognitive problems. Children with primarily academic issues are treated as
a group. Those schools/programs are staffed heavily with reading specialists, speech therapists, and they
rely heavily on assistive technologies. Children with primarily behavioral issues are treated as a separate
group. Those schools/programs are staffed heavily with counselors and social workers. They emphasize so-
cial skills training, counseling, and behavioral management. The main differences between private special
education schools and public schools are that private schools allow few or no mainstreaming opportuni-
ties, but they often have smaller class sizes, making redirection of students with attention disorders less
burdensome.
66Lauglin v. Central Bucks School District, Case No. 91-7333, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Pa., Jan. 11, 1994.
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in a private school. The school district claimed that the boy’s severe emotional and behav-
ioral problems went far beyond that of a typical ADHD child and that the proposed place-
ment was appropriate. His parents argued that their son’s severe emotional and behavioral
problems were attributed to poor management of his ADHD, and that if placed in an LD
setting, his conduct problems would be less severe (apparently he was easily distracted by
the “acting out” of other students). Several experts for the student testified that his con-
duct problems were secondary to ADHD. The hearing officer accepted the causation narra-
tive offered by the school district and thus ruled in its favor. The hearing officer pointed to
evidence that over 60% of children with ADHD also have Oppositional Defiant Disorder or
Conduct Disorder (implying that he likely had one of those conditions as well). The hear-
ing officer also pointed out that DSM-III-R (in effect at the time) did not classify ADHD
as a learning disability but as a disruptive behavior disorder.67
The issue of primacy of symptoms came up in a case involving a seventh-grade stu-
dent from Indiana who was diagnosed with ADHD, had serious emotional problems and
low average to average intelligence, and experienced increasing difficulty in school through-
out his elementary school years.68 The student began having trouble keeping up with his
homework in fourth grade. His parents started investigating special educational programs
during his fifth grade year, but his academic and behavioral problems escalated upon en-
tering middle school. As a result, his time in a resource room increased in sixth grade. He
also was supposed to receive daily support in the regular language arts and math classes.
When he continued to regress – becoming withdrawn, fighting, failing to complete assign-
ments and to review for quizzes – and the district proposed the same program for seventh
grade, the parents obtained independent assessments and ultimately enrolled him in a pri-
vate school. The school district claimed that the student’s primary disability was emo-
67Recall that the re-classification of ADHD as a learning disorder, and not as a behavioral disorder, was
one of the changes made in DSM-5.
68Parents of Matt A. v. Valparaiso Community Schools, Case NO. 2:95-CV-295, U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D.
Ind., Jan. 30, 1997.
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tional. The witnesses for both sides agreed that he had serious emotional and behavioral
problems; they disagreed on whether those problems were caused by frustration resulting
from his other disabilities or whether they existed independently. Although witnesses on
behalf of the student testified that his problems likely would be “triggered” by other chil-
dren with significant behavioral concerns, the hearing officer discounted that testimony
because both sides agreed that it was difficult to disentangle the boy’s attention deficit dis-
order from the emotional problems. For children with behavioral problems, schools seem
to relegate the attention problems to the background, thus interpreting the category in a
quite different way than the medical diagnosis would contemplate.
A similar issue reached the Ninth Circuit in 1995, when a 16-year-old student with a
learning disability, attention deficit disorder, and conduct disorder was unilaterally placed
by his parents in a private school.69 The student was eligible for special education under
the SLD category. He had a history of poor academic performance and bad behavior and
had been hospitalized for a period of time for aggression. After the student received failing
grades in a program that combined regular education classes with a resource specialist,
the district implemented a program of special education classes with resource services,
and once again, the student failed. Immediately before his private placement, the dis-
trict responded with yet another IEP that reduced the time he spent in special education–
despite his failures under the former programs. The school district’s main expert witness,
the school psychologist who had assessed the student, testified that ascribing the boy’s
poor performance to a neurochemical deficiency was “overly speculative” because Ritalin
therapy did not provide the relief from symptoms he would have expected if there were a
neurochemical imbalance; the school psychologist further claimed that the boy’s problems
stemmed from the conduct disorder (which was not a basis for eligibility on its own). A
due process hearing officer determined that the district had denied the student an appro-
69Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
July 5, 1995.
196
priate education, which justified reimbursement for the private placement. The decision
was affirmed on appeal by the district court and the Ninth Circuit. School and private
psychologists agreed that the student needed structure and individualized attention; the
hearing officer and courts found that the use of four to six different teachers and three dif-
ferent resource specialists in the school district’s proposed program would not provide that
structure. They were also influenced by the fact that the student did better academically
after transferring. The use of a behavior plan with immediate consequences was improving
his behavior. The conduct disorder was not seen as the principal cause of his symptoms
because there was evidence that he had attention problems dating back to early in his
schooling. And many of his teachers agreed that his “negative behaviors stem[med] from
his attention-deficit disorder and his resultant school failure, depression, and feelings of
inadequacy.”
In sum, issues with placement decisions often relate to the fit of pre-packaged pro-
grams designed by educators (that do not target attention issues) to the needs of students
with ADHD. School interpretations of ADHD thus are shaped by the existing programs
offered by school districts.
4.5.5 Consequences
In addition to diverging opinions about whether inattentiveness provides a medical expla-
nation for poor motivation, parents and schools disagree about whether impulsivity pro-
vides a medical explanation for behavior sufficient to excuse a student’s misconduct. Dis-
cipline issues were involved in about 20 percent of the due process hearings in the dataset.
Many of those discipline cases involved the question whether an act of misconduct that led
to some disciplinary action was a manifestation of the student’s disability. As discussed in
Chapter 2, there is a positive relationship between the level of student discipline and the
prevalence rate for ADHD, despite the assertions of some researchers that a diagnosis is an
alternative to disciplinary action. The ability to use medical knowledge about ADHD to
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excuse behaviors that otherwise would result in discipline largely explains that aggregate-
level relationship. Even though I found that parents prevailed in relatively few of the re-
ported decisions, the threat of due process likely has a substantial chilling effect on school
district approaches to discipline.
Some disputes arise at the intersection of school discipline and the juvenile justice
system. A case that highlights this issue came from the Sixth Circuit’s review of the dis-
missal of a juvenile court petition.70 After a middle-school student vandalized a school
bathroom, a Tennessee school district filed a juvenile court petition against the student.
The student had a long history of misbehavior and failing grades, and the school district
was aware that he had been diagnosed with ADHD and that he was receiving medication
for his condition. Before the incident, the school district had been in the process of as-
sessing the student for special education services. A few days after the juvenile petition
was filed, the school district held a disciplinary hearing, which also served as a meeting
where the school certified the student as eligible for services. At that meeting, the school
determined that although the student’s destructive behavior might be related to his dis-
ability, his “unauthorized presence” in the restroom was not. The juvenile court petition
was dismissed by an administrative law judge on procedural grounds: because the prop-
erty destruction was related to his disability, the juvenile petition constituted a change
in placement without following proper procedural safeguards. A district court upheld the
dismissal of that petition, and the school appealed. The Sixth Circuit viewed the juvenile
petition to be the “culmination of a long series of disciplinary actions taken against him by
the school system despite their awareness of a disability and his deteriorating grades and
behavior.” Since the filing of a juvenile petition against the student triggered a change in
placement, regardless of whether it resulted in incarceration, he was entitled to receive a
multidisciplinary team meeting from the school district before a juvenile petition could be
filed.
70Knox County Pub. Sch. v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
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The Tennessee case was decided based on a fact pattern of a period of neglect followed
by an extreme sanction. Many other cases (criminal and non-criminal) discuss what it
means for behavior to be a manifestation of ADHD. In a Colorado case from 1994, a 17-
year-old student with ADHD was expelled from school after an indecent exposure to a fe-
male classmate.71 The boy’s parents requested a due process hearing to contest the expul-
sion. By the time of the hearing, the student had pled guilty to a criminal charge based on
the incident and was sentenced to a juvenile diversion program. The hearing officer found
that the student did not qualify for special education at the time of the hearing or at the
time of his expulsion. Like the boy from Tennessee, he had a history of poor grades, but
the hearing officer found that his grades appeared to result from lack of interest and con-
flicts with teachers. Moreover, the hearing officer found that the incident in question was
not symptomatic of the type of conduct that characterized ADHD. Although an expert for
the student testified that the incident resulted from poor impulse control, the hearing offi-
cer found that this was not an “uncontrollable, inappropriate type of outburst that ‘lack of
impulse control’ connotes to the hearing officer, in the neurological sense.” The act “was
intentional: a plan was involved, as was the execution of several steps to carry it out.”
This was not a case where the consequences of the act were not considered, but one where
the actor “simply had no respect for the consequences.” The hearing officer remarked that
“[i]t would similarly do a disservice to the usefulness of ‘attention deficit disorder,’ as a sci-
entific term describing a specific condition, if it were expanded to cover any and all types
of aberrant conduct.” The hearing officer was influenced by the student’s failure to take
medication, observing: “The finding is similarly inescapable that during those years when
Petitioner was on Ritalin, both his grades and test scores were substantially better than
they were when he was not taking medication. Petitioner’s parents, and Petitioner him-
self, do not believe in taking drugs to control behavior, however, and have not persevered
71Academy School District #20, Colorado State Educational Agency, Case No. L94:119, October 26,
1994, 21 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 965.
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with medication regimens when prescribed.” The desire to punish the student (and his
parents) for refusing to continue a medication regime was clear: the boy and his parents
were blamed for the lengthy history of misconduct.
It is common to point to evidence of deliberation to justify a finding that behavior is
not symptomatic, but it is difficult to distinguish acts of impulsivity and acts of simple
(non-neurological) bad judgment; in other words, does a series of antecedent impulsive acts
undermine the ability of students to explain behavior in medical terms. For example, in
another Colorado case, the theft of money by a middle school student from an unlocked
file drawer was not a manifestation of his disability because testimony indicated that the
student planned the theft for more than a day before carrying it out.72 And in a 1997
Georgia case, bringing a firearm in a car parked on school property was not a manifesta-
tion of the student’s disability because it demonstrated “poor judgment” and not impul-
sivity.73 Similarly, the decision to detonate a “dry-ice” bomb was not impulsive because of
the research required to construct it.74 Likewise, a fight following a basketball game was
not an impulsive act because it had been planned.75 A California due process hearing offi-
cer, on the other hand, found that keying a car owned by the high school principal (in re-
sponse to peer pressure) was an act of impulsivity.76 And in a 1999 case from Minnesota,77
a hearing officer found that bringing an unloaded paintball gun on the school bus was im-
pulsive because the decision to act was spontaneously made in response to a request by
72Academy School District #20, Colorado State Educational Agency, Case No. L2002:111, August 12,
1992, 37 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 264.
73Oconee County School System, Georgia State Educational Agency, Case No. OSAH-DOE-SE-98-022-
46, October 2, 1997, 27 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 629.
74Poway Unifed School District, California State Educational Agency, Case No. 2010060622, July 27,
2010, 55 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 152.
75Fallbrook Union High School District, California State Educational Agency, Case No. SN05-00383,
March 28, 2005, 43 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 159.
76Sequoia Union High School District, California State Educational Agency, Case No. SN392-01, April
6, 2001, 34 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 303.
77Independent School District No. 279, Minnesota State Educational Agency, Case No. 78-2103-12203-3,
May 28, 1999, 30 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 645.
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another student. The intervention of other students in the latter two cases worked in favor
of the diagnosed students. The boundary drawing problem here is central: educators (and
the judicial process) do not wish to defer reflexively to medical explanations for behavior.
Medical expertise purports to lend a scientific (or objective) explanation for what educa-
tors understand to be poor judgment of a sort that adolescents commonly exhibit without
regard to any disability. The cases are reminiscent of the problem that psychology poses
for criminal law (Valverde, 1998).
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter documents a tension between educational and medical approaches to han-
dling the symptoms of inattention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity in the context of the
legal system – one of the major arenas in which jurisdiction claims are made (Abbott,
1988). Prior work does not examine the conflict between medicine and education, because
it assumes that educators do not or are not able to challenge the free movement of medical
categories through educational institutions. However, the hearings, which take the form of
disputes about eligibility, placement, drug use, and student discipline, document clashes
between medical and educational points of view. The reconciliation of medical and educa-
tional approaches within the legal system reveals a re-configured object — one that bal-
ances the individualizing and objectifying tendencies of medical knowledge with the equi-
table and remedial functions of education and law. More broadly, I show that what ADHD
means in practice is determined by interaction among doctors, the medication, children,
parents, teachers, school administrators, lawyers, hearing officers and legislators. These ac-
tors apply different logics, and the category moves through different institutions, but the
resulting object is sufficiently stable to provide a means of communication and sufficiently
flexible to allow for different interpretations (Bowker and Star, 2000).
The clashes provide evidence of the normal state of affairs in which the use of the
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ADHD category in schools is regulated by educational authorities, so that they can avoid
“medicalization” and protect their jurisdiction. They document a tension between a medi-
cal category that assumes that a heterogeneous set of symptoms stem from a central neu-
rological processing deficiency and an educational category that sees behavioral and cogni-
tive symptoms (and the children that exhibit them) through separate lenses. Differentiat-
ing children with primarily behavioral or cognitive symptoms allows educators to develop
programs that provide a better fit to teacher training, respond to needs for classroom dis-
cipline, and facilitate the different needs of children. Teachers and schools embrace med-
ication as a way to treat symptoms, and there is evidence of medicalized approaches by
schools in dealing with behavioral issues. But educators typically reinterpret the medical
category as it pertains to the ontology of “attention.” In sum, educators do not concede




When Leon Eisenberg (the researcher that performed the first scientific drug trials in
child psychiatry in the 1960s) died, his obituary in the New York Times (Carey, 2009)
highlighted two interesting facts. One, Dr. Eisenberg was deemed “courageous” by Keith
Conners (another early drug researcher) for denouncing the psychoanalytic approach to
treating children, an approach that favored “rich kids” and was unscientific. Two, Dr. Eisen-
berg had become disenchanted late in life with the use of the ADHD diagnosis because it
“morphed from a relative[ly] uncommon condition ... to one whose current prevalence is 8
percent” [and growing] for no “self evident” reason.1 In other words, what started as an ef-
fort to use science to reach those children that psychoanalysis and schools were failing to
reach evolved into something that benefits wealthier families whose children need to en-
hance their performance in schools. How this happened is the story of my dissertation.
I argue that ADHD prevalence has increased during the past two decades to an ex-
tent far beyond any level that environmental factors can explain and at a time and place
that is inconsistent with medical imperialism. As shown in Chapter 1, the category did
not emerge when conditions were optimal for a medicalization process to occur. Research
on children in institutional care in the 1930s and 1940s identified a connection between
brain damage and emotional and behavioral abnormalities, discovered the calming effects
of stimulant drugs on hyperactive behaviors, and developed a way to use technology to
link drug responses to neuroanatomical features of the brain. At that time, there was no
serious opponent to medical expansion. But the category did not emerge for nearly half a
century – not until the power of the medical profession had diminished considerably.
The formation of new identities around disability shaped a milieu in which the disor-
der could thrive (Lakoff, 2000). When deinstitutionalization returned children with severe
mental illnesses or developmental disabilities to public school systems, new ways of edu-
cating children with those conditions had to be developed. In addition, new categories of
1According to the New York Times, Dr. Conners referred to the rising diagnostic rate at a recent medi-
cal conference as “’a national diaster of dangerous proportions” ’ (Schwarz, 2013b).
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school-specific disabilities were created in response to the federal government’s increased
role in education. The effort to ensure equal access to schooling and to raise achievement
levels led to the problematization of unexplained underachievement – specifically, under-
achievement that could not be explained by intellectual deficits or poverty. This was the
specific precursor to the new categories of hyperkinesis and learning disabilities – both of
which formed as alternatives to the minimal brain dysfunction (MBD) category. Where
the former category was of little use outside of the institutional context, these new school-
specific disabilities extended the reach of disability identities to new groups of children.
The advocates of hyperkinesis and learning disabilities pursued different goals and rep-
resented different constituencies. The learning disabilities category was carved out first in
the political arena and became a part of the special education legal regime. It responded
to the problem of unexplained learning challenges affecting children from high socioeco-
nomic status backgrounds. The hyperkinesis category initially responded to the problem
of hyperactivity in boys from low socioeconomic status backgrounds, in part because of
a perceived improvement in the activity levels of children that used stimulant drugs (and
were unable to afford psychoanalytic treatments). Hyperkinesis later evolved into atten-
tion deficit disorder, which officially entered the psychiatric lexicon in 1980. The renam-
ing of the disorder resulted from the involvement of new groups of experts – psychologists,
neuropsychologists, and other medical professionals – who came to view attention as the
core deficit of the syndrome. Ultimately, the trajectories of the two disorders reversed:
learning disabilities became a residual category for poorer children who were shifted out of
the mental retardation category as a result of legal pressure to limit its application (Ong-
Dean, 2006), while attention deficit disorders became a category associated with perfor-
mance enhancement of high-income, white children. Drug studies reached progressively
broader groups of children as researchers became interested in the problem of medical solu-
tions to learning difficulties, and the psychologists and other new medical specialists began
to focus on the cognitive aspects of attention. As a result, the demographics of the cate-
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gory began to shift towards high SES students, particularly as parents began to identify
with the label themselves.
The introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s also played a role in the de-
velopment of the medical category. When the federal government began to assume an in-
creased share of responsibility for the costs of mental health care, the biological/categorical
approach to mental disorders was adopted (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005). This led to in-
creased reliance on pharmaceutical treatments rather than psychoanalytic care aimed at
the wealthy. Although psychiatrists had advocated for the use of stimulant drugs to treat
hyperactive children who could not afford other remedies, drugs were not seen as an exclu-
sive remedy until the 1990s. I show in Chapter 2 that the hypotheses that form the core
of the medicalization argument are not supported by empirical data. Prevalence and treat-
ment are not associated with physician density or marketing regulation. Moreover, white
and high-income students are the groups most likely to use drugs as stand-alone treat-
ments. Although parents appear to be a key driver of diagnosis and stimulant drug use,
their selective use of stimulants (particularly among the economically advantaged) (King
et al., 2014) undermines the claim of medical dominance and suggests collaboration in-
stead (Moreira, 2006).
In Chapters 3 and 4, I show that the success of the category is attributable to the par-
ticularities of the institutions in which the diagnosis is embedded. Medical recognition
provides a way through which parents can challenge the way their children are treated
at school and in other institutional settings, so the ADHD diagnosis and the medication
treatment usually are successful in translating the interests and coordinating the actions
of schools, teachers, parents, and children. The conception of expertise that underlies the
disorder, however, is distributed across these actors and is jointly maintained among them.
Looping effects are also part of the network. Although experts created the classifications
MBD, hyperactivity, attention deficit disorders, and so on, the patients/consumers make
them their own, and experts ultimately must confront the new types of patients by mak-
206
ing additional changes to the diagnostic criteria. I show that those changes, in turn, can
act on patients/consumers, affecting the age characteristics, the gender ratio, the socioe-
conomic divide, etc. Moreover, it is clear that a better understanding of the category can
lead to a greater likelihood of agreement among caretakers (such as the fact that hyperac-
tivity is a characteristic of young boys), making it more likely that behaviors of boys are
identified as hyperactive and treated as requiring medical intervention. Furthermore, al-
though medicalization portrays the disorder as a reaction to disruptive behavior in schools,
I show in Chapter 3 that it is used by economically advantaged students as a cognitive
disorder that helps them to respond to relative weaknesses in schools where demands are
higher. This means that students in wealthier schools are more likely to be diagnosed.
Although the medical category ADHD is an object flexibly used in different ways by
medical professionals, insurance companies, the criminal justice and civil justice systems,
parents and schools, medical expertise is not. Rather, medical knowledge disrupts educa-
tional practices, whether related to assessments, eligibility determinations, programming,
or school discipline. The version of medicalization theory that claims that wealthy parents
are simply engines of medicalization is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the category
ADHD is not strictly medical; it is shaped in schools into an object that includes educa-
tional and medical understandings of children’s behavioral and cognitive problems. Edu-
cators have not conceded jurisdiction over childhood cognitive and behavioral problems to
medical explanations or experts, except when doing so fulfills educational needs, as shown
in Chapter 4. Accordingly, although the medical frame was a “starting point of an analy-
sis, a sign of the need for an analysis, ... it should not be the conclusion of [the] analysis”
(Rose, 2007, pp. 701-702). As I show, the spread of the medical category ADHD in fact
says little about the way that the category is used by parents and children.
This study has several limitations. The large, nationally-representative datasets used
in Chapter 2 do not allow for exploration of school and community effects. Nor could I use
those data to answer questions about symptoms and their relationship to diagnoses and
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treatment. The dataset used in Chapter 3 allowed for examination of symptoms, schools
factors, and longitudinal trajectories, but the small sample sizes undermined the ability
to obtain accurate estimates of many of the macro-level factors contributing to diagnosis
and treatment. The gaps between waves made it difficult fully to understand the process
through which relative deficits in the classroom led to diagnoses and treatment. Further-
more, both of those analyses show that parents are active in securing diagnoses and med-
ical treatments, but they leave open the possibility that parents are merely “drivers” of a
medicalization process. In other words, neither of those quantitative analyses fully respond
to the question of whether the institutionalized category – as opposed to the medical cat-
egory – is truly “medical.” Furthermore, the quantitative studies are dated: they do not
account for diagnostic practices after DSM-5. The examination of disputes in Chapter 4
is useful for observing the nature of clashes between parents and schools, but the relative
infrequency of hearings means that we know little about what happens in the absence of
a legal dispute. Future qualitative research is needed to understand how and under what
conditions teachers respond to deficiencies in the non-cognitive skills of students, how and
under what conditions teachers begin to ascribe medical causes to those deficiencies, and
how, how often, and under what conditions disputes with parents begin to unfold.
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APPENDIX
The first two editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association in 1952 and 1968, preceded the
rise of biological psychiatry (First, 2010). DSM-I included the subcategory, Adjustment
Reaction of Childhood, listed in the Personality Disorders category under the title Tran-
sient Situational Personality Disorders. The subcategory was divided into three disorders –
habit disturbance, conduct disturbance, and neurotic traits. DSM-I did not refer to disor-
ders of inattention, impulsivity, or hyperactivity, but identified “learning disturbances” as
one of several “special symptom reactions,” along with speech disturbance and enuresis.
In DSM-II, “conduct disturbance” disappears. A new section, “Behavior Disorders of
Childhood and Adolescence,” describes seven behavior disorders: hyperkinetic reaction,
withdrawing reaction of childhood, overanxious reaction, runaway reaction, unsocialized
aggressive reaction, group delinquent reaction, and other reaction of childhood or adoles-
cence. DSM-II defined the diagnostic criteria for hyperkinetic reaction as follows: “This
disorder is characterized by overactivity, restlessness, distractibility, and short attention
span, especially in young children; the behavior usually diminishes by adolescence.” This
definition was followed by one sentence concerning differential diagnosis: “If this behav-
ior is caused by organic brain damage, it should be diagnosed under the appropriate non-
psychotic organic brain syndrome.” With this differential diagnosis requirement, organic
brain damage was no longer presumed, and in fact cases associated with organic brain
damage were specifically excluded. The label hyperkinetic reaction syndrome reflected the
understanding that hyperactivity was a central symptom that was characteristic of chil-
dren commonly referred to child guidance clinics (Russell, 1942; Childers, 2009). DSM-II
described “learning disturbances” as “specific learning disturbances” and still listed them as
“special symptoms.”
The following table displays changes in the DSM across seven important dimensions,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.1: Map Showing Geographic Variation in ADHD Prevalence, Prescription Drug




































Strattera Use Among Diagnosed
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Figure A.2: Co-Morbid Conditions, by Race, for Children, Ages 4-17, with an ADHD












Table A.2: Distribution of State Education Agency Decisions by State
State Number of Decisions State Number of Decisions
Alabama 61 Mississippi 2
Alaska 4 Missouri 8
Arizona 8 Montana 1
Arkansas 19 North Carolina 6
California 145 New Hampshire 16
Colorado 7 New Jersey 37
Connecticut 31 New Mexico 4
District of Columbia 4 New York 163
Delaware 10 Nevada 2
Florida 14 Ohio 6
Georgia 27 Oregon 25
Hawaii 11 Pennsylvania 100
Idaho 1 Rhode Island 2
Illinois 40 South Carolina 4
Indiana 16 Tennessee 8
Iowa 15 Texas 138
Kansas 6 Utah 2
Maine 27 Virginia 11
Massachusetts 95 Vermont 14
Maryland 36 West Virginia 2
Michigan 20 Washington 10
Minnesota 29 Wisconsin 17
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Implementation of IEP 27
Personnel 5
Programs and services 419
Private school costs 182
Discipline
Behavior plan 10
Manifestation determinations 76
Other discipline 144
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